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7 September 1984

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GROUP FORMS TO PUSH FOR NORDIC NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE

First Meeting in Oslo

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 6 Aug 84 p 3

[Article by Morten Moller Warmedal]

[Text] "Treaty Now" is the name of a joint Nordic action for a Nordic nuclear-free zone which held its first meeting in Oslo on Saturday. Eva Nordland, Rachel Pedersen and Wenche Aamodt Soranger took the initiative and they want to stress coordinating work in the Nordic region for a nuclear-free zone. The goal is to have the Nordic parliaments approve a treaty on the zone issue in 1985.

Around 50 people from the entire Nordic region met in Toyen Community House on Saturday to take part in the founding of Treaty Now. Associate professor Eva Nordland told AFTENPOSTEN that the attendance was what had been expected in view of the short notice given and the fact that the meeting was held in the vacation period.

The three people behind the group, who were responsible for the peace march to Paris in 1981, see the work for ratification of treaties establishing a Nordic nuclear-free zone as a continuation of the peace work done earlier. Action will take place on two levels: a popular mobilization and active lobbying of politicians. Eva Nordland is hoping for substantial support from the group of Nordic parliamentary members that will meet in Copenhagen in October to discuss the zone issue.

Treaty Now is aimed at coordinating efforts for a Nordic nuclear-free zone. There is no direct connection between the organization No to Nuclear Arms and Treaty Now. Eva Nordland stressed that it is essential to come a step further with peace work and that there are big opportunities in gathering the various peace groups in the Nordic lands in a joint effort for one issue.

Treaty Now has a council with members from the Nordic countries. In addition to the main office in Oslo there are offices in the capitals of Denmark, Sweden and Finland.

In her introduction Eva Nordland pointed out that Treaty Now must help give politicians the strength to advocate practical measures against the arms buildup. She reminded her audience that there is no such thing as isolated security and that work in the Nordic region must be part of a larger solution with nuclear-free zones in both East and West.

She stressed that someone must begin to break the institutionalized vicious circle where international relations are based on power communications and traditions of violence.

Storting representative Reiulf Steen of the Labor Party also addressed the meeting. He recalled that work for a Nordic nuclear-free zone based on a treaty is an obligation in view of Norway's membership in the United Nations. He hoped the treaty work would lead to a realization that any strategy that includes the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons is an immoral strategy.

"The freeze movement has become a real power factor, especially in the United States. No responsible politician in Norway can still stand up and defend the atom bomb in a security policy debate. The peace movement can take the credit for that," said Steen who said that efforts for arms reduction and peace should not be scaled down. "Frustration should not be allowed to spread. In that case the results we have achieved so far might be lost," said Reiulf Steen.

Platform on NATO, COB Agreement

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 7 Aug 84 p 3

[Article by Morten Moller Warmedal]

[Text] A revision of Norway's defense agreement with the United States and Great Britain, a rejection of the COB [Collocated Operating Base (agreement by which USAF planes would use Danish or Norwegian air force bases during war emergency)] agreement and a rejection of Norwegian participation in NATO's nuclear planning group, but continued Norwegian membership in NATO. These are the goals of Treaty Now, a Nordic peace action that wants all Nordic parliaments to approve the establishment of an isolated Nordic nuclear-free zone in 1985.

Treaty Now had its first meeting last weekend and yesterday the organization presented the result of this first initiative for a coordinated effort for a Nordic nuclear-free zone. Associate professor Eva Nordland, Wenche Aamodt Soranger and Rachel Pedersen are the Norwegian sponsors who were also behind the peace march to Paris in 1981.

The Nordic representatives of Treaty Now who were present at the press conference yesterday denied that the goal of a joint Nordic zone resolution would lead to Denmark, Iceland and Norway leaving NATO.

Consequences

The organization admitted that it had not done much in the way of evaluating the security policy consequences of a Storting resolution on an isolated Nordic nuclear-free zone. Defense cooperation with the NATO countries should be maintained, but "certain agreements" must be revised and we must repudiate NATO's first-strike strategy and the current nuclear strategy.

This means that the organization wants an end to Norway's participation in NATO's nuclear planning group. This raises questions about our alliance affiliation in a crisis when Norway is supposed to receive forces from the United States and Canada that would be capable of using nuclear weapons from Norwegian territory.

Hope

When Eva Nordland was asked if she didn't think it was totally unrealistic to think that Storting would approve the establishment of a Nordic nuclear-free zone in the course of just 1 year, she replied that popular involvement in this issue in the Nordic region along with increasing sympathy among politicians with regard to the zone question provided hope for a joint Nordic resolution. Treaty Now will use a number of approaches to influence the politicians while at the same time it will mobilize the grass roots.

Isolated

Treaty Now views the proposal for a Nordic nuclear-free zone as an outline for global arms reduction. However the zone must be set up on an isolated basis with the hope that the other European countries will eventually follow suit. "We have continuous contacts with international peace groups, especially in the Balkans and in Latin America," said Eva Nordland.

The treaty in which the organization is putting its trust is a document prepared by international law expert Jens Evensen. The document is a starting point for further revision of the text of the treaty.

Fiasco

Helge Sivertsen, a well-known opponent of nuclear arms, called the action valuable. He said the latest deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe was a fiasco for the diplomacy of threats.

"The tactic of negotiating from a position of strength has failed. We need to establish East-West cooperation based on trust and the women who coordinate Treaty Now are serving as an impetus in this effort," he said.

Treaty Now will mark the occasion of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August 1945 by using the time until 9 August of next year as an action year with the slogan, "Treaty Now."

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CSO: 3639/147

SORSUNNATA PEACE GROUP HOLDS FIRST NATIONAL CONGRESS

Godthaab GRONLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 1 Aug 84 p 5

[Article: "Peace Groups in Eight Towns"]

[Text] Soon there will be peace groups in eight towns in Greenland. They are Qasigiannnguit, Aasiaat, Ilulissat, Oqaatsut, Narsaq, Uummannaq, Qeqertarsuaq, and Godthaab. This was announced at the peace movement's first national congress, held on 20 and 21 July in Qasigiannnguit.

About 30 extremely active "peace workers" participated in the congress. Most were from Qasigiannnguit and Aasiaat. The national congress was formally opened by Mayor Themothaeus Frederiksen (Siumut Party) [moderate leftist party favoring greater local autonomy], who said it was about time a peace movement was established in Greenland. He added that, even though Greenland was an out-of-the-way place, it could be bombed by a simple push of a button.

The congress concluded by electing members of its Executive Committee: Peter Christiansen, Baltser Andersen, Amalie Josefsen, Tittus Gronvold, and Daniel Petersen from Qasigiannnguit, Tony Bisgaard from Narsaq, and Hans Peter Kristensen from Aasiaat.

Sorsunnata hopes to participate in the North Atlantic peace meeting to be held in Reykjavik this year. Sorsunnata will send Hans Peter Kristensen and Karno Reimer as its representatives, if the home-rule government allocates funds for travel expenses.

This national congress helped strengthen the organizational structure of the peace movement. It was decided that the congress would be the supreme organ of Sorsunnata. Several working groups were appointed: a finance committee, a newspaper committee to keep the membership informed, and a public relations committee for publicity among nonmembers. The headquarters will remain in Qasigiannnguit at the home of Baltser Andersen, a teacher.

In order to increase awareness of Sorsunnata, the organization distributes a newspaper, with a total circulation of 4,000, to labor unions and local party organizations throughout the country.

DEBATE ARISES OVER GROUP PROMOTING 'ZONE'

Reiulf Steen's Backing Denounced

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 8 Aug 84 p 2

[Editorial: "No Treaty Now"]

[Text] An organization calling itself Treaty Now is presently being formed. The goal is to achieve a treaty establishing a nuclear-free Nordic zone before the parliamentary elections next year. Jens Evensen's draft will serve as a model for the treaty sought by the group, which organizers claim will include organizations and members of parliament from all the Nordic countries. At a press conference in Oslo on Monday, the organizers maintained that the withdrawal of Denmark, Iceland, and Norway from NATO was not one of the group's goals.

Both this theme and Mr Evensen's draft treaty are well known from the continuing debate of the past 2 years--a debate most people believed would be put to rest after the disarmament and security compromise in parliament last winter. According to this compromise, a possible treaty establishing a nuclear-free Nordic zone must be seen in a broader European context. Any such treaty must be based on a joint effort by the European NATO countries and North America and it must include lasting, verifiable solutions reached through negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Since this agreement was reached in parliament, nothing has happened in the international arena to change its fundamental principles. Nor has the newly founded organization offered any new arguments. For this reason, and because we are gradually approaching parliamentary elections here in Norway, we doubt that the organization Treaty Now will even come close to achieving its goal.

Thus, we are surprised to see that the former chairman of the Labor Party, Reiulf Steen, acted as a cheerleader at the founding of the group. Of course, we know that Steen almost instinctively contradicts the present leadership of the party, but he participated in the compromise in parliament last winter where--we repeat--the question of a treaty establishing a nuclear-free Nordic zone was not seen as an isolated initiative, but as part of events in Europe as a whole. Thus, it is not entirely reassuring that such a prominent Labor

Party member as Reiulf Steen is breaking out on his own and demanding "action now." We assume that the responsible leadership of the party will explain this phenomenon.

We also would like to caution against believing that this group is not seeking the withdrawal of Norway from NATO. Many idealistic standard-bearers of the peace movement actually are NATO supporters. They are used to justify the assertion that the movement supports continued membership in the alliance. These people simply do not understand that it is impossible to be for NATO and, at the same time, oppose the policies of the Western alliance. Many, however, now understand this faulty logic. This is why the anti-NATO parties such as the Socialist Left Party and the Norwegian Communist Party immediately supported the No to Nuclear Weapons movement and now support the new organization Treaty Now.

Thus, responsible peace advocates should support adequate disarmament measures in Europe--with lasting results. Treaty Now is not the way to go.

Defense Committee MP Attacks Steen

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Aug 84 p 3

[Article by Morten Moller Warmedal]

[Text] "If the group Treaty Now is successful in establishing a unilateral nuclear-free Nordic zone, it will represent a Norwegian departure from NATO principles. It is somewhat surprising that Reiulf Steen supports this movement," Thor Knudsen (Conservative Party), deputy chairman of the Defense Committee in parliament, told AFTENPOSTEN.

A new Nordic organization held its first meeting last weekend. Its goal is to unite Nordic peace activists in support of a nuclear-free Nordic zone. Treaty Now wants the Nordic parliaments to approve a treaty on the zone issue in 1985.

The proposed nuclear-free Nordic zone is nothing new. This latest effort by the peace movement, under the leadership of Eva Nordland, is seen as an attempt to take the offensive. To a great extent, this has been a "dead issue" since last May when the Foreign Affairs Committee in parliament reached a compromise in connection with the parliamentary report on security and disarmament.

"Treaty Now maintains that it is not seeking a Norwegian withdrawal from NATO, but the consequences of parliamentary approval of such a treaty are clear, considering our relationship to NATO," Thor Knudsen said.

"If we approve unilateral disarmament in the Nordic countries or throughout the West, we will be in conflict with the parliamentary resolution of 24 May. Following the proposal made by Treaty Now would mean a departure from NATO. My understanding is that the organization wants Norway to renounce the possession and use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances," Knudsen said.

The organization maintains that Norway must revise several aspects of its military cooperation with NATO, but that Norway should remain a member of NATO.

"A decision in favor of unilateral disarmament without placing the issue of a nuclear-free Nordic zone in the context of joint Western negotiations would mean that we renounce the element of deterrence inherent in the possibility that the West could use nuclear weapons. This is the opposite of a security policy," Knudsen said.

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CSO: 3639/149

SUPREME COURT ON FRENCH LANGUAGE IN MANITOBA

Ottawa Proposal Puzzles Judges

Montreal LE DEVOIR in French 12 Jun 84 pp 1, 10

[Article by Rodolphe Morissette]

[Text] More than one judge on Canada's Supreme Court is perplexed at the solution offered by Ottawa to extricate the Manitoba government from the legal imbroglio over the rights of the province's French-speaking citizens, in which it has been trapped for 95 years.

The highest court in the land yesterday began hearing arguments from the parties to this constitutional super-suit: first the Canadian government's side, yesterday, and then Manitoba's. Since both parties acknowledge their inability to find a political solution to the problem of French-speaking minority rights in Manitoba, they have taken their cases to the high court.

What they are, in essence, asking the court to do is to decide as to whether Article 23 of Manitoba law, like Article 133 of Canada's Constitution, really requires the province to promulgate all its laws and statutes in French as well as English.

Should the Supreme Court find all the legislation and statutes enacted since 1890 invalid on the grounds that they were promulgated only in English, how can the provincial legislative assembly possibly avoid "chaos"? The Federal Government is asking the Supreme Court to order Manitoba to translate into French, within the next 2 years, the 4,000 or so laws and regulations now at issue. Meanwhile, Ottawa suggests, the Court could declare the laws valid ... /ad interim/ on grounds of /public necessity/.

"We're in a strait-jacket," cried Judge Willard Estey. Judge Jean Beetz took a dim view of the Ottawa proposal: "What makes you think a ruling from this particular Court would have any more force (than all the previous ones)?"

Ottawa's Attorney General Pierre Genest had just reminded all that the case had been brought before the Manitoban courts on several occasions. These courts had held "ultra vires" the Act of 1890 amending Manitoba's constitution, which had been adopted 20 years earlier, and made English thenceforward the sole official language of the province, the sole language of the Legislative Assembly, and the sole language of the courts.

To questions from Judges Estey and Beetz, Mr Genest replied simply that there is no really pertinent precedent. Judge Bertha Wilson returned to the attack: "You advance the idea of impending chaos ... Within what limits could one apply such a principle? How is one to assess the situation practically?"

The Solution

The judges would very much like to have some hard and clear-cut facts as to the time the translation job would take.

"Assuming that we accede to your request," said Judge Beetz, "and then the 2 years are up and the translations are not finished... Are they going to come traipsing back before us and ask for an extension?" Attorney General Genest replied that it is up to Manitoba to demonstrate that the time allotted is too short.

Judge Estey lost patience: "What is this 2-years stuff? Some kind of hocus-pocus? Or are we still talking about the law?" He added, a moment later, ironically: "And what if it should take them 3 years? Does that make us (the Supreme Court) baby-sitters on all this stuff?"

In the matter of Attorney Roger Bilodeau, the Manitoba Appellate Court had ruled in July 1981 that Article 23 (Manitoba Constitution) and Article 133 (Canadian Constitution), which are worded almost identically, do not constitute an obligation, but merely a suggestion for future action. The Manitoban Government plans to sustain that position in the days ahead.

If, however, he said, the Supreme Court vacates all laws and regulations enacted as of today, the Pawley government will ask the Court to refrain from imposing "spurious deadlines."

Since the Supreme Court ruled, in December 1979, on both the matter of Georges Forest and on the French Charter of the Levesque Government in Quebec (laws and regulations promulgated in only one language are unconstitutional), Manitoba, as of 1980, had translated only nine of its 115 laws. In 1981, none of the 49 laws passed that year were translated. From the first session in 1982 to the final session of this year (February), only 63 newly enacted laws out of a total of 161 were promulgated in both languages.

Attorney General Genest also lit into the way the Manitoba government at the time dealt with the French version: it was approved only much later, after all the necessary imprimaturs had been obtained. He argues that both versions must go together through the legislative process, from first to third reading, in both official languages. At issue, in his view, is primarily the language in which official documents are published.

Should the Supreme Court finally rule that the 29,000 or so pages of official documents of the Manitoban legislature are invalid, the Pawley Government suggest another way out of the horrendous mess that would ensue. We could, he points out, call on the power to reserve decision or the power of disclaimer vested in the Lieutenant Governor, or, in other words, in the Federal cabinet.

Mr Genest had some ironic comment on this "unaccustomed and surprising" proposal": here we have the Solicitor General of a province asking the Federal government to keep an Argus eye on his province's legislative process. "In so doing, we should be giving the Federal Cabinet full discretion to pass judgment on the validity of provincial laws." There, he concluded, you have a heretofore totally unknown pattern for Federal-Provincial negotiation...

Appearing this week before the seven judges hearing this case is the Franco-Manitoban Society. After it will come the Quebec government, the Federation of French-speakers Outside Quebec, Counsellor Roger Bilodeau, the Anglo-Quebecois Alliance-Quebec group and the Free Choice Movement (of Quebec).

To wind up the week, a group of Anglo-Manitobans will follow spokesmen for the Pawley government to address the bench.

Manitoba Argument Debated

Montreal LE DEVOIR in French 13 Jun 84 pp 1, 10

[Article by Rodolphe Morissette: Hard Lines for Manitoba]

[Text] In the questions they asked at the end of yesterday afternoon, the justices of Canada's Supreme Court warned attorneys for Manitoba's government that they were sailing into some very stormy seas. Their first quarter-hour of argument over the rights of Franco-Manitobans was rough indeed.

Counsellor Kerr Twaddle spoke on behalf of the Pawley government. With his first words he drove straight at the heart of the quarrel: Article 23 of Manitoba Law, like Article 133 of the Canadian Constitution, does not place an "obligation" upon the province to promulgate all its laws and regulations in both official languages. On the contrary: the law is merely a "suggestion" for future procedures.

"If these provisions are merely suggestive," interrupted Chief Justice Brian Dickson, "what is their effect?"

"Manitoba's laws and regulations are therefore valid," replied Mr Twaddle. "Failing to follow this "suggestion" in no way invalidates acts of the legislature."

"Ergo, if the issue here is mere suggestions," suggested Justice Willard Estey, "there is nothing here for us to set right and Manitoba may go on doing what it is doing now..."

Counsellor Twaddle backed down: he admitted that, yes, two orders from the County Court, one in 1892 and one in 1909, had ruled the 1890 decision of the Manitoba legislature to make English the sole official language of the province /ultra vires/. But, he added, "we had no knowledge of those actions until Judge Alfred Molin cited them (in a minority opinion from the Manitoba Appellate Court in July 1981)."

In fact, Counsellor Twaddle explained, it was not until December 1979 -- when the Supreme Court ruled in the same sense on Quebec's French Charter and in the matter of Georges Forest vs. Manitoba -- that "we felt ourselves bound" by Articles 23 and 133...

The justices' jaws dropped. Justice Estey: "Does that mean, then, that all laws enacted in English alone since 13 December 1979 would be invalid?" Counsel does not think so. In reply to Justice Antonio Lamer, Counsellor Twaddle says that Article 23 is merely advisory, even since December 1979. Three seconds later, he adds: well, yes, the provision is mandatory, but that failure to apply it does not invalidate laws passed without it.

Several seconds of confusion. The justices scrunch down deeper into their great scarlet chairs. Counsellor Twaddle picks up the thread of his argument.

"How can anybody declare the archives, transcripts, and journals of both legislative chambers invalid?" It is getting late, though, so the Court adjourns until this morning. The justices have been sitting for 15 minutes when the Manitoba advocate tardily shows up. All observers are expecting heavy weather.

Earlier in the day, Counsellor Gerald Beaudoin, representing the Federation of French-Speakers Outside Quebec, reminded the Court that it was the intention even of the provinces that founded Canada in 1867, as it was that of the Manitoban leaders who did likewise in 1870, to make use of both languages mandatory in all legislative acts of the province: otherwise it would be meaningless to talk of constitutional "guarantees."

Furthermore, said Mr Beaudoin, "A constitutional guarantee perforce entails nullity (if it is not respected), otherwise it would not be a guarantee." The District Attorney also believes that the

initial articles of the enabling Act of Article 23, passed by Manitoba in 1980 after the Supreme Court had handed down its decision in December 1979, are invalid as well.

It is not enough, he argued, to claim compliance with the Constitution when you simply translate, after passage, laws enacted solely in English: simultaneity, on the contrary, is mandatory; neither version may take precedence over the other, and both must be adopted, ratified, and promulgated at the same time.

As for the remedy the Supreme Court ought -- or ought not -- to decree to get Manitoba out of the chaotic situation it would be in should the Court rule that all laws and regulations passed by the Manitoba legislature for the past 95 years are null and void, Counsellor Beaudoin says the Court need not worry its honorable head. It will not be the Court that will create any obligation whatsoever upon the Manitoban government (ordering it to translate all its laws, past and future, for example). Rather; by virtue of its powers to interpret the Constitution, it "says" what the law is; as for any obligations that may stem from that legal opinion, it is "the Constitution, not the Court, which create them."

The parties here are a long way from agreement as to what steps to take to rescue the Manitoban government from its juridical Catch-22. On Monday, the Federal Government asked the Court to order the provincial government to translate, within 2 years, all 4,000 laws enacted over the past 95 years and which are now presumed to be null and void.

Counsel Joseph Eliot Magnet, who represents the Franco-Manitoban Society, would prefer a political solution: leave it to the Manitoba government to adopt a resolution in which the province would stipulate itself the ways and means it will use to extricate itself and how much time it will take.

At several points, however, Justice Jean Beetz objected: "Given this assumption, there is still the risk that we may find ourselves looking at a legal vacuum (the time until all laws have been translated into French)..."

Counsellor Magnet assures the Court that it can all be done in the space of 12 months, and maybe in three. Justice Estey is skeptical: "Supposing that the staggering scope of the task is cited, one fine day, by the Assembly as an excuse for washing its hands of the whole thing?" Justice Beetz also thinks that the Manitoba government could wiggle out again by some ruse such as passing a resolution amending Article 23 of Manitoba Law. Such an amendment to the Constitution could be defeated by one or two votes. And that would be the end of it."

Unlike the Ottawa spokesmen, who invoke the doctrine of "public necessity" to persuade the Court to impose obligations and deadlines on Manitoba in the matter of translation, Counsellor Magnet pins his plea on the theory of the government's "de facto mandate."

That doctrine holds that the legality of the Manitoba Legislative Assembly is rooted in the 1870 Constitution which created it, and not in the constitutionality of any law or laws it may have enacted since then. Should, for example, the province's election law be found null and void today because it was read and enacted in only one language, there would be no effect on the "reality" of the citizens who elected a government, of the existence of a body of municipalities, or a judicial system, or of a Legislative Assembly.

Attorney Stephen Scott, pleading the case of an Anglo-Quebecois group known as Alliance-Quebec, has a far more radical solution in mind. He wants the Supreme Court to provide the best possible insurance of the juridical continuity of the Manitoba government by ordering new legislative elections under an election law enacted beforehand and promulgated in both languages.

Manitoba French Rights Deliberated

Montreal LE DEVOIR in French 14 Jun 84 pp 1, 10

[Article by Rodolphe Morissette: "Manitoba Plea-Bargaining"]

[Text] Before the Supreme Court of Canada, the leaders of Manitoba's government were engaged all day yesterday in plea-bargaining on their theoretical position on French minority rights in that province. On the other hand, they were more than merely reluctant to translate all the laws enacted by their province into French.

Attorney Kerr Twaddle, who represents Mr Howard Pawley's Neo-Democratic Party, explained that the laws enacted in Manitoba, which do nothing but amend laws enacted earlier, do not need to be translated into French. The province, he said would translate only "those of the 'old' laws that are pertinent to the French population." The Manitoba case the Court has been hearing since Monday aims at finding the least ridiculous possible way out of the the juridical briarpatch, uniquely Canadian, that has sprouted from the fact that the province, despite its own constitution and that of Canada, has debated, enacted, and promulgated every one of its laws since 1890 in English only.

Joining with the Franco-Manitoban Society and other groups, the Federal Government argues that all these laws are null and void. The seven justices approached the question by seeking enlightenment as to what could be done in such circumstances.

The justices questioned Mr Twaddle as to the time it would take [to translate all the Anglophone laws into French]. He told Justice Antonio Lamer that it would take the province 10 years to translate "only the important laws." Among those he excluded from the "important category" were all private laws. He also ruled out all emergency laws. "Ten years," he repeated to Chief Justice Brian Dickson: "That would be our final pullback position."

"What would you say to 2 or 3 years?" prodded Justice Willard Estey.

"That would be all right too," replied Mr Twaddle, adding: "And the same length of time for translating the regulations." In the end, the District Attorney declared that Manitoba would agree to the deadlines the Court imposed, if indeed it did impose any.

Chief Justice Dickson wanted to know what Manitoba would do if the Court were to declare every law passed only in English by the province null and void. The province, replied Mr Twaddle, would try to pass an amendment to its constitution to that effect, with the approval of Ottawa. He could not, however, guarantee that the government would be able to "persuade the Legislative Assembly to do that."

The fact of the matter is that the Pawley government failed to bring the Assembly around last February.

The justice returns to the attack.

"And what if the government can't bring them around?" "At that point there would be no laws for governing the State, no more provincial courts, no laws to permit the government to raise taxes or to spend money."

"But just how could the provincial government extricate itself from such a bind?" Justice Dickson asked, pressing his point.

"All it would require would be for you to rule that our laws are valid," he replied. "There is nothing else you can do. And if you don't do it, you'll be creating a province outside the Constitution."

Mr Twaddle then set about explaining why, as he saw it, the Court must declare all Manitoban laws enacted up to this very day valid. That stated, he proceeded to unroll a whole string of possible bargains.

His main argument ran like this: "Granted, the Supreme Court, in the matter of Georges Forest (December 1979) had ordered Manitoba from then on, to pass and promulgate its laws in both French and English. The obligation, he argued, is merely "statutory." Failure to comply, he argued, does not render the laws invalid.

Mr Twaddle argues that the men who founded Canada and Manitoba had no such intention at the beginning. The District Attorney said nothing at all about the guarantees written into these two fundamental documents for French-speaking Manitobans. "All they were trying to do was to constitute a province and give it a good government."

On Tuesday, Justice Dickson had asked him: "How, then, do you go about protecting your minorities?" Addressing the Court, Mr Twaddle sheepishly replied: "We take them to court." "You've just lost your case," blurted Justice Estey.

The Manitoban government then unfolded its fallback positions. It first asked the Supreme Court to declare all laws enacted up to now valid. As for future laws, the province would fulfill its obligations.

Second retreat: instead of declaring all the province's laws null and void, suggested Mr Twaddle, rule instead that they are only "subject to annulment," rather than invalid. Why? Because the irregularities we see so clearly today never occurred to our ancestors. "Now here we are in this extraordinary situation in which the unthinkable has happened," said Mr Twaddle with a wry smile, alluding to 95 years of illegality.

Mr Twaddle fell back another foot or so. Of course, the new Canadian Constitution (1982) states that inasmuch as it is the supreme law of the land, "it renders inoperative all incompatible provisions in any other rule of law" (Art. 52). What we have here, said Mr Twaddle, is merely an apparent incompatibility, not one of substance. When the Trudeau government adopted this document, it could not have done so with the intention of nullifying all the laws of Manitoba, he concluded. At this point Justice Bertha Wilson indicated astonishment at these distinctions.

The Anglo-Manitoban group which since last year has savagely opposed the Pawley government's efforts to alter the Manitoba constitution and extend French-language radio and television services to the province got its day in court, with Attorney Darcy McCaffrey as its advocate.

The prosecutor warned the Court: "Refrain from massive nullification! It would be unfair to a lot of individual citizens... It would be tantamount to dropping a legal bomb on the province." The Court, he argued, should be content in this case with imposing a remedy both "just and appropriate, in harmony with individual rights," and assume a flexible position.

Lastly, the Attorney General of Canada, represented by counsellor Pierre Genest, reminded the Court that Canada, with Manitoba's

consent, asks the Court only for an opinion. "We are not asking the Court to act at all, but rather to voice an opinion saying that as of a date certain (the Federal Government is talking 2 years) Manitoba must have corrected the situation; otherwise all its laws will be held null and void."

The Court took the matter under private consideration, and did likewise with the Roger Bilodeau case, which it heard in less than an hour shortly thereafter. As for the issue, this second case, which does not ask the Court for an opinion, but for a ruling, is no different from the earlier one.

Mr Bilodeau had gone before the Manitoba Courts in 1980 and 1981 to challenge the validity of two specific laws on grounds that they had been enacted and promulgated only in English. At issue are the traffic laws, as well as the law governing the traffic courts. Mr Bilodeau had been handed a summons for speeding.

The Manitoba Appellate Court had refused to declare those laws null, because it anticipated that considerable chaos would inevitably ensue, given the impact such a ruling would have on all existing laws. It was that ruling in the summer of 1981 that gave rise to both the cases before the Supreme Court today.

In the Bilodeau case, it is not only the fate of all Manitoban law that indirectly hangs in the balance (because the rest of the laws would automatically be nullified on the same grounds); the more immediate question is this: Will Mr Bilodeau get his traffic citation quashed?

6182

CS0: 3619/77

AKEL REFUSES TO MEET KKE (INT.) SECRETARY

Nicosia 0 AGON in Greek 29 Jul 84 p 14

[Text] AKEL refused to meet a delegation of the Communist Party of Greece (Interior) which came to Cyprus to examine the prospects for a common policy on Cyprus by the political parties in Greece and in Cyprus.

This was stated in part by Giannis Baniyas, secretary general of KKE (Int.) during a press conference in Nicosia. Speaking after the conference, Baniyas said also that "AKEL refused to meet the delegation of our party (composed of himself and a party official) because of our ideological differences, as we were told. The efforts for a meeting with AKEL had started in Athens before we came to Cyprus. AKEL did not commit itself. When we came to Cyprus there were new efforts for a meeting but AKEL explained that it was not going to meet our delegation. In Cyprus we met with the president of the Republic and with political leaders.

"I found a positive attitude on a common policy on the Cyprus issue. A positive attitude on such a common policy exists among the political forces in Greece. Our party favors some form of a National Council in Greece with the participation of all political parties including those which are not represented in the Chamber of Deputies. Any solution of the Cyprus issue must provide for the removal of foreign troops from Cyprus."

7520

CSO: 3521/331

CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY ON CYPRUS REPORTED

Ali Birand Interview Cited

Nicosia O AGON in Greek 28 Jul 84 p 1

[Text] We do not know whether Soviet Vice President Kuznetsov did indeed call "savage" the Turkish invasion or whether his statement during a meeting with Greek Chamber President Alevras was quoted accurately.

If this harsh but justified term was used to describe the truly savage and barbaric Turkish invasion of Cyprus, then we are entitled to hope for a more dynamic change in Soviet policy toward Cyprus. It is known that the Soviet Union has carefully avoided for the past 10 years to condemn clearly the Turkish invasion of Cyprus just as it has avoided to ask for the withdrawal of the Turkish occupation forces, using in this case the general term "withdrawal of all foreign troops".

It is also known that beyond moral support the Soviet Union has not made any effort to force Turkey to end the occupation and to remove its troops from Cyprus. It was also said, not without justifications, that the Soviet interests are better resved by leaving the Cyprus problem unsolved since this dangerous continuation of the conflict may eventually lead to a Greek-Turkish clash and the break-up of NATO's southeastern wing.

All these reports are not arbitrary nor do they constitute anti-Soviet Propaganda. Moscow has followed until now a steady and consistent policy on Cyprus serving the Soviet interests. The USSR supported morally the Cypriot cause and did not press Turkey to force it out of Cyprus.

Lately, however, after the Turkish Cypriot pseudostate [TRNC] was declared, a shift was noted in the Soviet position toward Cyprus as even Turkish sources point out.

There is an obvious hardening of Soviet positions toward Turkey and a more positive shift toward the Greek positions. Reports that military installations are constructed with American observations and are being incorporated in the context of using Northern Cyprus as a base for American moves against pro-Soviet Arab governments, even against the Soviet Union itself, increased even more the Soviet reactions and worries.

Therefore, it Mr. Kuznetsov did indeed say what is being reported, then we witness the climax of these Soviet reactions and worries due to the recent developments in Cyprus and the turn of events on the island.

Nobody knows whether and to what extent Moscow will draw the line in its relations with Ankara because of Cyprus. But here in Cyprus we know-- and we do not believe that the Soviet policy is so naive as to ignore it --that the new situation shaping up in Cyprus is not going to develop in favor of Soviet interests in the area. On the contrary:

If the pseudostate is allowed to consolidate itself, if the Turkish army is allowed to stay on, this part of Cyprus will turn into an unsinkable aircarrier of the Americans against the Soviet Union and its allies in the area.

In other words, what the Soviet Union fears will become reality. The pseudostate which will be consolidated possibly with Soviet tolerance will become a source of danger to the Soviet Union and a permanent threat against its allies and its interests.

Anyone who can see beyond his nose can tell that following the recent developments in Cyprus, the Soviet attitude cannot remain the same. Because, in such a case, the Soviet Union itself will consolidate the "state" and will allow the creation of an American base in a critical and inflammable area which will threaten directly the security and the interests of the USSR. According to this logic, we should expect more decisive policy on Cyprus. This seems to serve the Soviet interests and we cannot rule out that at a certain point they may come close to the interests of Cyprus.

TRNC Viewed as U.S. Base

Nicosia 0 AGON in Greek 29 Jul 84 p 1

[Text] The chairman of the Executive Council of the General Staff of the Warsaw Pact forces, Soviet General Konstantin Mikhailov expressed fears that the Denktash pseudostate will be used in activities which will threaten the security of the Soviet Union.

"Certain actions lead in that direction" the Soviet general stated, adding that "the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [TRNC] will certainly be used for military purposes."

General Mikhailov noted also in his interview with Ali Birand that the situation in Cyprus is very dangerous and has political and military repercussions on the entire area. These repercussions are particularly visible on the Greek-Turkish relations.

PRAVDA Article Invoked

Nicosia 0 FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 29 Jul 84 p 3

[Text] Our antennas must always be fine-tuned to pick up any signals relating to Cyprus question, to analyse them, to evaluate them, and to compare them to previous messages so that the responsible leaderships--government and political--will be able to utilize the opportunities as they present themselves. One of the most significant messages of the last few days is a dispatch to PRAVDA by its correspondent in Nicosia. When we take into account that in Soviet documents every word is carefully selected, then we will be able to assess the significance of the report and plan accordingly.

The Soviet views on the Cyprus issue as presented in the dispatch of the PRAVDA Nicosia correspondent have shifted considerably in favor of the Cypriot rights compared to previous positions. The policy of the Turkish leadership and especially the cessationist activities of last November, that is, the declaration of the "state" and the subsequent decisions of the Turkish leadership are specifically condemned.

Beyond that, the Soviet newspaper clarifies that the Soviet Union "opposes decisively the partition of the Cypriot's state under any guise, or its annexation by any country and its struggles with consistency so that Cyprus will become an independent sovereign, territorially integral state, free of any foreign military presence and non-aligned." In this case we have an identity of views because there is an identity of interests between Cyprus and the USSR, to avert the partition of the Cypriot state. We know that the policy of Ankara and of its organs aims at partition. We also know that when pressures are exerted on Ankara in a precise and specific manner so that the Turkish leadership knows that what is said is not mere words, the pressure brings results.

The Soviet Union has every reason to oppose the partition of Cyprus and Cyprus has every reason to fight against its partition. Therefore, we should be able to utilize with proper handling and policies Moscow's "decisive opposition" to the partition of Cyprus. It is not an unrealistic demand to have Soviet demarches of substance to Ankara to avert the present dangers from Turkey's partition policies. Provided, however, we move correctly. This does not mean that we will become a satellite of the Soviet Union or that we will change our non-aligned position on international problems or that we will introduce changes into our social system.

If we assess the Soviet position correctly, we can hope that the Soviet activities may strengthen our struggle to avert the great danger of partition and annexation of Cypriot territory to another country. The Soviet Union does not have the reasons invoked by the United States when it refuses to press Ankara on the Cyprus issue.

7520

CSO: 3521/331

LEADING SOCIALISTS DEBATE PARTY COURSE ON EVE OF CONGRESS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 3-9 Aug 84 p 1, 3

[Article by John Wagner]

[Text] There is continuing and growing suspense over who will be elected to the two deputy chairmanship positions at the 34th congress of the Social Democratic Party in Copenhagen on 15 to 19 September. So far, the debate has centered around the party's profile. Member of parliament Helle Degn wants to draw a sharper line, while former Finance Minister Knud Heinesen is warning against raising a hullabaloo over nothing.

"I believe we have reached the point at which we must say to those vying for the deputy chairmanship of the Social Democratic Party: "Shut up or think before you speak--and this applies to everyone participating in the debate."

With this appeal and reprimand (in the newspaper AKTUELST last Saturday) to his well known fellow party members--none of them mentioned by name and none forgotten--Social Democratic chairman and former Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen tried to put a heavy lid on the self-perpetuating personal and party battle currently raging in the crisis-ridden Danish Social Democratic Party.

He received an immediate reply from one of the three main candidates for the deputy chairmanship, member of parliament Helle Degn. She made the following remarks to JYLLANDS-POSTEN on Monday:

"I understand that Anker Jorgensen wants us to consider carefully what we say in the public debate, but he should have considered that before recommending two candidates. It is a bit late to express regret about that now."

The next day, an AKTUELST editorial had to express regret that "the problem of the deputy chairmanship of the Social Democratic party is not only alive and well, but it is growing."

"In particular, those who have attacked the press for making the debate into a 'question of personalities' are now discussing personalities with every newspaper that will listen," AKTUELST added, without mentioning any names. But that was just 2 days after an extremely "personal" interview with Helle Degn had appeared in BERLINGSKE SONDAG.

Thus, the debate over personalities continues within the Social Democratic Party. Behind this debate, however, is the question of how the Social Democrats can overcome three election defeats and regain governmental power. Helle Degn has said:

"Clearing up some of the personality problems at the party congress (15 to 19 September, Ed.) is not enough. The Executive Committee and the delegates must give us some more precise direction. Will the next 4 years be characterized by the present cautious Social Democratic line or will we give Social Democracy a stronger profile? I support the latter alternative."

Helle Degn has stated in detailed interviews that, "a stronger profile would mean that, if Social Democrats oppose the government's economic policy, they would vote against the government's proposed budget. It would also mean a stronger position on defense policy and an unambiguous rejection of nuclear power as an energy source in Denmark."

WEEKENDAVISEN asked Social Democratic spokesman on political matters Svend Auken, the former labor minister, if he, as a political spokesman, saw a need for a stronger Social Democratic profile. He answered:

"No, I do not. I believe we have strong, comprehensive proposals that form an alternative to the present nonsocialist policies. But we have a communications problem, in the sense that we have not been active and skilled enough in getting our message across to the voters. As a result, I hope one of the main themes at our congress will be how to achieve better results with our alternative proposals."

Svend Auken believes the Social Democrats are still suffering from being in power during the worst years of the economic crisis--1980, 1981, and most of 1982--after which the four-party nonsocialist coalition has been able to bask in the glory of the international upswing. He also believes that the Social Democrats have lost ground because their politics have become more a matter of personalities than of ideas.

"Approaching a national congress with three candidates for two deputy chairmanship positions would normally be depicted as democracy at work, but since this situation has arisen in the Social Democratic Party, the nonsocialist press writes only about power struggle and rivalry. We will have to live with that as long as there are so many exciting Social Democrats. But it is humorous when the nonsocialist papers say that Anker Jorgensen, who just turned 62, is too old to stay while, at the same time, Finance Minister Anders Andersen, who is soon to be 72, is too young to step down," Svend Auken said.

On Helle Degn's concrete examples of a more clearly defined policy, for example voting against the proposed budget and taking a firmer line on foreign policy, the party's political spokesman said the following:

"I believe Helle Degn would do us all--including herself--a big favor if she would be more concrete in her proposals. Actually, I believe we are not really in disagreement."

Heinesen's Warning

In addition to Svend Auken, former Finance Minister Knud Heinesen is one of the prominent Social Democrats who have been responsible for the political stance of the Social Democratic Party. Heinesen is one of Anker Jorgensen's closest advisers. He is favored to succeed Anker Jorgensen, if the chairman should step down "prematurely," i.e. before a clear successor is chosen.

Knud Heinesen believes that his party's "communications problem" is that too many voters have lost confidence in the Social Democrats. He told WEEKENDAVISEN:

"Every party in opposition has a communications problem, since the government usually is more interesting than the opposition. This means that an opposition party must present political alternatives that are extremely clear and well defined, in order to be heard at all. But being heard is not enough. It is just as important to have the confidence of the people. The people must believe that the policies you support in opposition will be the same policies you carry out if elected to form a government. Otherwise, strong statements will be seen as a loud hullabaloo over nothing--and that will impress no one. Thus, an opposition party must formulate alternatives that are clearly defined and that the opposition itself believes in. If the opposition party does not believe in them, nobody else will, either. We can do a better job than we have so far--and this is precisely what we must try to do."

Knud Heinesen is skeptical toward some of the proposals that have been made to delineate the party's profile on selected issues. He said:

"In the draft program that will be discussed at the party congress, the Executive Committee will recommend that nuclear power be eliminated from our country's energy planning. This is a clear stance and I am unaware of any proposal to make it any more clear. The same is true of the security policy recommendations in the draft. In some respects, they go beyond the resolution adopted by parliament on 3 May--and they were approved by a unanimous Executive Committee."

Clear 'No' to Nuclear Weapons

According to Knud Heinesen, the Social Democrats took a "somewhat stronger position" by stating in the draft program that the party will work to keep Denmark free of nuclear weapons "in times of peace, of crisis, and of war," while the resolution of 3 May states that this will be done "by promoting plans to make the Nordic countries a nuclear-free zone in a larger European context." Now the two concepts are no longer directly linked.

On the Social Democrats' stance toward the government's budget proposal, Knud Heinesen said:

"Our alternative to the government's economic policies is stated clearly and precisely in our program for economic development through the year 1990, entitled The Path of Solidarity. This document is included in the draft program,

which was approved unanimously by the Executive Committee. In my opinion, this is a far more reasonable and emphatic way of expressing our criticism of the government's economic policy than voting against the budget would be."

WEEKENDAVISEN tried in vain to persuade former Social Affairs Minister Ritt Bjerregaard to comment on the debate over the public image of the Social Democrats. "At the present time, when so much could be misunderstood," she prefers not to discuss the matter, which will be dealt with at the national congress.

The self-examination by the Social Democrats is being watched with great interest by various other parties: SF (Socialist People's Party), the Radical Liberal Party, and the government. Other questions being asked leading up to the congress 6 weeks from now are: Will Anker Jorgensen manage to create peace and unity within his party? Will Knud Heinesen be reelected as one of the two deputy chairmen, even though two women--Helle Degn and Radio Council chairman Birte Weiss--are stealing the show from Anker Jorgensen's right-hand man? Will the party congress once again prove to be to the left of the party leadership and does this indicate which direction the leadership will move during the coming year?

Personalities Decisive

Leading Social Democratic politicians may swear on a stack of Bibles and state with "total honesty" that the struggle for the deputy chairmanship and the debate over the party's image have nothing to do with who will replace Anker Jorgensen as party chairman, but the other parties do not believe them. Whether the congress approves the Executive Committee's draft program or a multitude of the more than 3,000 amendments proposed by local party organizations, it is still believed that the course of Danish politics during the coming year will be affected more by which individuals are chosen to fill the top posts in the Social Democratic Party and, especially, who will be waiting in line to replace Anker Jorgensen.

"We must decide who the next chairman will be when the time comes to make a change," Anker Jorgensen recently told POLITIKEN. Sources close to the party chairman stated, "The political situation existing at the time a change in leadership must be made will have at least as strong an impact--perhaps even stronger--on the choice of a successor as the personal wishes of Anker Jorgensen."

Four or five names may be heard when Social Democrats, leaders in other parties, and so-called political observers are asked who is in line to replace Anker Jorgensen.

If Knud Heinesen is reelected as deputy chairman at the party congress, he will be the favorite during the coming year. Heinesen's strengths are his experience and his image as a credible politician who is able to work with the nonsocialist parties. His weakness is that many of his fellow party members see him as a "fuddy-duddy" and that his politics could be a mirror image of those carried

out (unsuccessfully) by Anker Jorgensen.

Many nonsocialist politicians have named president of parliament and former Finance Minister Svend Jakobsen as the Social Democrat who could immediately reestablish cooperation across the middle of the Danish political spectrum. He is also regarded with high esteem within the Radical Liberal Party, whose support the Social Democrats must have if they are to regain government power. In his own party, Svend Jakobsen is known as a party soldier who does what he is asked to do, without bothering anyone.

The Good Standard-Bearer

In the Social Democratic Party--out at the local level and, more and more, within the parliamentary group--Svend Auken has made a rapid rise to the status of potential candidate for the chairmanship. Auken's political flair is undeniable, as is his gift for public speaking. He is a good standard-bearer for the party and enjoys the backing of labor. But he is also known as a person who is somewhat untidy and argumentative, who could easily offend needed coalition partners.

AKTUELT editor in chief Harry Rasmussen recently created quite a stir when he mentioned Birte Weiss as a possible successor to Anker Jorgensen. Even though Birte Weiss, perhaps more than any other, has become a voice for the so-called grass-roots and popular movements--a popular role among many Social Democratic circles--she is given little chance of becoming the next party leader, even if she is elected deputy chairman at the party congress. The other woman candidate for deputy chairman, Helle Degn, is given no chance whatsoever.

Ritt Bjerregaard, on the other hand, is not out of the picture. She has undeniable leadership qualities and is seen by many rank-and-file party members as a far-sighted, dynamic leader who could give the party a strong new image. Ritt Bjerregaard's weakness is that she has made so many enemies within the labor movement that anyone, including Anker Jorgensen himself, who chose her as Jorgensen's successor would justifiably fear causing a split in the party.

Thus, it is an interesting decision Anker Jorgensen and his closest advisers (and, formally, the Executive Committee of the party) must make when Anker Jorgensen decides it is time to step down. Now, at least one deputy chairman must be chosen. That is almost equally as exciting.

9336

CSO: 3613/211

LIBERAL PARTY AT IMPORTANT CROSSROADS IN CHOOSING NEW LEADER

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Aug 84 p 9

[Commentary by 'Monitor']

[Text] The Liberal Party is a paradoxical one. In spite of an energetic organization and solid support it does not have a firm grip on the voters. With the leadership shift the Liberals face a choice between a future as a languishing farmers' party or starting the change that would make them a consistent neoliberal party.

The Liberal Party is a party of paradoxes. In a period when it is fairly common to talk about party crises, the Liberal Party has preserved its party organization intact.

This is manifested in many ways. An amazingly large number of Liberal voters are faithful members of the party. They are also active. They participate loyally in the meetings and other activities that are necessary to keep the party organization alive. This at a time when the other old parties have had a hard time holding onto their members and an even harder time involving the remaining members in the life of the party.

This gives the Liberal Party solid support. It has been amazing time after time to see how much vitality and energy there is in the old farmers' party. When the situation demands it has been possible to summon up from the hinterland some unknown but, as experience has shown, usually well-schooled work horse. At the same time these have been people who have not been spoiled by such rigid party training that they have been devoid of independent political initiative and the ability to think for themselves.

The advantages for the Liberals have been great. When Poul Hartling in 1975 doubled the size of the Folketing group from one day to the next, it was possible to use the many new members in parliamentary activity, with a few exceptions. The same was true when the Liberal Party supplied ministers in 1978 and again in 1982. It was not too difficult for the little party to come up with suitable ministerial subjects. In both respects the Liberals, at least up to now, have had assets that both the Conservatives and the

Social Democrats have lacked to some extent. It is also due to these assets that the four-leaf-clover government has been able, in spite of everything, to stand out with a certain profile of ideas and not just as a temporary administrator of the Social Democratic estate.

In spite of all these assets, the Liberal Party is still in a bind. It is a bind with such serious perspectives that it could very quickly turn out to be a crisis that does not bode well for the party's future. The Liberals have problems with the voters. Aside from a fleeting swell in the mid-1970's the Liberals have not had much appeal for voters. In the last election it was their Conservative partners who scored the big gains. Opinion polls since the election do not give the party a prospect of better luck soon when the voters again assess the efforts of the four parties in the government coalition.

This may seem unfair. But that does not alter the fact that the Liberal Party has never really renewed its profile. Voters in cities and outside the agricultural job sector still view it as the farmers' party and not much else. Time after time there has not seemed to be much liberalism or broad-mindedness in the party which has tried for a number of years to launch itself as Denmark's Liberal Party. This has never really been fully credible, partly because the party too easily resorts to defending narrow and short-sighted class interests. It is also connected with the fact that the broad-mindedness of folk high school liberalism is always held in check by the often narrow and rigid outlook of the farm community.

There is no reason to exaggerate the importance of a change in chairmen in a political party. This is not in itself a crisis for the Liberal Party. Of course the party has people who can handle the job and there is certainly no doubt that the chairman of the Folketing group, Ivar Hansen, would be equal to the task. The problem of the Liberal Party is far more serious. Even before Henning Christophersen announced that he was thinking of saying farewell to Danish politics the party was in a crisis. It had just not been acknowledged by the party's top leadership. If Ivar Hansen is crowned as new chairman without any discussion at the party's national congress, it will be a sign that the crisis has not been admitted even now.

Ivar Hansen would do an excellent job of representing the party for the old block of Liberal voters.

But they will vote for the Liberal Party anyway. On the other hand it is quite certain that he will not present any renewal of the party. Nor will he be able to get one going. He would probably not even see a need to renew the Liberal Party profile or, even more important, to renew the party's policies. Thus the Liberal Party will see its voter support shrink in step with the continuing migration away from agriculture.

That is a sad prospect. For the country could use a real liberal party. And in spite of it all, the liberal tradition is so strong in the Liberal Party that it had a chance to be the natural gathering point for the voters who

would like an economic and business policy liberalism combined with a consistent broadmindedness in the areas of education, culture and justice and who can also live with having these values practiced in the broader context of EC policy.

It is hard to say how big this group of voters is among urban salaried employees and self-employed people outside of agriculture. One thing is certain--neither the Radical Liberals nor the Conservatives really present this profile any more than the Christian People's Party or the Center-Democrats do. It is also certain that none of these parties has the same prerequisites as the Liberal Party for turning the present neoliberal trends into a concrete policy when it comes to the direction and dimensions of the public sector, when it comes to changing the political playing rules and establishing an entirely new political style that differs from that of the Social Democrats and provides a different profile in relation to Poul Schluter's pragmatic conservatism.

The Liberal Party's new chairman could be the first acknowledgement that the party has recognized the looming crisis and the possibilities that exist for a liberal party.

With the right person in the post it could also be the first step toward the party's liberation from the past and its restructuring for the future.

If Ivar Hansen is selected without any open discussion of these problems, it can only be taken as a sign that the Liberals have chosen to postpone their problems until an anything but promising future.

6578

CS0: 3613/209

PAPANDREOU'S CHANGE OF COURSE: ACTS, NOT WORDS NEEDED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 29-30 Jul 84 p 9

[Text] Up to the June elections for the Europarliment, the Papandreou government's main concern was promoting the socialist transformation of the Greek economy, with all the extensions of the "change" in the country's foreign relations. Since those elections, the governing party's main concern has been how it will keep itself in power. This very significant change in the directional lines of government practice was the "news" from Papandreou's 27 July meeting with press representatives.

The prime minister, with what he said and with the very careful avoidance of previous expressions and "positions," showed that he correctly interpreted the result of these elections; that he was made aware of the very bitter--for him--truth, that if he does not revise the goals of his policy, in the next national elections--whenever they are conducted--the percentage of votes he will win will not allow him to form even a cooperative government.

When it started out, the PASOK government believed that its electoral strength, augmented for "legitimization" of its socialist visualizations by the votes of the two communist parties, was the consent of the absolute majority of Greek people for decisively abandoning the bourgeois regime and the West, even if substantial sacrifices accompanied the transformation. After three years of a policy of "shattering" the prerequisites for the private economy's operation and encouraging "class" confrontations, the government realized that that was not what the 48-percent "mandate" meant. The people expected work better than that of the government it voted against, not losses, one after the other, in the name of the socialist paradise--which has something in common with the mental institutions for ideologic purification, precisely because it does not offer solutions to man's material and moral rights.

With Papandreou's 27 July statement, the "socialist economy" became a "mixed economy." It was acknowledged that the agricultural-industrial cooperatives, whose organizational formation alone would radically change the agricultural population's role in the economy's operation and in social relations, cannot render what is expected of them because they are lacking competent officers. The socializations have been restricted to state enterprises and organizations, without the slightest reference to large private enterprises. For the latter--Papandreou explained--government intervention was necessary as a result of the inability of their private managers to deal with the problems of survival created by over-borrowing. (Not because--as the party texts say--their "socialization" was planned in the process of the socialist transformation.)

The "realistic" government positions in the economic sector had been announced in advance by Minister of National Economy Arsenis when, in his own press conference, he said that the government is not opposing private initiative and that the enterprises put under state control were placed in order to restore them, not to include them in the public sector. Arsenis showed the same respect for the principles of a free economy when he confirmed that bureaucratic controls of the market will stop and only the correct implementation of the rules for healthy competition will be monitored.

The prime minister's answers day before yesterday to journalists' questions communicated with increasing persuasiveness about the "landing" to which the 17 June elections forced PASOK. Because, aside from economic issues, a change worth heeding was noted on foreign policy issues--such as the rejection of the idea of purchasing airplanes or other weapons from the "East" because of the repercussions which Papandreou clearly let it be understood are undesirable. While any offensive reference to the United States, NATO and the EEC--as occurred in the past--was avoided.

Nevertheless, even if the lessons from the elections and the failures in accomplishing positive work have forced the government to replace its tactical targets, it remains to be seen whether it has the ability to carry its reformed intentions into practice. If it does not achieve them, then no application to exercises of political dexterity will hinder its electoral disapprobation. In democratic regimes, mistakes do not allow delays in the imposition of sanctions!

9247

CSO: 3521/322

SHIFTS REACTIONS SEEN WITHIN PASOK

Alevras' Influence

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 14 Aug 84 p 1

[Text] Strong in-party reactions were caused within the governing camp as soon as the various factions learned about the intention of Premier Papandreou to give greater weight to the suggestions of the Chamber of Deputies President I. Alevras. The reactions came mainly from the party activists and the non-parliamentary cadres who feel that the influence of Alevras will signify a government shift toward more moderate positions and the acceptance of some form of dialogue to deal with the problems which call for positive action.

For the time being these reactions are limited to attacks by the pro-government press against unidentified pressures on the premier and to reminders that the government continues on the same course.

The next few days will be the most critical, in the view of political observers, because the premier must prove that he is able to reconcile the direct and indirect pressures, which some regard as more effective, by party activists and non-parliamentary cadres and to convince that he accepts the implementation of a more moderate policy.

The balancing of these trends is regarded as the most difficult effort for Papandreou who has shown that he can accept only one point or view in his party and in his government.

Alliance

The same observers recall that many times in the past the PASOK chairman had emphatically promised several things such as limiting the role of the branch organizations and subsequently the role of the party activists, or the acceptance of a more tolerant policy in the economy against the advice of the non-parliamentary cadres but Papandreou always reneged on his promises. The party activists and the non-parliamentary cadres appear to have joined forces in the last few days in order to deal with the influence of Alevras on the premier and to assure that the new promises

will remain on paper only. The premier upon his return from Kerkyra 2 days ago stated that "there is no substance" to the rumors about early elections, about a reshuffling of the cabinet or about purging the party activists. But at the same time he praised Alevras and promised that the president of the Chamber of Deputies will play a more active role in the future. Papandreou insisted that the elections will be held in October 1985 and noted that in Kerkyra "he renewed an old and strong friendship with Alevras."

The parliamentary circles of the majority party discussed these statements with considerable distrust, interpreting them as an effort on the part of the premier to preserve the present balance and to present to the outside world a different government image. The same circles termed as most significant "information" the refusal of Alevras to confirm in the presence of the premier the Papandreou statements and to agree politically with him. Alevras avoided politely to reply and accepted with a smile the phrase that an old friendship was renewed. Certain people discussed this phrase saying that it indicated and confirmed that prior to the Kerkyra vacation there was a problem with Alevras.

The Reshuffling

On the other hand, the parliamentary deputies find that the premier wants to impose a change of policy while retaining the same ministers and limiting the reshuffling to some marginal changes. However, both in the Central Committee which had a meeting before the premier left for his vacation and in his meetings with parliamentary deputies at Maximos Palace, the deputies insisted that there can be no change in policy as long as the same persons remain in the cabinet. This is because the party activists and non-parliamentary cadres have been identified politically with the exercise of leftist and autocratic power.

The parliamentary circles believe that this week the influence of the party activists and the non-parliamentary cadres on the premier will rise. Since they continue to hold their posts they can delay decisions directly through their constant contacts with Papandreou and indirectly through their intervention in the work of the government.

The Elections

According to the same circles, the only sure point in the statements of the premier is that there will be no elections in the fall. They base their argument in part on the fact that maintaining the balance within the governmental camp will absorb most of Papandreou's time, leaving no room for other political initiatives. But, they add, this does not mean the elections will take place in the fall of 1985 because "anything can happen" in the current fluid political conditions.

Changes Repeated

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 15 Aug 84 p 1

[Text] As soon as the reactions of the various sides of PASOK reached Papandreou, he moved to cut short any changes in the government's policies. The same circles of the governing party discuss now the likelihood that the government will continue the same course and will focus on the cohesion and effectiveness of its work instead of embarking on changes which may not result in success. Political persons close to the decision-making centers in the governing camp rule out the possibility of even a limited reshuffling in secondary ministries in spite of the fact that a few days ago they argued in favor of some minor changes in personalities to give the impression that "something has changed."

In the last 2 days they were discussing the replacement of one or two ministers but they considered more likely that the Ministerial Council will remain in its present form ruling out even those minor changes. The same circles attribute these developments to the pressures exerted by the party activists and non-parliamentary cadres on the premier against any real change in the composition of the cabinet. The most significant development in the last few days is the cooperation between the party activists and the non-parliamentary cadres in a "common front" to exert influence on the premier. It appears that the former differences between Tsokhatzopoulos, Laliotis, Gennimatas on one side and Arsenis on the other have been removed.

The "Common Enemy"

The circles in PASOK say that the "common enemy" (i.e. the president of the Chamber of Deputies I. Alevras) has brought them together. For many of them, these positions are the limit of what they can "accept" if they are to maintain some degree of political influence. The party activists and the non-parliamentary cadres realize that their political existence depends on the premier's support and that without it they will cease to exist politically. As a result, all past disagreements between the party activists and the non-parliamentary cadres have been set aside, "replaced" by their common front. The strongest weapon of these two groups is the fact that they control the state and party machinery. The control is more effective because, as experience has shown, the premier does not exercise keen control and therefore the various cadres have a great deal of "freedom" of action. The same PASOK circles, consider this control as the main obstacle for an agreement between Papandreou and Alevras in spite of their being together for 12 days in Kerkyra. Alevras, expressing the views of the parliamentary deputies, argued that there can be no change in policy unless the persons who suggested and implemented the previous policies are removed.

Admission of Failure

On his part, the premier and his close associates believe that any radical change in persons will amount to an admission of failure by Papandreou himself since he selected these persons most of whom have no independent political existence of their own. The parliamentary deputies say that the premier has shown that he prefers to work with persons of his own choice, otherwise he would have implemented at some point his many promises to change the government policy.

This inaction and uncertainty favor those who hold today the various posts (blessed are those who are in control) and who the more they feel secure in their posts the more they continue their old policies. This climate is strengthened by the fact that Papandreou seldom carries out his agreements.

Characteristically they mention the case of the Euroticket, when it was agreed that immediately after the election one of Mavros' men (Gazis), one of PASOK men (most likely Avgerinos) and Glezos would resign. In the end nobody resigned from the coveted post of the Eurodeputy.

The creation of this climate of uncertainty most likely rules out the possibility of having elections this fall for the very simple reason, according to parliamentary deputies, that the premier does not have the possibility to cultivate the necessary political atmosphere. But the same uncertainty is limiting the likelihood of having the elections in October 1985.

7520

CSO: 3521/334

PROBLEMS, DISCUSSIONS ARISE IN EUROPARIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 27 Jul 84 pp 1,3

[Article by I KATHIMERINI correspondent in Strasbourg, Kostas Kekis]

[Text] Strasbourg--New Democracy made it clear yesterday to PASOK that, in public appearances of the Greek parties in Strasbourg, the Eurodeputies G. Mavros and M. Glezos, who have been elected on the PASOK ballot, must be represented by the leader of PASOK and not appear as "independents." If Mavros and Glezos wish to speak at public appearances then they will have to resign from the PASOK group and declare themselves independents, as they have the right to do by regulation of the European Parliament.

ND's position was upheld by the leader of its Eurodeputies, G. Boutos, in the presence of journalists when they were invited to a press conference given by the leaders of the Greek parties; it did not occur in the end because of a lack of...a previous understanding.

Silent Agreement

KKE's attending representative, Alavanos, indirectly with his silence agreed with the position supported by Boutos. He was willing in the future for a formal process to be observed in public statements or meetings of the Greek parties participating in the European Parliament.

The KKE Eurodeputy was also in favor of postponing the press conference so future procedures can be arranged in a private meeting of the responsible parties.

The issue developed as follows: Yesterday morning, PASOK decided to collaborate with KKE and KKE Interior and summon journalists to make a public statement about the ten years since the restoration of democracy in our country.

Efraimidis (KKE) and Kyrkos (KKE Interior) told Plaskovitis that ND should also be invited to this kind of public appearance of the Greek parties since they cannot equate it with the extreme right. On the other hand, Khr. Dimitriadis, EPEN's [National Political Union] Eurodeputy, had already been excluded from the public representation, as a "representative and apologist of the dictatorship," as he was characteristically called by Plaskovitis.

By Concession

Finally, after deliberations, Plaskovitis summoned ND shortly before the press conference. Boutos was briefed about the content of the conference when he arrived at the hall where the journalists were waiting. He saw seated next to Plaskovitis Mavros and Glezos and the Eurodeputy, Paraskevas Avgerinos. The ND leader asked what would be the procedure and Plaskovitis said that he, as head of the largest Greek party in the Europarlament, would speak and all the others, including the KKE and KKE Interior representatives, would be able to speak for two minutes each because "the television will take pictures." It should be noted that the ERT [Greek Radio and Television] cameras had already been set up.

Boutos did not agree to this scheme, especially since he had not been informed at the proper time about the press conference. He refused for ND to be given time equal to the other parties and to the time Plaskovitis had allotted to Mavros, Glezos and Avgerinos.

To Mavros and Glezos who maintained that they had the right to speak because they have declared that they are "affiliated" with the socialist group and not its regular members, Boutos said that, according to regulations they belong to the PASOK group and are members of the socialist group as long as they have not declared themselves independents. Therefore, he added, in public appearances of the parties they must be represented by the PASOK leader, Plaskovitis.

The Postponement

Facing an impasse, and to avoid wrecking a future cooperation of the parties in public appearances, primarily on national issues, they agreed to postpone the conference. PASOK Eurodeputy Avgerinos, a member of the PASOK Executive Office, supported the postponement.

Plaskovitis said only two things on behalf of everyone to emphasize the present representation of democratic Greece in the EEC ten years after the fall of the dictatorship. He stressed that this representation is important in all the Community's organs and in the Europarlament.

In the Europarlament, he said, a Greek has occupied the position of vice-president--he himself holds the position--and all the Eurodeputies are members of its committees and thus our country has an effective voice.

G. Anastasopoulos

Today, the ND Eurodeputy, G. Anastasopoulos, will be elected president of the European Parliament's important Transport and Shipping Committee. He will take over the only position of committee president which has been given--after many behind-the-scene pressures within the Christian-Democratic group--to a Greek deputy.

In the meantime, the ND Eurodeputies are displeased with the presidency of the Christian-Democratic group to which they belong. The reason for their displeasure is that ND has not been given as many positions as it should have received in the presidencies of Europarlament committees since it is the third-strongest party within the Christian-Democrats.

It should be noted that the leader of the ND Eurodeputies, Boutos, who, along with a German and a Dutch Eurodeputy, laid claim to the position of president of the agriculture committee, a committee exceptionally important for Greece (by agreement of the Parliament's political groups, the president of this committee will come from the Christian-Democratic group), left the group's meeting exasperated because, after many schemes, the Dutch Eurodeputy was elected president of the agriculture committee.

According to information, Boutos left the Christian-Democratic group's meeting because the Eurodeputies from the northern countries did not want to give up the committee's presidency to their colleague who comes from a southern country, particularly from Greece. The reason is that the European Parliament's agriculture committee plays an important role in forming decisions about the Community's agricultural policy.

9247

CSO: 3521/322

AVEROF ANNOUNCES DECISIVE OPENING TO CENTER

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 8 Aug 84 pp 1, 3

[Text] Ev. Averof, the chairman of the New Democracy Party announced a decisive opening to the Center during the first post-election meeting of the ND Parliamentary Group. During the meeting the prevailing atmosphere was that of "tense tranquility". Averof, who considers an early parliamentary election very possible, gave special weight to the conditions which will prevail at the next election and he made clear that the ND requires the following to assure a fair election: a) it will not accept electoral surprises with regard to the system, favoring that of reinforced proportional representation and the return to the preferential check-mark; b) it will not tolerate the non-removal of four ministers (justice, interior, public order, and press), the nomarchs and the management of Radio-TV [ERT]

At the same time Averof gave assurances that in forming the local tickets (in the event the preference check-mark is not re-instated) the current deputies will be placed at the top of each ticket and he declared ND's intention to question the right of the government to enact institutional changes.

The long address by Averof (it covered one and a half out of 2 hours) was generally regarded as comprehensive; it covered all aspects of the new political reality as it developed since the Euroelections (characteristically Averof spoke on specific measures of democratization in ERT and announced his preference for free competition by amending the constitution.)

The comprehensiveness of Averof's address contrasted, in the opinion of political observers, with the brevity of the discussion which followed and in which--characteristically--none of the leading personalities took part although they were present.

The prevailing atmosphere during the two-hour meeting (with approximately 100 deputies and Eurodeputies present) was characterized by the same observers as "tense tranquility" which was not disturbed even when Deputy Kondogiannopoulos hinted at the subject of leadership--a subject all had in mind--nor when Averof in closing his second address in a milder tone than that of last Saturday repeated his standard position that he will remain at the head of the ND.

Averof went on to announce the establishment of the new committees in the context of the organizational drive. He underlined that his intention is to have an ND office in every village, to conduct frequent public opinion polls and to reorganize the party's information services. Averof announced several organizational activities (a Women's Congress, in-party elections, regional-provincial conferences, a youth festival) and then closed his long speech by noting that "the New Democracy Party is the only guarantee to reverse [the country's] terribly dangerous course" and by giving the assurance that "in the next election, no matter when they take place, we will become the government of Greece and we will govern with a spirit of justice, freedom and progress."

The Deputies

The following deputies spoke after Averof:

Ath. Krikos who said that Averof's report was good and who made certain comments on the vote of absentee voters.

A. Papadongonas who expressed concern that the ND's opening to the Center may displease the rightist voters.

Ill. Vougiouklakis and D. Manousakis who spoke on organizational matters.

Tz. Tzanetakis who expressed the view that the results of the Euroelection were not very favorable to the ND. He asked Averof to develop with his associates a new proposal to be offered to the people.

Vas. Kondogiannopoulos, who said that he does not share Averof's satisfaction with the Euroelection results and added that "something else must be done to achieve a better result." He said that the new committees are of questionable effectiveness and asked for a change in the ND governing program.

7520

CSO: 3521/334

POLL SHOWS CENTRIST VOTERS HOLD BALANCE OF POWER

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 12-13 Aug 84 p 4

[Text] I KATHIMERINI presents today the key points of an analysis on the data of the public opinion polls held in March and October 1983 and in May 1984 shortly before the Euroelection. The analysis is interesting because it shows over a 15-month span the changes that took place in the trends and preferences of the electorate which were eventually registered in the result of the Euroelection. It should be noted that the final poll forecast a 4 percent difference in favor of PASOK, a forecast which was born out by the election. The opinion poll was conducted on behalf of the Center for Political Research and Training [KPEE] by the firm EMRD (HELLAS) Ltd. The data were analysed by KEPP Director Giannis Loulis who wrote an article published in the review EPIKAIRA which will be out this week.

In analyzing the shifts of voters during the periods of the three polls, especially interesting is the analysis of the May 84 poll which shows PASOK 4 percentage points ahead of the New Democracy. This difference was affirmed by the results of the elections a month later.

Comparing the degree of voter "loyalty" to that of October 1983, Loulis writes:

"The most loyal voters--who would vote for the party they supported in the 1981 parliamentary election--belonged in May 1984 to KKE with a 'loyalty' index of 97.2 percent, and the ND with 94.2 percent. High also was the level of KKE (Int.) (85.7 percent) while that of PASOK was reduced (81.5 percent) and that of the Democratic Socialism Party [KODISO] was very low (47.2 percent)." Loulis goes on: "The ND, shortly before the Euroelection, had brought together almost the totality of its 1981 voters (94.2 percent) with only 3.1 percent 'undecided.'" PASOK had 81.7 percent with 7.1 "undecided." At the same time 5.7 percent of PASOK voters in 1981 shifted to the ND and 3 percent to KKE-Int. Obviously the limited PASOK losses to ND but also to the other parties explain the fact that in the end PASOK came first in the June election. On the other hand, the slight improvement of ND (compared to the 1981 parliamentary election) is due to some gains from PASOK but not enough to get ahead of PASOK."

Of particular interest is the "loyalty" index shown by the October 1983 poll. The "loyalty" of PASOK voters was then only 68.3 percent (compared to the 1981 parliamentary election) while 22.4 were undecided. The data show that in 1983 the governing party had a clear loss of loyalty and a significant portion of its voters had doubts. Loulis observes:

"The ND--which in the same month had a high 'loyalty' index of 84.7 percent--should have tried to win over this large pool of PASOK voters to outdistance it. The existence of 22.4 percent undecided PASOK voters shows that in October 1983 the governing party faced serious problems of a probable shift of its voters. But in the end, as shown by the May-June 1984 poll and the result of the Euroelection, PASOK regained most of those voters (with minor losses in favor of ND) and thus was able to remain first. Obviously this group is the one that decided the contest between PASOK and ND. It should be noted that in October 1983, ND attracted from PASOK 2.4 percent of its 1981 voters, a percentage which ND increased somewhat in 1984 but in a limited way since most 'undecided' returned to PASOK."

The Economic Criteria

One of the most interesting sections of Loulis' analysis is the one dealing with "Electoral Behavior on the Basis of the Socio-Economic Criteria."

According to the May 1984 poll, PASOK seems to be strong among the 25-34 age group (45 percent) and fairly strong among the ages of 35-44 (40.8 percent). It also has steady support from the middle and lower socio-economic groups (average 39 percent). PASOK appears to be weak in the older groups (55-64, 31 percent and 65-69, 21.4 percent) and also in the upper socio-economic group (27.8 percent).

The New Democracy is weak among the younger groups (18-24, 20 percent; 25-31, 25.1 percent; and 35-44, 39.5 percent) and stronger among older groups, mainly in the ages 45-54 (42 percent) and 55-64 (44.4 percent), while the percentage falls to 34.7 percent in the age group of 65-69 years. The strength of the ND in the higher socio-economic group is 43.7 percent and 27.9, 37.9 and 31.3 percent in the other three groups studied in the poll.

KKE is strong in the age groups of 18-24 (19.5 percent), 25-34 (13.6 percent) and 65-69 (13.5 percent) as well as in the lower socio-economic group (16.5 percent).

KKE-Int. is particularly strong in the younger groups, 18-24 (10.2 percent) and 25-34 (4.9 percent) as well as in the two higher socio-economic groups (5.6 and 7.1 percent).

Loulis further compares the 1981 vote by each socio-economic group and age with what the same groups indicated they were going to vote in the 1984 Euroelection [Table I]. He notes:

"PASOK in comparison to 1981, shows a significant decline in the stronger economic groups, that is, in groups A/B and G1 (Table II). The A/B group favored

PASOK with a significant difference (15.9 percent). Although the change appears to have started earlier, the shift must have climaxed recently since in the October 1983 poll ND exceeded PASOK by only 6 percent.

Table I

Voter Indication for the Euroelection by Age and Socio-Economic Group

May-June 1984 Poll Taken For KPEE

	<u>Total</u>	<u>N.D.</u>	<u>PASOK</u>	<u>EDIK*</u>	<u>KODISO</u>	<u>KKE</u>	<u>KKE-Int</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Undec</u>	<u>No Ans</u>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
ND	34.2	94.2	5.7	9.5	16.7	--	--	7.3	9.4	6.7
PASOK	38.4	0.9	81.7	14.3	11.1	2.5	8.6	5.5	26.7	10.0
KODISO	1.4	0.6	0.6	23.8	47.2	0.3	--	1.8	--	--
KKE	11.8	--	1.2	--	--	97.2	--	5/5	11.7	--
KKE-Int.	3.3	--	3.0	--	--	--	85.7	7.3	9.4	--
EPEN	0.5	0.9	--	--	--	--	--	7.3	--	--
Other	1.3	0.2	0.2	52.4	--	--	--	21.8	3.9	--
Undecided	7.7	3.1	7.3	--	22.2	--	5.7	30.9	33.3	16.7
No Answer	1.5	--	0.3	--	--	--	--	12.7	5.6	66.7

*Democratic Center Union

"Of particular interest is the electoral behavior of group G1 which in 1981 was the 'citadel' of PASOK's strength. PASOK lost a considerable portion on this group which in May 1984 favored PASOK approximately by the same percentage points as the next two groups (G2 and D/E--see Table II).

"It is obvious that although the ND benefits from the displeasure against PASOK in group A/B (high economic group), it does not benefit as much in the next group (G1). In the latter group, ND shows a notable but not spectacular increase. (KKE-Int. shows greater increase in this G1 group. ND remains steadily strong in the G2 group coming 'neck and neck' with PASOK while it improves somewhat in the lower group (D/E). There is no doubt that the ND can increase its support in the G1 group."

Noteworthy is the PASOK decline in the 35-44 age group where a small increase in ND support brings the two parties "neck to neck." Impressive is the decline of PASOK in the 45-54 age group in which ND moves ahead. ND gains even more ground in the 55-64 age group. One can say in a very general sense that in the younger age groups ND reduces its distance from PASOK while the distance increases in the older groups.

The Centrist Votes

On the basis of the March 1983 poll data, Loulis has studied the parameter of the ideological orientation of those voting for the two major parties. At the same time ND attracted 82.1 percent of the voters who considered themselves

"rightist" (15.5 percent of the total sample), 73.3 percent of the "center-right" (6.5 percent of the total sample) and only 6.8 percent of the "centrists" (who, however, represented 17.6 percent of those questioned).

Table II

Shift of Voters of the 1981 National Elections on the Basis of Their Declaration How They Would Vote in June 1984

Poll: KPEE of May-June 1984

	Age							Socio-Economic Group			
	Total	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65-69	A/B	G1	G2	DE
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
ND	34.2	20.0	25.1	39.5	42.0	44.4	34.7	43.7	27.9	37.9	31.3
PASOK	38.4	34.4	45.0	40.8	34.4	31.0	21.4	27.8	38.9	38.5	39.3
EDA*	0.5	0.1	0.5	0.8	0.3	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.1	0.2	0.5
KODISO	1.4	2.0	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.1	0.4	2.3	2.0	1.9	0.5
KKE	11.8	19.5	13.6	9.1	9.9	9.1	13.5	10.0	10.2	7.6	16.5
KKE-Int.	3.3	10.2	4.9	1.7	0.9	0.5	1.7	5.6	7.1	3.1	2.1
EPEN**	0.5	0.0	0.1	0.6	0.8	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.6	0.4
Other	0.8	1.4	0.5	0.8	0.5	1.1	2.1	2.3	1.5	0.5	0.7
Undecided	7.7	11.2	7.6	4.4	7.6	9.0	22.2	6.9	9.4	7.5	7.5
No Answer	1.5	1.3	1.2	0.8	2.5	2.6	3.1	0.8	1.7	1.9	1.1

* United Democratic Left

**National Political Union

The "center-left" (16.7 percent of the sample) constituted the mainstay of PASOK voters (815 percent). Of those considering themselves as "centrists," PASOK received 62.5 percent, while PASOK's appeal to the "leftists" (20.7 percent of the total) was only 22.5 percent in spite of the rhetoric of PASOK's more radical cadres. Loulis adds:

"In conclusion one may say that the support to ND and PASOK changes in the areas of the 'center-right' and 'centrist' voters since the ND appeal stops at the 'center-right' while the PASOK appeal begins with the Center. Although we do not have more recent data on voters choices based on their political self-identification, we can extrapolate from the percentages of the 1981 voters which ND proved unable to attract. Even though the high percentage of those who did not answer (10 percent) or refuse to characterize their political identification (12.8 percent) does not allow secure conclusions, the existing tendencies show that the block of 'center-left' and 'centrist' is larger than that of 'right' and center-right.' If this assessment is correct, then it is evident that the ND needs a significant part of the centrist voters to outpace PASOK. On the other hand, if PASOK begins to lose those voters it will cease being the 'first' party.

"It is also interesting that the poll data support the empirical assessment that those who characterize themselves as 'liberals,' 'center-rightists' or 'centrists' are less strongly committed to their political 'credo'--according to

the related question--and, therefore, they constitute the large pools of voters who, because of their flexibility, will decide, as in the past, the election."

Analyzing the views of the voters on the government and the specific government actions (using the March 1983 poll) Loulis comments that the voters are more strict on specific actions--especially those which affect the economy--than on the government's overall performance. He notes: This may mean that in spite of some additional time given the government, the specific measures (especially as they concern the economy) do not satisfy, at least for the time being. Loulis poses the following questions:

On the basis of the above data and especially in view of the fact that the public opinion is not at all satisfied with the government's handling of two issues (inflation and unemployment) it considers most important, should we not expect a stronger rejection of PASOK in 1984? Is it not true that the electorate held the ND responsible for the inflation and rejected it in the 1981 election? There seem to be two answers to these questions:

1. Public opinion seems to grant (as noted earlier) still more time to PASOK.
2. The ND--as the other major pole of attraction for the voters--does not seem to have the appeal which would result in a greater shift of voters from PASOK.

A similar conclusion is drawn from the answers of voters to the question on the "ND performance" both in the March 1983 and the October 1983 polls. These data do not give a positive image of the ND and this image (as the corresponding image of the government) seemed to get worse instead of better from March to October 1983.

KPEE was established in Athens in 1975. Its objectives are:

1. To spread more widely the basic principles of pluralistic, multiparty, democratic society.
2. To strengthen the liberal values of private initiative and the basic values of a free market economy.
3. To study continuously the contemporary social, political and economic phenomena.

7520
CSO: 3521/333

TRADITIONAL LEFT SEEN SUFFERING FROM INACTIVITY

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 12-13 Aug 84 p 4

[Article by Khristos Karanikas]

[Text] The traditional Left is non-existent on the political scene despite the inability of the two major parties to present a convincing picture. In spite of the populism of the PASOK leadership and the slogan-filled exploitation of the events of the 1940s with their one-sided propaganda, the parties of the traditional Left give the impression that their historic role has come to an end. The two communist parties limit their criticism of the government to secondary and marginal issues.

The traditional Left, showing once again its timidity and political sterility appears to have surrendered to the PASOK leadership the root support it has and which it can use as a political weapon. Although the Euroelections with their polarization and extremist activities came and went, in no way did the communist parties propose anything different even as a detail from what the two major parties proposed. The social, economic and, by extension, the political developments of the last few years in all aspects of the country's life pass unnoticed by the two communist parties.

In some way, almost the totality of the forces which consider themselves Left in our country, give the impression that their historical role has passed. Marxism is a "scientific" bible for all of them, crowding in their desk drawers the expressions of political dynamic in order to be able to classify them. The KKE, more faithful to the tradition and the orthodoxy, completes it with Leninism and with its attachment to the policies of Moscow. The KKE (Interior) is pleased with the Eurocommunist blessings hoping to attract the people through intellectual structures. But the talk about the past, censored as a result of the Left's concessions to the PASOK leadership and the toleration of populist phenomena which are considered as an insult to the democratic sentiment and practice of the Greek people, cannot easily be turned into a means of attracting people.

The antagonism of the traditional Left toward the governing camp is limited to marginal problems often taking narcissistic character. Thus both communist

parties claim, at least in words, that the direct or indirect participation of each in the government will turn the populist phenomenon into a democratic power. Their inability to embark on a more profound criticism of the political developments is shown also by the fact that they identify as a political consent the vote, that is, the obligatory choice among existing parties, ignoring that in 1981 and more so in 1984 the vote for all of them was merely a vote of tolerance.

Revival of the 1940s

The more significant realignments in the country's political life seem to be taking place without the participation of the traditional Left as it has been identified directly or indirectly with the communist movement. In the same way as in the 1940s when the communists were unable to see beyond their nose and understand Stalin's intentions, today they identify the Left with the PASOK chairman and his personal choices. Socially the wounds of the civil war are alive and shape the political practice of Averof's Right and of Papandreu's Left and of the communists. Politically, this trauma is translated into a self-satisfaction of the traditional Left from the recognition of the national resistance, undervaluing democracy in a few ritualistic and religious-like moves.

In reality this is a reproduction of the same phenomenon of polarization and division the leaders of the two major parties tried to revive, and the Left remained silent. Even after the June election the two communist parties are unable to even describe the populist phenomenon at the top of the government thus contributing to the political emancipation of the public they influence. Political forces so dissimilar and contradictory like PASOK with its leaders who never fought [in war] and those who came to surface from America but also with the votes of the center and the democratic leftists at the base, have not been evaluated by the so-called Greek Left.

It is possible that all this is explained by the fact that the leaders of the two communist parties grew politically in the 1940s. The acceptance of some vision or ideological commitment determines all other assessments. Thus the orthodox KKE having the advantage conferred upon it by the seal of orthodoxy appears to oppose the government only on one issue--on the "purchase of the century" [note: the procurement of U.S. and French aircraft]; but even in this case it [spoke] with a low voice and without raising the problem of strategic choice, that is, the diplomatic assessments which cover the quantitative orders for military hardware. These reactions to this issue are sacrificed in the face of the government's declarations for peace, possibly because both share this shortsighted view of peace which they see as a matter of propaganda while they refuse to see it as a problem of the democratic function of the various countries. Totalitarian and autocratic regimes, throughout human history, relied on aggressiveness and war, or rather the violence and oppression internally are translated in the end to aggressiveness and war in international relations.

On its side, KKE (Interior) interpreted as a personal victory the protest vote against the polarization in the Euroelections thus showing that it continues to live in the days of the contractors with the instructions to tear down the walls

and to start preparations for a new construction expecting the realization of the promises of the Ministry of Housing and Environment so that its yard will be filled up with consumers of its ideology. This difference is the quintessence of the problem of the Greek Left, since its more enlightened section presumably copies the practice of other parties and tries to claim as its own the political act of condemning the polarization.

The movement of our political life as shown by the distribution of the votes in each area has not been understood by the traditional Left. Its parties and its theoreticians have not paid much attention to the phenomenon of the PASOK failure in the urban centers and its strong support in the villages. They did not analyze the effect of our induction in the EEC on the vote and the choices of the farmers. It is a fact that the party which is against the EEC won most of the farm vote because of the subsidies given the farmers by the EEC [sic]. Also there was no study of the psychological pressure exerted in the villages in favor of the government. Such pressure had not been in evidence since the years before the dictatorship. Since the days of Theodorakis Grivas and his legendary song, the villages no longer shape political developments. The large urban centers serve as the weathervanes of political migrations. The governing party lost in those centers. It is there that the new political forces emerge, not so much in the form of new parties, as in the appearance of new choices for the solution of the country's problems. This is largely the reason why the rallies and the peace marches organized by the two communist parties and PASOK are so small.

The commitment and the prejudices which appear on the surface are now visible on all areas of political and social activity. For some time now, the watertight compartments of our political life resemble cement platforms at different levels with the addition of ideological desk-drawers to register everything. The inertia and stillness which appear in the social demands and the political choices is the result of these watertight compartments which represent the most perfect job of the postwar contractors. But when every communication among the various levels is cut off, then the developments can take an explosive form, not so much in terms of violence--because the Greek people continue to show self-control and wisdom--but in the sense of contempt.

The next month will likely bring the first signs of the new messages in our political life with all their effects. The absence of any communication among the various levels appears also within the parties with the lack of any dialogue between the leadership and the rank and file. This is more visible today --with its political effects--because the leaders have ceased to turn the people on; they bore and they are less convincing. By necessity those who receive the changes in public opinion are undergoing also changes which are translated into action at a given moment depending on the other developments.

7520

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HOUR OF DECISION NEAR IN CYPRUS, UNANIMITY NEEDED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 25 Jul 84 p 5

[Editorial: "National Imperative"; passages enclosed in slantlines emphasized in original]

[Text] Former Prime Minister Georgios Rallis has proposed that the government and the opposition work out a common position and policy on the Cyprus problem. It is to Rallis's credit that he, alone of all the leading actors on the political stage, not only realized the necessity of doing this but also stated it publicly. His proposal has found a resonance and response that show both what a critical phase this greatest national issue has now reached and how necessary it is that all Hellenism--both Greek and Cypriot--deal with it united and in accord. We insist particularly on this last point. The fact that the proposal was accepted across the entire range of the political world in Greece (by the government first of all), but also in Cyprus, is proof positive that the realization of the need to work out and implement a common, unified policy line on the Cyprus problem has now reached maturity in the Hellenic consciousness, and that Hellenism demands it imperatively. Certainly the painful and bitter experiences with the development of the Cyprus problem, particularly in the past 12 months, have contributed to a great extent to this maturation.

This column's satisfaction at that fact is all the greater as, during the entire decade that has passed since the tragic events of the summer of 1974, it has never ceased to stress the need for domestic unity and for accord between the two branches of Hellenism--Greek and Cypriot. It has never ceased to stress the need for those two branches to collaborate frankly, facing and dealing with this great national issue on a unified policy line, worked out jointly.

There have been domestic discords and quarrels among political parties, both in Greece and in Cyprus, often springing from party ambitions and intended to win favor with the voters. Truly these doubly weaken the front Hellenism presents and are grist for the invader's mill. On the one hand, they divide us, pure and simple. On the other hand, because of them, there is no clear policy, with goals and handling thought out and marshaled in order, from short-range to long. It is only such a policy, enjoying the broadest possible consensus and implemented consistently and without wavering or demagogic sloganeering and approaches for domestic consumption, that will have a possibility and capability of success.

Cyprus Government Spokesman A. Khristofidis's statement expresses this reality and necessity particularly well. He said that, "it's natural that efforts on the national issue are more productive when they constitute an expression of political unity." It would be highly desirable if the agreement on a common line on the Cyprus problem were to cover the broadest possible range of the political world. Nonetheless, the /substance/ of the agreement must not be sacrificed to the fiction of broad acceptance or pseudo-universality. The agreement certainly must include the two principal political groups in the country. Otherwise, however, it would be better for it to be limited to fewer groups but to be concrete and substantive, rather than to extend to more or to almost all and consequently to be vague and without substantive content because /all of them/ cannot agree on the substance.

Second, agreement means /jointly working out/ the policy line and methodology after discussions and consultations. It does not mean informing political groups and personalities after the fact of faits accomplis or of a policy worked out unilaterally by the government. (This is not to dispute the government's right not to come to such an agreement or to implement a policy of its own on its own responsibility.)

Third, the agreement must cover not only goals but also handling and methods of action.

Fourth, it would be highly desirable to have a similar agreement among Cypriot politicians.

Fifth, finally Athens and Nicosia should work out a common, unified line on the basis of the individual agreements concluded domestically by each of the two parties.

A policy and the handling and methods to advance that policy should be chosen jointly. The policy should be the "golden mean" between what is desired and what is possible, and the handling should be what is most suited to the goals, far removed from demagogic approaches and sloganeering, which always lead to the wrong moves and sometimes to fatal ones. If all this is done, then Hellenism will make the maximum use of its resources and of the possibilities that general and specific circumstances offer at any given time.

The margin for error has been used up. The hour of decision and of responsibility /for everyone/ has sounded.

12593

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CHOICES, ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO NATIONAL LEADERS

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 23 Jul 84 p 4

[Article by Khristos Pasalaris: "Karamanlis, Andreas, Averof Think about upcoming Decisions. Elections, ND leadership: three problems demand solutions"; passages enclosed in slantlines emphasized in original]

[Text] News sources have clammed up--just about as they were under the dictatorship; leading politicians' lips are sealed; doors to party meetings are hermetically sealed; Maroudas is often irrelevant or misleading; opposing leaderships are meditating in secret before an "earth-shaking" autumn. Given all this we have a right (particularly today, when we are celebrating 10 years of democracy) to enter into the minds of the three top men in Greek political life and make up /a completely imaginary scenario/ of how each one sees upcoming developments from where he stands.

The ordinary Greek...loves to make predictions and to "get it right," though he often leans towards the most extreme and unorthodox forecasts. However, if you wanted to get the picture right--at least today--you would have to say that the three top men in Greek political life--Karamanlis, Andreas, and Averof--are deep in thought and /making their calculations/. Think of the chess grandmasters who will play a dozen or so moves ahead in their head...!

The Shoes Are Too Big.

Let us take a look at Evangelos Averof:

He is thinking that he has the Euro-election success to his credit, with a respectable gain for the ND, but without corresponding damage to PASOK. He was expecting something better, and he had passed his enthusiasm on to people who do not easily become enthusiastic. Two or three percentage points more would have "untied hands," cleared the way, taken care of his problems....

He was criticized for the "half victory," and no doubt he would have resigned by himself on 18 June if the ND vote had gone down to 35 percent. "Unfortunately" for him, the vote went up to 38 percent but not to 42 percent. /That is to say, he ended up where the "Karamanlis figures" start./ Thirty-eight percent is a very big shoe for the feet of Averof or Tallis, and even bigger for all the ones below....

However, the party faithful--all those conservatives who shout and shout again, "Let's get rid of the Change yesterday"--are insisting on /renewal and mobility/ in the ND, a party which has had a permanent leadership problem ever since Karamanlis and--by all indications--will have one in the future too. Unless things become so bad on a national scale that Karamanlis is obliged to give up either his second term or his retirement home and take over the party again to win a sweeping victory, possibly with over 50 percent of the vote. That however would occur only if the people were faced with the choice /"Karamanlis or Marx."/ No such choice seems to be on the horizon; on the contrary it is probably growing more distant....

Thus Averof, with the 38 percent "big shoe," is free to say in 2 months' time: "Gentlemen, I've done the best I could, and I'll do the same in the future. However, I'm not up to the job. One of you will have to take the rudder. I'll stand by him and help him with all my ability. Well then, get together and pick out your new leader...."

Since the party "priesthood" will not permit any "youngster" (and there are many of them) to climb to the top, it will cast its votes and choose its third leader A.K. (after Karamanlis). This leader will be superior to Averof and Rallis in some ways and inferior in others, but /in any case he will not be the "great leader,"/ since the peculiar will of history does not desire still other great leaders in the two bourgeois parties after ELEVTERIOS VENIZELOS and KONSTANTINOS KARAMANLIS.

Whoever it is though, he will be ACCEPTED [capitals in original] by the conclave /without the slightest danger of a split,/ because despite everything that people say, the ND is the only one of the parties that is not in danger of breaking up today, just as PASOK was in no danger once it got on the straight path to power....

"Shall I Hurry or Shall I Wait?"

Let us move on to Andreas though:

Like Averof, he too will spend an August of meditation and...calculation, because things are so evenly balanced that "anything goes." His no 1 problem is similar to the one he faced in June (elections simultaneously or separately?). "Shall I call early elections," he is thinking, "or push on to the end? But to call them early, Karamanlis will have to agree too. But he doesn't want them, he won't let me have them.... Of course I can submit the government's resignation, but then what will he do? He'll hold elections whether he wants to or not, but who knows what sort of government he'll appoint first? And then I won't have him nearby. And if I don't have him nearby, that breaks up the "Siamese twin," and I lose a sure 10 percent. Apart from everything else that could happen.... Unless I persuade him to agree...."

"What do I gain by holding elections early? I avoid another year's decay, and as things are going, a year's decay is around 8 percent. What else do I gain? I bring the party together again and head off splits and losses to the left and right. I get in before the presidential election and hold on to the

conservative voters who want the "Siamese twin" with Karamanlis. I hold the presidency in my hand up to May '85. There's a lot to be said for this fall...! Then again, if I push on to the end, if instead of elections... I artfully reconstruct the government in the fall, I still hold on to the "Siamese twin" advantage, at least until May. I also control the state, and whoever controls the state has 5 percent right there. So I give a second term to Karamanlis (of course what he'd do then, God only knows: there'd be nothing to stop him after being re-elected unanimously) and then I have a 50-50 chance when I go for my second 4 years, since the other party doesn't have and will not have a leader to equal me, and then I'm in line for the presidency with a PASOK government, or even with an ND one."

Elections in the fall then, or at the end of the 4 years? /There is no answer./ Either is possible....

Decisions in February.

But let us go on to Karamanlis:

Whatever difficulties he has had recently, he still seems to know how to deal with them. For all that he has almost never used the prerogatives and "super-powers" the constitution grants him, he remains the dominant figure in our political firmament. Many refer to him as "God," but most agree that he has been absolutely correct in his role, and that he is the first and only supreme magistrate to win the approval of both large parties, and even of the non-dogmatic left.

In the 50 months of his presidency, he is the one who of all leading politicians, Greek and foreign, has talked the least but done much more, sometimes entirely behind the scenes. After all, his motto is /"Do what you do, but don't show off, because then people get jealous...."/

He does not want any talk about the presidential election. He always says that he has not decided what to do, whether to run again or whether to go home after half a century of political life. He will run again if he is convinced that he can play his role correctly and perform a positive service. /He will have decided that by February '85 and will announce his decision then..../

They say that he thinks Andreas is sincere in saying that PASOK will support his candidacy, which has just been confirmed for the fourth time this last week by a majority of the executive bureau, because the needs of the nation and also the party's practical interest demand it. Besides, everybody knows that a break between Andreas and Karamanlis would lead to a national crisis and division. The error of most arbiters of the polity in Greece has been that their actions led to national division. It is Karamanlis's gift that from 1974 to the present he has constantly been extinguishing the latent sparks of division and silently but steadily bringing the ship back to its traditional course.

Patience Until September.

Greeks are quick and ready to charge mistakes to their leaders and to belittle them even as they make history. Many charge mistakes to Karamanlis, as our

forefathers charged mistakes to Venizelos, Trikoupi, Kapodistrias. They charge mistakes to Averof and many more to Andreas. But they are the only leaders we have; we voted for them; we cheer them in rallies; they determine the fate of the nation....

Now all three are calculating, each according to his own abilities and his own political sense. In 2 months we will certainly have more to say and... /less to imagine/. For what we said today, the fans of political fanaticism and party passion will have to forgive us. However much you try, you will not find violent coups or spectacular party breakups or dramatic resignations or thrilling announcements...!

At least not until September...!

12593

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U.S. WARNED 'NATIONAL DIGNITY' LANGUAGE ONLY ONE SPOKEN

Athens EXORMISI TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 13 Jul 84 p 32 _

[Editorial: "Only One Language"]

[Text] Wednesday noon, through the U.S. ambassador in Athens, Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou brought up for review with the American government the entire complex of Greek-American relations, in light of the latest developments.

Let us hope that this time the "allies" across the Atlantic have realized that the time is gone forever when a simple nod from them was enough to make Greece agree to their every plan or accept the faits accomplis they sought to create.

All the events that have marked Greek-American relations in the last two weeks constitute the visible side. The culminating event here was the publication of an utterly clear warning by the Greek government that it is not about to tolerate the slightest interference in our country's domestic affairs nor the overturn in any way of the balance of forces in the Aegean.

The Americans had recently begun a provocative propaganda campaign against our country. Each day it took a different form, but its purpose was always clear. There were the statements by U.S. officials; the articles in newspapers that generally reflect the views of the U.S. government; the..."objections" (!) by mid-level officials to the content of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou's speech to the PASOK congress; the solid indications that the United States will attempt to overturn the 7:10 ratio; and the reports that they will put obstacles in the way of our obtaining military equipment. All this shows that our "allies" are testing our nerves and noting our reactions.

Once again, however, any plans against our country fell through. The government reacted decisively and decided to denounce the agreement on the bases and to review the entire complex of relations between Greece and the United States if the latter "forgot" the obligations it undertook vis-a-vis Greece in signing the treaty. All this doubtlessly destroyed any inclination to extend the run of this vulgar mini-series of hidden challenges.

The government spokesman stated categorically that a precondition if the treaty on the status of the bases is to remain in force is that it be observed faithfully and its terms be implemented, and immediately afterwards the U.S. State Department issued "calming" communiques. This shows that the Americans

understand only one language: the language of national dignity and the refusal to negotiate on anything that has to do with our country's security, independence, and sovereignty. And events have confirmed this as clearly as can be.

However, the lesson from all this is that some people who pretend to be friends of our country do not wish to realize that it is solely and exclusively the government elected by the vote of the sovereign Greek people that decides on the course that Greece will follow. Hence they persist in being "displeased" with our country's foreign policy when it does not go along with their own pursuits. This does in fact happen rather often--and it happens because the national interest, the only thing considered in the government's decisions, demands it. And since it happens, these "allies" plan to do us injury in order to "punish" us for not "consulting" them before we do or say something, as we used to do.

With this in mind each one can draw his own conclusions on the following question: whenever Greek-American relations are tense and certain Greek political forces hasten to defend the...Americans, either by accusing the government of "distancing itself" from the "alliance" or by keeping silent, who does this position of theirs serve in the end! Let them remember though that the Greek people knows who is struggling unwaveringly for its interests. And it knows who has put those interests in the service of the "allies'" plans, even when they go against our national existence.

12593

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POLITICAL

GREECE

BRIEFS

WHAT IS IN A NAME--Former Deputy Minister of Press and Information Ath. Tsaldaris maintains that, because of his name, he should be placed second on the list of New Democracy candidates, right after the chairman of the party. He claims that the name "Tsaldaris" will attract at least 3 percent of the voters on a pan-hellenic scale. [Text] [Athens TAKHYDROMOS in Greek 9 Aug 84 p 7]

CSO: 3521/335

EASTERN BLOC ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED

Zurich DIE WELTWOCHEN in German 26 Jul 84 pp 21-22

[Article by Marcel H. Keiser: "Because an Ounce of Espionage Is Worth a Pound of Theory"]

[Text] Switzerland as Distributing Center

It is true that the suspicious-looking truck merely contained electronic equipment for the Soviet United Nations mission in Geneva, which is being greatly expanded at the moment. But the extent of the equipment involved prompts the suspicion that it could also be used for intelligence purposes. The affair concerning the extra-large "diplomatic pouch" is another indication of the degree to which Switzerland is being used as an intelligence transshipment site.

Last week the producers of "Radio 24" had their listening audience try to guess what was probably being shipped in the mysterious Russian truck which for 10 days had been helping journalists in Switzerland and in other countries besides to come up with welcome headlines during the dog days of a slack period in news. An especially quick-witted listener proclaimed that the vehicle, which was provided with the seal of the Moscow foreign ministry, was transporting the Olympic team of the Soviet Union--which as is known is leading the boycott of the socialist countries against the summer games in Los Angeles.

But ever since last weekend now, when the FRG had brought itself to make massive threatening gestures by blocking the truck at the German-German border crossing of Helmstedt (whereupon Moscow finally backed down, and for the purpose of a superficial inspection by FRG agents it let the vehicle be driven to the extraterritorial premises of the USSR's embassy in Bonn), it has been known what it was that the Soviets officially reported as freight in accordance with the belatedly deposited waybill: Radio equipment, decrypting devices, and other technical equipment and furniture for their Geneva UN mission, which is being expanded at present. According to the relevant Vienna Convention, to transport such goods under the protection of diplomatic immunity is absolutely legal--in any case, with the depositing

of the papers the formalities were satisfied, and therefore by now the "Sovtransauto" truck has been allowed to leave capitalist territory.

When on 11 July at 1415 hours the transport vehicle queued up at the Basel-Weil customs office for clearance, the Swiss border guards expected a routine process. (At first the only thing they found surprising was that the vehicle--which according to later statements from Bonn government spokesman Peter Boenisch supposedly had driven for a day and a half around the FRG--did not carry any German container seal). That is, the moving of tons of diplomatic material at a time is not a rarity. But for the first time the Soviet Foreign Ministry had not affixed its seal separately on the parcels but rather on the truck itself, whereby it declared the latter as a whole to be a "valise diplomatique," a "diplomatic bag." But after all the Swiss did not want to let such a monstrous baggage pass through as a diplomatic pouch: They insisted on the customary bill of lading, which the Soviets just as stubbornly refused to hand over. For what reason Moscow was suddenly acting outside the customary norm can only be speculated on: A trial balloon? A deliberate provocation? A foolish blunder partly due to the midsummer heat?

As is now possible to learn subsequently in official Bern, when the sealed-up truck stood within the grounds of the Red mission in Geneva, the Soviets wanted to meet the Swiss halfway: They offered to allow half of the shipment to be inspected, while insisting on the other hand that the other half had to remain concealed. But because Swiss officials do not want to see themselves as being on friendly terms with Levantine carpet dealers, they rejected the deal. The watchword from the Bundeshaus on this game of obfuscation always went: Everything or nothing!

However, in other respects official Bern was painstakingly endeavoring to avoid a severe confrontation, for which reason it considered the affair solely under the rubric of "customs problems." For this reason it has also escaped the notice of the Swiss public hitherto that the Soviets not only have formally protested in Bonn, but have done this likewise in our country. To be sure, in place of the official demarche in the form of a telegram they chose the diplomatic backstairs, since instead of the Bern office of Foreign Minister Pierre Aubert they selected Switzerland's permanent mission to the United Nations in Geneva as their addressee. In parallel with this all the available telephone lines were buzzing: Although the Russian bear was hemming and hawing discreetly, nevertheless for the timid excellencies of the Aubert entourage this sounded like an unpleasantly shrill descant. A high official of the ministry--who has already internalized pallidness to such an extent that any resemblance to his former self seems to him to be pure coincidence, and who for that reason does not want to read his name in the newspapers--made known to the WELTWOCHTE conspiratorially: "The Soviets have intervened at all levels."

Interest in Emigrants

Meanwhile the pressure has dissipated itself without effect in the department of treasurer Otto Stich, to which is assigned the overall management of the customs and which has stubbornly dug in its heels. The

only people allowed to properly enjoy this thriller were the two drivers, who with a few bottles of beer as provisions lounged in the sunshine while waiting around at the Basel-Weil customs office.

Of course it is a bit much at last to have a truck which in its entirety is supposed to pass through as a "diplomatic pouch." However, for years now Western intelligence and counterintelligence services have been alarmed to a much greater extent by a fleet of other vehicles from the mammoth Red empire and its satellite states. Sweden has been infuriated that "Sovtransauto" trucks time and again choose routes through a militarily sensitive area. A vehicle checked by the Austrian police contained equipment for measuring road widths as well as the load-carrying capacity of bridges; such information is of interest to armored forces and other units supplied with heavy equipment. Netherlands counterespionage has identified more than 20 Russian truck drivers as officers of Soviet armored units. These have regularly handed over papers and smaller electronic devices to members of the USSR's mission at the Hague: It was finally ascertained that in particular the water depths in the canals and rivers were being measured. National Council member Ernst Muehleemann, who is experienced as a brigade commander, declares that in Switzerland as well Soviet trucks would often pass over key military terrain for some strange reason, especially during important maneuvers.

Attorney Roland Hauenstein, the public-relations officer of the Federal Prosecutor's Office, draws a complex picture in this ticklish affair: According to his information, neither Swiss counterintelligence nor "friendly services" have any certain evidence for the contention that the trucks are carrying on board electronic reconnaissance equipment. On the other hand, he said, there exists evidence "in a political direction": According to this, in some cases drivers have the task of finding the whereabouts of refugees. That over and above this they are also entrusted with military snooping around seems "reasonable" as well to the Federal Prosecutor's Office, although it lacks the any proof of this--or at least that is the official line.

Since World War II Switzerland has granted asylum to thousands of refugees from the East. Thus a total of 15,800 Hungarians entered the country between 1956 and 1981, and since 1968 there have been about 14,000 Czechs; some 3,000 Poles came in 1979/80. Under the cloak of their diplomatic status, the Eastern intelligence people are spiritedly tracking down the emigrants; the circumstances of the refugees are investigated for the purpose of enticing these people to carry out secret-service objectives for the old homeland, or at least for the purpose of recognizing even at an embryonic stage every impulse towards an opposition movement emerging in exile.

Blackmail in the Consulate

In any case, activity in this connection is particularly strong on the part of the Yugoslavs, whose underground secret service is unabashedly and also doggedly waging a secret war against refugee Croats above all. In this connection Switzerland is faced with the delicate problem of measuring out

the proper degree of intervention: Namely, if it steps in too energetically, it runs the risk of ultimately playing into the hands of the Soviets, who always have a vital interest in any destabilizing of the Yugoslav multinational state. But conversely our conception of the law does not allow Swiss territory to become a freely usable playground for disreputable elements.

A new pattern from the sewing box of perfidy which is intended to serve the aim of catching emigrants on the secret-service hook has come to the knowledge of National Council member Fritz Hofmann. According to the remarks made by this Bern SVP [Swiss People's Party] deputy, above all those refugees from the East who are in contact with relatives in their original homeland "systematically come under pressure": "It is here that the intelligence specialists think that they have before them a pool of informants," he explains to WELTWOCH. The sordid game begins when the refugee wants to visit relatives or friends who have remained behind and therefore applies for a visa at the consular office of the state in question.

Secret Service Diplomats

He says that for the most part the attempt to sign them on thereupon runs on two tracks: On the one hand the applicant is encouraged to accept a temporary special passport or a consular passport from his former homeland (which spares him possibly troublesome stampings later in his Swiss passport). But such a double identity violates international regulations, whereby the applicant is already wriggling on the hook: "The bearer of the special passport," according to Hofmann, "becomes vulnerable to blackmail because of his transgression--by those who have talked into him into committing the transgression." On the other track, according to the finding of the former chairman of the People's Party, the consular officials play up the arguments involving a "personal ban against visits" and "a restriction on leaving the country" for those who have stayed at home: The threatened measures will "bring to heel" the applicants again and again. However, the Federal Prosecutor's Office is more mollifying here, since according to its own evidence it does not have any knowledge of such happenings.

On the other hand, one resigns oneself without debate to the finding that the embassies and consulates of the communist East Bloc countries are virtual spy nests. Experts think that in some places up to two thirds of the diplomatic personnel of the USSR missions belong to the Soviet secret service KGB or to the GRU, the intelligence organization of the Red Army. In Bern the Eastern superpower has accredited no less than 28 ostensible diplomats, and it has another 61 in Geneva with the United Nations and some of its sub-organizations (added to which are three representatives from the Ukraine and two from Byelorussia, all of whom reside in the buildings of the Soviet mission). The army of assistants exceeds the number of "diplomats" many times over: It was declared at one time that in Switzerland about 700 Soviet functionaries are active, with this figure covering members of the State Trading Bank, Aeroflot, and diverse newspapers and press agencies, and including at least 200 people on the

payroll of the KGB. John Barron, an American expert, also counts Ivan Ivanovitch Ippolitov, the new Soviet ambassador in Bern, as a KGB officer.

The GDR assigns 10 diplomats to Bern, 11 to Geneva. For Bulgaria the reference figures are 8/9, for Hungary 7/12, for Poland 11/9, for Romania 5/6, and for Czechoslovakia 10/11. One never knows definitely who really has the say--it could even be the chauffeur. But in any case they are all harnessed together in a gigantic intelligence system with the Soviet Union to help the 10,000 eyes of the KGB already in place to spy out the capitalist enemy even more intensively. How the division of labor works in this trawl-net was elucidated by Switzerland when in September 1982 Bern police assault troops stormed the occupied Polish embassy and in the process comprehensive dossiers fell into their hands: Defense attache Zygmunt Dobruszewski had spied on our military airports in meticulous detail.

Computers Instead of Bombs

The swollen numbers of personnel of certain embassies has annoyed the Federal authorities again and again. With a gentle steadfastness in recalling the Vienna Convention, according to which the tasks and the personnel should be in a reasonable relationship to one another, the country is seeking to put a stop to these things, but so far has shied away from taking draconian measures. In any case, in the first 6 months of 1983 alone bans on admission to the country were imposed on 60 Soviet diplomats found guilty of espionage in other countries.

Since 1948 a total of 262 cases have been counted of news agencies banned in this country, of which a good 177 were on behalf of communist countries. In some cases Switzerland serves as the operational base for activities which aim at third-party states, but to a not insignificant extent the tentacles are spreading towards Switzerland itself: The trade mission of the Soviet Union in Bern has parked itself at a location which of all places is next to the Central Office for General Defense, in the spring of 1982 an Aeroflot cargo airplane strangely enough got off to one side of the prescribed flight path, and the Bern branch of the Soviet news agency "Novosti," which was closed by the Federal Council last year, had specialized in disinformation and had meddled extensively in the domestic politics scene in Switzerland. Twice now the government offices of the Federal Government, the cantons, and the communes have had to be cautioned about not listening gullibly to requests arising from the collecting mania of East European libraries and institutes.

If formerly military targets above all were the sorts of things in the sights of the foreign spies, today to a greatly increasing extent interest is directed at the economic sector as well as at the latest in the sphere of leading technologies. Because the United States has ordered strict restrictions on the exporting of sensitive goods to Poland and Afghanistan, now the Soviets and their satellites are seeking to circumvent the so-called Cocom [Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy] list by using every intelligence trick in the book and by employing enormous

resources. There is an impressive description of how much agility is being seen in connection with the actions being taken in this regard in "DEFENSE NATIONALE," a French technical journal. Since this magazine represents an unequalled treasure trove of details, the Federal Prosecutor's Office has declared it to be required reading for its officials.

12114

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OZAL MAKES MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENT ON GREECE

Ozal Conciliatory Toward Athens

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 25 Jul 84 pp 1, 11

[Article by Hasan Uysal reporting breakfast press conference by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal in Batman on 24 Jul 1984: "We Have Not Least Desire for Single Inch of Soil"]

[Test] Batman/Diyarbakir - Prime Minister Turgut Ozal asserted that Turkey "has not the least desire for a single inch of Greek soil." He said the two countries would be able to solve their problems after a long, slow process of rapprochement without emphasizing the "30 years of accumulated problems" between Greece and Turkey. Stating that by acting on the step-by-step approach, Turkey would be able to provide electricity and water to the Greek islands, Ozal said, "Our thinking is that unilateral easements are necessary from the standpoint of rapprochement between the two nations." The prime minister said, in reference to Greek Prime Minister Papandreou's attitude, that "seats cannot be taken around the negotiation table under conditions unacceptable to Turkey." "If they were to say, 'We will not let you into the Common Market,' then it would lead to hostility and bring about a situation even more tense than it is today," he said. The prime minister said both nations suffered from the tension, that they were arming and "money which could be spent elsewhere was going to the wrong places because of this."

The prime minister has been in Eastern Anatolia for 5 days with a huge contingent of more than 80 ministers, national deputies, undersecretaries, top level bureaucrats and journalists. After spending the previous night at Turkish Petroleum Corporation facilities, he had a breakfast interview yesterday morning at which reporters' questions concentrated on foreign policy matters. During the interview, at which the speech by former Greek Foreign Minister George Mavros, carried by CUMHURIYET 2 days ago, was discussed, Ozal explained the Motherland Party government's approach to and general stance on Turkish-Greek differences. He said:

"Ever since taking office, we have tried to put relations with Greece on a more moderate, more practical and more realistic footing with the hope of resolving the problems. Of course, these have a particular background. Looking at it realistically, as one must, this background comprises a period of almost 30 years during which relations began to grow strained, no problems were resolved in this period, but on the contrary grew gradually worse. Just as experiments to date at the international or other levels in the context of negotiations have not brought results, these negotiations have, unfortunately, made matters worse."

"As a result," he continued, "An atmosphere seems to have come over Greece as if Turkey had designs on Greek territory, in which it is caught up in worrying that 'Turkey is going to attack me.' As we have said numerous times, we have no desire for an inch of Greek soil."

Ozal said, "I am saying plainly, we have not the least desire for Greek territory," then speculated that Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou thought he had won by being tough on Turkey in his election campaign. "Maybe so, maybe not. There was a much harsher trend after the elections. Now, another election is coming up. The atmosphere of tense relations in the next election, in my opinion, would not help him. On the contrary, it is necessary to do the opposite. Just as we have done." Ozal explained:

"From the time we took office, it has not been our thinking to say we have many problems with Greece and we should lay them out before us and solve them. That is, we have not made the same old mistakes, because these are problems that have accumulated over 30 years' time. In order to solve them, a long period of mild weather is necessary. Friendships must evolve first.

"We two nations are near neighbors. Why should better relations not develop, or why haven't they? Look, for example, at the islands right under our nose. I do not want to say anything, but these islands ought to be an opportunity for friendship. We ought to be able to come and go and so should they. Providing for the large part of the islands from Greece is very expensive for Greece. Actually, supplying from Turkey, getting certain goods from Turkey, is extremely important to the touristic development of those islands. Why haven't they figured this out? We would benefit, also, as tourists who went there would come here also. Relations of this sort would bring the people who live in that area closer together. Needless toughness, needless hostility will not resolve these problems."

Lifting Visa Requirement

Prime Minister Turgut Ozal then explained the purpose behind Ankara's unilateral discontinuation of the visa requirement for Greek citizens within this context, as follows:

"We unilaterally decided that we were going to discontinue the visa requirement. It is not easy to do it unilaterally. Of course, we do not expect Papandreou to jump up and say immediately, 'Turkey lifted it, let me do so, too.' Such did not enter our mind, because people have committed themselves and cannot immediately turn around. Perhaps change will be possible slowly, over a period of time. Our thinking is that they will see the seriousness of our intentions and be able to change over time. We do not intend to reinstate our visa if they do not lift theirs. Our thinking is that easements of this sort are necessary from the standpoint of rapprochement between the two nations. We think this is the way to rapprochement."

What Will Happen

As regards the probable future of relations, Ozal said:

"What will happen in the future, can we reach agreement? We can provided we stay away from difficult problems...if that is made a condition. Now and then Papan-dreou will say, 'I will negotiate if the UN resolutions are not applied on Cyprus.' So negotiations are impossible. This kind of approach is impossible. Seats cannot be taken around the negotiation table under conditions unacceptable to Turkey. Then, if they were to say, 'I will not let you into the Common Market, then it would lead to hostility, that is, it is more dangerous. This hostility would lead to political hostility. That is, it would bring about a situation even more tense than it is today."

After discussing the likelihood of growing tension, the prime minister was asked whether there would be new "unilateral easements" for Greece. He replied:

"Actually, we are considering more freedom in these matters. I think we may even not demand a passport at some point. I think identification would be sufficient. Passports are required under present conditions, and I know Greece makes some trouble even over those. It would be nice if they stopped the harassment of people coming to Turkey. We may offer some easements having to do with the islands, with supplying them. If they had a water problem, we could supply water. There is an electricity problem, I believe, and their electricity has become a great deal more expensive. Yet, the islands are only 2 or 3 miles from us, and cable could be stretched."

Face to Face

In answer to a question about the statement "Papandreou-Ozal can solve their problems" appearing in the remarks by former Greek Foreign Minister Mavros published by CUMHURIYET, Ozal first said, "It is not something that could happen by chance by two top-level people coming face to face." "First the atmosphere of rapprochement would slowly emerge, then they would meet. Not so much would come out of the meeting, but it would be step by step," he said. "What Mavros was saying came from the idea that the two countries alone would be able to solve the problems," he ruminated, adding, "That is my opinion also." "That is, there is no need for anyone else. We will sit down and resolve. There is no need for the United Nations," he said.

Asked whether he was hopeful of rapprochement-agreement, the prime minister replied that he was "realistic" and continued: "This tension brings injury to both countries. They go ahead with a certain amount of arming themselves and we look at them and start thinking, 'Oh, they are buying arms, let us do so, too.' The upshot, of course, is that money which could be spent elsewhere is going to the wrong places because of this tension. We have to think better."

Cemal Ponders Greek Response

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 25 Jul 84 pp 1, 7

[Article by Hasan Cemal: "...But Ozal Again Extended His Hand"]

[Text] If you were to ask Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoglu to name one of the most basic tenets of Turkish foreign policy, you would likely get this answer:

--An important quality that we deem unchanging and have no desire to change in our foreign policy is the objective assessment of events without alarm or excitability and to act at all times with composure. Our government's behavior is on this track...

It may be said that policy towards Greece is being conducted along the lines of which Mr Halefoglu speaks. In fact, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal gave a further example of this in his replies to reporters' questions on Turkish-Greek relations yesterday morning in Batman.

In a statement tantamount to a reply to remarks made to CUMHURIYET by George Mavros, a former Greek foreign minister, Ozal underscored several important points, as follows:

--As we have said many times, we have no desire for even an inch of Greek soil. Of course, as long as tension continues between the two countries and, indeed, as long as Greece is taking measures on the islands in violation of agreements, we are forced to take counter measures. I am saying plainly, we have not the least desire for Greek territory.

--Prime Minister Papandreou has another election coming up. He believes he won by being tough on relations with Turkey. The atmosphere of tense relations, in my opinion, will not help him. On the contrary, it is necessary to do the opposite. Just as we have done.

--If he were to say, "I will not let Turkey into the Common Market," then it would lead to hostility. That is dangerous. This hostility would lead on to political hostility. That is, to a situation even more tense than it is today.

--Needless toughness and needless hostility cannot solve problems. This tension is damaging to both countries. They are arming themselves. And we look at them and start thinking, "Let us arm ourselves."

--There is no need for anyone else. If the two nations put our heads together, we will solve these problems over time between ourselves.

Along with these remarks in Batman, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal came up with yet another of the unilateral demonstrations of good will he has been promoting since taking office. Underscoring and re-underscoring the line that Turkey "has no desire for Greek soil," Mr Ozal repeated that he was ready to seek dialogue. What other conditions for dialogue could there be from the standpoint of the Papandreou administration?

The Ozal administration is being criticized by certain circles in our country for its Greek policy. Ankara is said to be following "too conciliatory" a line in connection with the problems between Turkey and Greece.

One cannot say that all of these criticisms are unrealistic.

Mr Papandreou must have figured out that friendships cannot last forever on one-sided good will and concessions. Friendships become lasting in the degree that they reflect a realistic balance of mutual rights and interests.

At present, Prime Minister Ozal insists on going forward with his "unilateral good will" policy. Once again, he has extended his hand across the Aegean.

We shall see, will Mr Ozal's hand, once again, be left in mid-air? Or will the first glimmerings of a move towards dialogue become visible from Athens?

8349

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KOHEN CONDITIONAL APPROVAL OF OZAL 'OLIVE BRANCH' TO GREECE

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 2 Aug 84 p 2

[Article by Sami Kohen]

[Text] Prime Minister Ozal's extension of the "olive branch" to Greece one more time impelled, at least, Greek Prime Minister Papandreou to speak a little more softly.

And this can be considered an advance.

We had grown accustomed to Papandreou's directing harsh words toward Turkey at every opportunity since coming to power -- and, of course, prior to that time. Now, his rhetorical statements such as that made at his recent press conference, "We wish to live in peace in this region and with good relations with our neighbors," and that made in talks with our Athens ambassador, Akiman, "We, too, are always ready to extend the olive branch," are signs of, at the least, a "change in style."

It can be asked, "What, practically speaking, is changed? Papandreou's basic views on the Turkish-Greek impasse and his feelings toward Turkey have not changed."

This is true. The Greek prime minister still maintains the old, rigid position on the topic of the impasse. He clearly stated this at the press conference. He repeated his views, about which we are aware, on problems related to both Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, placed the entire blame for the disagreements and tensions on Turkey, and, once again, stressed that he does not see a need for any negotiations whatsoever on these problems.

There was more. Papandreou did not take seriously Ozal's "gestures" to provide water and electricity to islands near the Turkish coast and to return, in time, Greek Turks who were expelled from Turkey. On the topic of visas, he gave an implausible excuse to show why Greece is unable to act as Turkey does.

This is to say that, in response to Ozal's splendid words, there has been absolutely no change in Papandreou's policies.

But that was impossible anyway.

Who would expect a change in Papandreou's views in the face of an olive branch adorned with marvelous gestures?

We do not, in the least, believe that Ozal or the framers of foreign policy in Ankara harbored the faintest hope on this issue.

It was this action from Ankara, a last-resort effort, that could -- and did -- have a positive effect on world opinion and that could -- and, as can be seen, did -- force Papandreou to alter, if not his policies, at least his style of speaking.

The interpretations that, when making these gestures, Turkey humbled itself before the Greeks, cringed before them, or even offered them concessions are not at all accurate.

Which foreign-policy goals are being abandoned, which rights are being surrendered by extending an olive branch to Athens?

If, however, the policy pursued toward Greece started out from the belief that it is necessary to rely on a "cudgel" rather than an "olive branch," then everything would be different!

We believe that even those who are unhappy with the olive-branch policy consider a position with Greece leading to peace and reconciliation preferable to a policy that will create crises and tension.

There is no doubt that Turkey will not bow down to Papandreou's demands nor abandon its fundamental views so as to achieve detente and rapprochement in Turkish-Greek relations.

After emphasizing this, however, we also say that, as long as the Turkish-Greek impasse continues to exist and the problems which are so difficult to solve remain unsolved, the two neighboring countries must not act as enemies and must engage in actions and contacts that will be able to alleviate reciprocal suspicions, fears, and insecurities.

Wherever a Turk and a Greek meet in the world, they immediately become friends.

A Turk traveling in Greece and a Greek coming to Turkey are affected and moved by what they see and feel and by the similarities they discover.

What they say during exchange visits, which are numerous this tourist season, clearly confirms this.

Can't these wonderful sentiments also be carried over into politics?

Can't Turks and Greeks live as friends, side-by-side with their problems?

Can't such a closeness and softening between peoples create an environment more favorable for the governments' solution of disagreements in the future, if not today?

Turkey's answer to all these questions is, "Yes."

As long as there is nothing to lose -- and there is nothing to lose at this time, it is best to continue to hold out the olive branch.

BIRAND ON DIPLOMATIC IMPACT OF DISK, PEACE ASSOCIATION TRIALS

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 31 Jul 84 p 9

[Editorial by M. Ali Birand: "The West Awaits the Conclusion of Two Trials"]

[Text] The decision to hasten political trials-- particularly in the case of DISK (Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions) and the Peace Association-- is an extremely appropriate one and an extremely worthwhile one from Turkey's standpoint.

No one in Turkey could possibly want to see people who were involved in incidents of terror or who took the lives of others for political or ideological reasons go unpunished, because the "right to live" is the most precious, inviolable right in this world.

It is for this reason that, as the trend to abolish capital punishment has been growing stronger throughout the world, attempts by persons to impose their views upon others through terrorism have been drawing more and more reaction. Trying and sentencing people for ideas or political convictions outside the realm of terrorism, on the other hand, is a practice that has begun to disappear in civilized countries.

Within this context, bringing trials like those of DISK and the Peace Association to a speedy conclusion would openly expose who was and who was not involved in terrorism, and these cases would be closed. Closing them, moreover, would be tremendously beneficial both in terms of reinforcing peace within Turkey and in terms of our foreign relations, particularly our relations with Europe.

Although eight months have passed since we entered into the "period of transition to democracy" following the elections, our relations with Western Europe remain at a standstill. Despite the promises our Foreign Minister received during his recent tours and despite repeatedly successful initiatives, nothing is happening. Contrary to all that is said, we have seen no definitive effort in either Germany, Italy, the EC Commission, or

the European Parliament to remedy this "standstill." Many of us noticed how the EEC had tried to keep the Turkish-EEC Association Committee meeting in late July on the technical level and avoid giving it a political character.

The reason: Expectations...

The DISK and Peace Association trials top the list of issues upsetting Turkey's relations with Western Europe, and the activities of organizations that expect to modify their positions on the basis of the outcome of these trials is not to be underestimated....

Three union confederations consisting of 155 million members have been putting constant pressure on the organizations with which Turkey has relations (e.g. the EEC, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe). Similarly, voting by liberal, social democratic, and socialist parliamentarians in both national and international parliaments is being influenced to a significant degree.

However, Turkey's relations with Western Europe will be on the agenda of several organizations this fall, and attempts will be made to answer the question of whether relations should remain at a standstill or be reactivated.

-- At the end of September, the Council of Europe will be re-examining developments in Turkey, and the issue having the most impact on this meeting will be the outcome of the DISK and Peace Association trials.

-- In October, the European Parliament will be opening Turkey's case and rendering a decision.

-- Probably between November and December, or in the first half of 1985, the EEC will be taking into consideration the decision reached by the European Parliament and naturally the approaches of the union confederations, and it will be undertaking a new initiative to get relations "out of the refrigerator."

-- The "aid" question in the U.S. Congress is also going to be influenced to some degree by the conclusion of the DISK and Peace Association trials, even if not to the extent that the European organizations are going to be. This is because the U.S. Congress has also been watching these developments with increased interest.

In summary, it would be no exaggeration to say that hastening these two trials would be greatly beneficial in terms of the above upcoming scenario, and that Turkey's relations with Western Europe are going to be affected significantly by the outcome of these trials.

OPPOSITION PARTIES RAP CHANGE IN EMERGENCY LAW

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 31 Jul 84 pp 1, 8

[Text] Ankara (ANKARA NEWS AGENCY) -- With the exception of the Nationalist Democracy Party (MDP), opposition parties have been reacting strongly to the decree of legal force which, by changing the State of Emergency Law, prevents recourse to litigation because of personal and administrative actions of governors. The decree is currently under review by President Kenan Evren.

Cezmi Kartay, Deputy Chairman of the Social Democracy Party (SODEP), stated that the decree of legal force prepared by the government was an attempt to turn a 'state of emergency' into 'civilian martial law.' He maintained that the decree was a new and dangerous product of the government's tendency to operate the country outside the control of the Grand National Assembly. He continued:

"Besides giving governors excessive power, this decree also puts citizens who might be harmed by personal and administrative actions of governors in a position where they cannot seek out their rights. It is impossible to reconcile this decree with the concept of 'a state governed by the rule of law.' An arrangement of this sort is illegal and unconstitutional."

Populist Party (HP) General Secretary Aydin Guven Gurkan made the following statement to ANKARA NEWS AGENCY, criticizing the change to be made in the State of Emergency Law through the decree of legal force:

"We, the Populist Party, could never consent to the removal of a crucial guarantee of our constitutional order such as cutting off recourse to litigation because of personal and administrative actions of governors. Nor could we ever consent to having restrictions imposed on an irrevocable social right such as the right to strike."

Riza Ulucak, Deputy Chairman of the Prosperity Party (RP), remarked that democracies had no place for despotism, that inability to have recourse to litigation because of administrative actions of governors would create a vacuum, and that the vacuum would be filled by despotism.

Correct Way Party (DYP) Chairman Yildirim Avcı termed it "wrong" to cut off recourse to litigation because of administrative actions of governors. Noting that "All power carries with it responsibility," he added:

"As power increases, the responsibility with which it is to be used must be clearly defined. Governors must be open to litigation for all of their actions. If they are not, this is a violation of the law. Cutting off recourse to litigation because of administrative actions of governors-- even if it is during a state of emergency-- will cause irresponsibility among governors to spread throughout the country."

MDP Secretary Ulku Soylemezoglu said that his party had not studied the draft yet. He maintained, however, that a situation aimed at disrupting the country and the integrity of the state could exist in provinces where a state of emergency was declared. "In this respect," he noted, "I think it is perfectly normal for governors to be granted extraordinary power."

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12279

BARLAS ON JUDICIAL FLAWS PROMPTING REFORM

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 13 Aug 84 p 1

["Today" column by Mehmet Barlas: "Judicial Reform"]

[Text] It is an indisputable fact that our written laws as well as our judicial system have suffered erosion and have become outmoded in the face of the changing conditions of our time.

This situation must be remedied without hurting the concepts of justice and law. "Supremacy of the law" in Turkey can only become possible if the judicial system functions effectively and if the laws are workable.

We know that for years several institutions have taken part in this quest which we may call "judicial reform." This work, which began with Supreme Court opinions and continued with studies by academicians, was reflected in a draft proposal prepared by a Ministry of Justice commission. For example, changes envisaged in divorce provisions in "Family Law" have already been made public.

However, the area covered by the Civil Code is not the only field where "judicial reform" is needed.

Certain provisions which have lost much of their functionality and effectiveness in procedural law as well the Trade Law and the Companies and Bankruptcy Law must be updated. If, in addition to these changes, the courts and legal procedures are reorganized so that they can operate more smoothly, the judicial machinery in Turkey will surely work more effectively than it is now.

There are plenty of examples.

For instance, in legal disputes today, the judicial system virtually protects the debtor against the creditor as a result of available stalling tactics in procedure and very light penalties.

The backlog in court cases, the fact that all evidence is not gathered before the trial, the fact that the late payment interest in the Debts Law is still 5 percent, the inadequacy of penalties for unpaid checks and the fact that it is easy to evade judicial warrants are problems that feed on each other. Mechanisms such as objecting to the judge or denying a signature are now being used to prolong a trial rather than as manifestations of justice.

From Justice Minister Necat Eldem's statements we have learned that preparations for "judicial reform" are progressing. That is encouraging.

However, law is not like the economy. Judicial reform is absolutely essential. The draft proposals prepared on this issue must be made available in advance for debate in the public and among jurists.

Perhaps, experiments such as the "South Korean model" or the "Japanese model" are allowable in the economy. But, in law, all possible alternatives must be discussed before a system is endorsed. That way, reform would become functional as soon as it is finalized.

9558

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POLITICAL, MILITARY FACTORS OF DEFENSE DOCTRINE

Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG in German 28, 31 Jul 84; 1, 2, 3 Aug 84

[Report by Edmund Entacher and Dr Leo Specht: "The Austrian Defense Doctrine"]

[28 Jul 84 p 37]

[Text] When the Austrian national defense plan was adopted by the legislature in 1983, it marked the preliminary conclusion of the so-called "defense reform" initiated in 1972. Since that time there has been unanimity among the political parties and in the infrequent articles appearing in the Austrian press. Above all, there were no substantive issues which arose with regard to national defense. In fact, a typically Austrian consensus of leaving well enough alone has prevailed.

The present study, for its part, attempts to discuss some basic problems connected with the Austrian defense doctrine and in particular, the question of the political and social considerations connected with its feasibility.

As distinct from those who criticize the specifically military aspects of the present doctrine and concentrate on efforts to weaken or even annul it, we consider our critique of the plan to be constructive. By calling attention to some conceptual weaknesses of the plan and challenging some of its controversial assumptions, we feel we are making a contribution toward the practical execution of the present (military) defense doctrine.

This is our purpose because the doctrine goes beyond traditional military logic; because it restricts the capabilities of the military establishment to defensive ends and above all, because it opens the armed forces to social movements. The armed forces appear to have become more controllable—and this statement in itself raises questions which are to be dealt with below.

The structure of our present study is as follows: the parameters of the existing defense doctrine; an analysis of defense theories; the new Austrian defense theory; the political and social aspects of the Austrian model.

Parameters of Existing Defense Doctrine

Since attaining its independence in 1955, Austria has committed herself to the maintenance of "everlasting neutrality" and its preservation "by all the means available to her." This latter, very broad—so as not to say vague—language contained in the Austrian state treaty has been interpreted from the outset as a commitment to Austrian self-defense by military means. The Western signatories of the state treaty in particular made compliance with this commitment an explicit condition for withdrawing from those sections of the country which they had occupied since the end of the war in 1945.

At that time, however, the dominant ideas on military defense were the very ones which had been applied during World War II between 1939 and 1945. But even the strategic and tactical concepts of those powers which could be viewed as posing a threat to Austrian sovereignty as of 1955 were based on these same traditions. What all these concepts had in common was that they exceeded the capabilities of a small country like Austria. Both a small-size "Wehrmacht" and some version of the Western or Eastern armed forces went beyond the real-world capabilities of our country. Any such military force would be a mere caricature that could not satisfy our demands, i.e. it could not afford anything like adequate protection for our country. Although this was quite apparent at the very outset, the political leaders issued a call for the creation of a small-scale "Wehrmacht" in 1955. The military leaders, for their part, most of whom were former German Wehrmacht officers from World War II, had never been taught to think along other lines and thus went ahead with the establishment of just such a small-size conventional army, using the large quantities of military equipment left behind by the Allies.

The resulting squeeze between the commitment to preserving national sovereignty and the capabilities of the instrumentalities created for that purpose became ever tighter with the passage of time. The inefficiency of Austrian national defense which became apparent in the course of maneuvers (such as "Bear Claw") in the late sixties resulted in an identity crisis for the military defense concepts of the nation.

This crisis of legitimacy was the result of both the clearly visible deficiencies of the military establishment and a reawakening of pacifist sentiments in Austria.

The experiences of the First Republic (between 1918 and 1933) cast a long shadow over those of the Second Republic (starting in 1945). In the 1934 civil war, the then Austrian armed forces constituted one of the main pillars of the fascist regime and were primarily responsible for the violent liquidation of the labor movement and of democracy. Ever since, social democratic and labor union mass organizations kept their distance or were even openly opposed to the national military establishment.

In addition, the slogans of the European protest and youth movements had an impact both on the mass media and the military defense of the nation. By the late sixties, large segments of the public looked upon the armed forces as a graphic expression of the backwardness and ineptitude of the Austrian political system.

During the 1970 parliamentary elections, the SPÖ raised the issue along these very lines. The Austrian political system should be changed, it was argued. The military defense of the nation, as symbolized by its armed forces, was said to be a farce and a reform of the armed forces was promised.

The 1970 parliamentary elections did in fact bring about a change. The first social democratic majority government in Austrian history took office. But it soon became evident that the social democrats did not have a plan for the reform of the military establishment. As a result, the conceptual crisis, which had been restricted to the armed forces themselves, now took hold of the social democrats who had been their most outspoken critics. In this situation, something of a compromise was worked out between the political leadership and at least some of the military men. Some of the latter said they were prepared to work up a new doctrine to supply the politicians with an appropriate model which could then be turned over to the military for implementation. The result of this exercise, generally speaking, has been the new Austrian defense doctrine.

On closer examination, however, we will find that this substantive weakness of the political leadership including political weakness vis-a-vis the military establishment and the conceptual weaknesses of the social democratic approach to national defense issues are at bottom responsible for the difficulties connected with the implementation of the doctrine itself.

The actual requirements of any new doctrine were predetermined by Austria's specific position in the world—by her neutrality; by the ban on joining any existing military alliance or to form a military alliance of her own. With regard to the commitment to her own military defense this meant that Austria had to come up with an effective national defense and would have to try—at least in the initial stages—to counter any possible military aggression without outside assistance.

Another requirement was based on the fact of Austria's small size. Her defense capabilities are clearly limited both in terms of manpower and economic and technological resources. It is also clear that a small country such as Austria can under no circumstances compete on the qualitative and even more so the quantitative levels of the big powers—and as compared to such a small country almost any aggressor—particularly in Europe, given its military blocs—falls into the category of a "big country."

Quite aside from that, the state treaty prohibits the Austrian armed forces from having specific weapons systems which have long since come to form the backbone of the conventional armies of the military blocs such as antitank and anti-aircraft missiles. But even those systems which Austria is not prohibited from having are in many instances quite unaffordable for a small country, if that country's defense expenditures are to be at all in keeping with its budgetary capabilities. Outside a military alliance which can distribute expenditures among its members, the cost explosion in the armament field is something a small country cannot deal with. In summarizing the above requirements, it is probably best to speak of material weaknesses as constituting the jumping-off point for the development of a new national defense doctrine for Austria. The first step which was taken, therefore, was to distinguish between those threats which might be met by a small country—without as yet saying how—and those which condemned such a country to total passivity; which were beyond its capabilities; to which it could not react. It is the nuclear threat which condemns such a nation to total passivity. If the assumption is that thermonuclear weapons would be used in an attack on Austria, then she could not react to such an attack being as small a country as she is. Under the circumstances, this particular eventuality was excluded from considerations regarding the new defense doctrine.

This is paradoxical; but only at first glance. To exclude a particular threat from considerations regarding a defense doctrine does not mean excluding the possibility that such an event might in fact occur. It merely means that it is beyond the capabilities of a small country to deal with it.

Under these circumstances, the possible threat is restricted to an attack by conventional means in which case a small country possesses a variety of options to meet the threat. Once more, there is one possible threat which has to be ruled out, namely the situation where a military alliance—which is to say a big power—wishes to conquer Austria. In such a case the small country in question has a brief period of reaction and defense available to it; but there is no question how such a confrontation would come out: the small country would succumb. There is a difference only in degree between the destruction caused by conventional weapons and that caused by a thermonuclear attack, if the object is to break down resistance by striking an annihilating blow. The horror connected with a conventional attack may be imaginable whereas in the case of a thermonuclear

attack it would not be. In the conventional situation, the resources of a small country would suffice to meet the threat—at least in theory. But in practice, the quantitative superiority of the aggressor would probably put an end to the attempt soon enough.

But the question is whether it is realistic to posit such an eventuality. Is it really conceivable that one of the existing military alliances in Europe would attack Austria without at the same time entering into direct confrontation with the other military bloc? Would one of the two blocs tacitly accept the possible operational advantage accruing to the other side from the occupation of Austrian territory? Conversely, is the occupation of Austria—given its limited resources—really attractive enough to provoke an attack by one of the two alliances in the course of a confrontation between them in Europe? In elaborating the Austrian doctrine, the answer given to this question was no. This means that any operation directed against Austria can only be viewed within the context of larger operations directed against the other alliance—which is to say against the real enemy. Any operations aimed at occupying different sections of Austria would be a subsidiary aspect of such large-scale undertakings.

But if that is the case, then one may assume the means to be employed by both the defender and the aggressor to be more nearly the same. The fact is that the aggressor would not be concentrating solely on the small country to be attacked. In such a situation, the defender's capabilities are enhanced, at least in theory. He can seek support from the real enemy of the aggressor (i.e. his primary target) which is to say from the other bloc and may expect to receive material assistance from him. But this, on the other hand, also increases the threat posed to the small country itself.

In other words, the threat which a small country like Austria might defend against would be a thrust by an aggressor through Austrian territory for the purpose of posing a direct threat to his real target, i.e. the other military bloc, in a new sector and perhaps surprising the enemy in the process. Such an operation might succeed, if the state whose sovereignty is violated cannot adequately defend itself. The simple threat to a small country—as was the case in Belgium in 1940—brings on a second danger which arises if and when the military bloc which has been taken by surprise and whose flanks are threatened concludes that the resistance offered by the small country whose sovereignty has been violated is inadequate to the task and decides to put a halt to its enemy's advance while still on the small country's territory. The entire destructive force of the confrontation between the two would then be unleashed on the small country.

If one considers this particular scenario to be a realistic one for Austria, then there is no other course left but to decide upon the most effective defense possible to meet such an attack. Which brings us back to our starting position—to the question of what means a small country is capable of investing and why they cannot withstand any direct confrontation with a large country.

[31 Jul 84 p 3]

[Text] The New Defense Theory

There have been a number of instances in the course of the 20th century where small countries under attack—or perhaps we should say: weak defenders—have successfully resisted a far superior aggressor. These instances have been studied on the basis of the force relationships involved for the purpose of drawing conclusions from them which might be generalized and applied to Austrian conditions. In the seventies, the most obvious such instance was the success of the Vietnamese in defending first against French colonialism and subsequently against American intervention. In World War II, it was the Yugoslav struggle for liberation from fascist occupation in particular which most corresponded to the scenario considered realistic in Austria's case and one which might be defended against. This assessment received additional support from the fact that the occupiers viewed Yugoslavia as a secondary war theater at all times and directed their primary attention elsewhere while the Yugoslav resistance movement was able to obtain third-country assistance.

In looking for theoretical concepts underlying military resistance against a superior foe, much valuable information was obtained from Mao's writings on China's resistance against Japanese aggression. It soon became clear that the connection between all these instances—from Vietnam to Yugoslavia to China—was Lenin's civil war theory which served as the starting point of the various theories which differed among themselves but slightly. But this brings us back to the statement we made at the end of the first article which was that we must begin by looking at the glaring material inferiority of the country under attack.

This also applies to the instances of successful resistance cited above—or at least for their initial stage. The defender appeared to be hopelessly inferior in terms of resources. In all cases, the solution to this problem always was beyond the means used and, by the same token, in the way in which they were used. The attacker's superiority in armaments was thus compensated for by strategic, operational and tactical means. Immediately upon initiating resistance, this occurred by avoiding the defender's own annihilation. Wherever the enemy was superior and wherever open combat would inevitably have led to annihilation, the already existing resistance forces avoided such combat entirely or engaged in it only to escape possible encirclement. As a general rule, the aggressor was never permitted to engage the defenders in actual battle—which is the classical means of bringing about a military decision. The traditional definition of 'battle' is that of a series of engagements interconnected in time and space. But in these instances there were just individual engagements and no link between these was ever permitted to exist. The huge military machine of the vastly superior attackers groped in the dark and did not achieve the expected quick and above all final victory. In those

instances where the defending forces sought out combat on their own, they did so because there was no risk involved. The purpose of such engagements—which went on become something of a symbol of the resistance struggle—was to capture materiel; to destabilize and, if possible, destroy the enemy; to shore up the morale of their own forces which in turn served to propagandize the struggle itself.

The name given by Mao to the relationship between the attacker and the defender during the initial stages of defense by a weak force against a strong force is the "stage of strategic attack and strategic defense" by the group under attack.

This procedure which calls for engaging in combat only if there is a hope of success and for not doing so whenever the aggressor may be expected to gain the upper hand requires more than mere military resources. An assessment of what the enemy can do and how strong or how weak he is can only be made if he is placed under constant surveillance and if his every move and his every tactical maneuver can be predicted. But this places excessive demands on the army—particularly during the buildup stage. Furthermore, the defense army-in-being could be attacked wherever it possessed a firm infrastructure such as supply facilities comparable to those of the attacking forces. Such key points would need to be defended in order not to lose the scant means at its disposal. These would be obvious weaknesses of the plan since the initiative would not only be with the aggressor in the case of an attack on such facilities but the defender would also have to bow to this initiative and would have to fight at a time and place not of his own choosing. In order to avoid this, the defender's supply system would have to be dispersed while the defending army is being built up and the initial phase of the defensive struggle is under way. Still another problem indicative of the fact that a force-in-being does not suffice in and of itself is that of the recruitment of personnel. This urgently suggests a second component without which the army cannot really exist and which will make it possible for that army to move from place to place. In all the instances cited above, this component was not only readily available but was also put to use in fulfillment of these same tasks. That second component is the population of the occupied territories—acting initially as a civilian support system for the resistance struggle or even as an essential element of it, as described above.

These two components which Mao calls "...war led by the people and [the] operations of the armed forces" and which complement each other "like a man's two hands" are in need of a third component, however, which is coordination and leadership. In the examples we studied it was always a political leadership to which both the popular resistance and the operations of the armed forces were subordinated. Fine distinctions between personages such as [Gen] Giap and Che [Guevara] need not be made to prove the point. Giap draws a distinction between the army and the party, whereas Che considers the military and the political avant-garde to be one. Giap follows Mao's lead on this score; but the principle is still the same in all wars of liberation.

The first phase of defensive war described above is followed by the assembly of a number of small units in the form of a larger force. During this second phase some larger-scale counterattack operations should already be carried out. Military resistance should now take hold among the people in such a way that territorial guerilla or partisan units are formed which pose a constant threat to the aggressor even in those areas which he has occupied and which operate according to the principle of no-risk combat. In the course of this second phase a network is established which is strengthened wherever possible by mobile army units—the objective being to create positions of strength and to prepare for a major attack on the aggressor. Mao refers to this second phase as "strategic consolidation and preparation of the counter offensive" on the part of the defending forces.

There are two more absolute requirements for success in this struggle: the availability of territory which can be kept clear of the aggressor's forces—if not permanently, then at least to a large extent. Once large-size units are formed, such territory must be available to the forces in the field for assembly, training and recreation. In the examples we studied this particular requirement had always been satisfied. The actual availability of such territory, of course, is conditional on the terrain—the more so, since it may have to be defended. During the Yugoslav defense struggle, large areas of the Karst Mountains were beyond the grasp of the German Wehrmacht.

In China, the reference is to so-called "central bases" or "strongpoint areas." As for the Vietnamese Popular Liberation Army, it was always able to engage in its recreational activities on the territory of the states bordering on South Vietnam and in particular in North Vietnam itself.

The second requirement of which we spoke is outside help which has to set in at least at this stage of the defense struggle. In its absence, it is unthinkable as a rule to assemble units capable of mounting major operations—units, in other words, which may in time be capable of turning engagements separated in time and space into real battles. The enemy may well serve as the logistic basis for a guerilla force. As a rule, it will get its weapons, equipment, ammunition and whatever else it needs from him. But large-size units are not in a position to get their supplies from the enemy. This requirement, too, was satisfied in all the instances which were analyzed.

The Yugoslav "people's war of liberation" doctrine offers the following description of the second phase of the defense struggle: the engagements are fought by small-size units up to such a point as larger-scale operations begin to take shape in and of themselves. The lion's share of the operation is now gradually taken over by the armed forces in the field and as these grow stronger and more firmly structured the dimensions of political victory begin to take shape. As time goes by, these forces become more and more comparable to those of the aggressor and we enter the phase

of the formation of conventional army units. During the Yugoslav defense struggle, this particular phase came to an end in about 1943. The two large-scale battles along the Neretva and Sutjeska rivers are a clear indication of this. Notwithstanding its actual outcome, the Tet Offensive in 1968 signalized the consolidation of national resistance to American intervention—and the battle of Dien Bien Phu was the comparable event during the war with France.

Now follows the third phase: the great counter-offensive. The resistance forces have attained sufficient strength and the weakening of the aggressor has progressed to such an extent that the defenders go looking for a decisive battle to be waged along conventional lines. This, according to Mao, is the phase "of the strategic counter-offensive and the strategic withdrawal (of the aggressor)."

In all three instances once again, the national resistance movement joined in the operations of the real enemies of the aggressor: Yugoslavia made common cause with the Red Army; China joined hands with the Western Allies in its struggle against Japan and with the Red Army in Manchuria and the South Vietnamese Popular Liberation Army linked up with the armed forces of North Vietnam. In each of the cases analyzed by us, the attacker had been worn down by an unending series of military engagements. Depending on the phase of the struggle, the types of combat waged tended to differ. There was classic combat, guerilla engagements as well as sabotage and terrorist acts as part of partisan warfare.

The typical structure [of the resistance movements analyzed] included a political leadership and administration of the defensive war; territorial defense units such as partisans and guerilla units—corresponding in most cases to the popular image of them—and other units which were organized and tended to operate along wholly conventional lines.

Although the second and third component described above require their own command structures, these are quite clearly subordinate to the political leadership.

But how to assess the component which clearly violates the precepts of conventional warfare? Which of the components asks too much of the preparation of offensive operations? The principle of avoidance is not merely peculiar to partisan warfare. The classic rules of warfare, after all, also call for forcing the enemy to enter into an engagement or to join battle at a time and place of one's own choosing. The economic employment of one's own resources seems almost self-evident. In all of the cases [we analyzed] the component which exceeded the aggressor's capabilities was time! To explain what we mean by this, let us merely remind the reader that even the United States of America with its vast resources was unable to wage war in Vietnam for an unlimited period of time. Without a doubt, it was not the material losses from this war—which may not have been

entirely unwelcome—which made for the decision to withdraw. In this instance, the loss of legitimacy which the political system of the United States had suffered—even if only temporarily—weighed more heavily than all the losses in men and materiel. In the case of the German occupation of Yugoslavia, every passing day on which the Wehrmacht had to commit forces to the Balkans pinned down troops which were sorely lacking on other fronts—primarily in the Soviet Union.

With regard to the Chinese war, Mao described this particular circumstance as the "long drawn-out war." In this type of war he saw the opportunity to turn around the force relationship vis-a-vis the Japanese aggressors over the long term. But this time factor not only has an impact on long-range planning for the operations of the defending forces. It only makes sense to consider the time factor, if there is a genuine counterforce in existence in the international arena in opposition to the aggressor. The "weak country" which has been attacked can delay the decision only with a view to the outside help it may expect to get and can avoid destruction only within this context.

This particular set of circumstances is a given in the case of the Austrian defense doctrine which is based on the eventuality of an attack by one of the existing military blocs in Europe on the other, transiting through Austrian territory. Its basic assumption may be that Austria's defense would be organized by leaning on one of the two blocs for support. The commitment to everlasting neutrality does not rule out such an approach because that commitment comes to an end, if and when Austrian sovereignty is violated and Austria then has a right to accept any assistance it can get.

[1 Aug 84 p 3]

[Text] Three-Phase Concept as a Guide

Based on the above considerations, the Austrian doctrine reached a number of conclusions with regard to the type and manner of the military resources needed for national defense. The first step was to look upon the country's entire territory from the point of view of terrain. At first, this was done in a very general way in order to find out which sectors offer themselves to the abovementioned thrusts into the depth or the flank of the other pact system. The next step was to define sectors according to terrain, classifying them as relatively easy to defend from the defense doctrine's point of view. This particular sector is the "central sector" which must remain in the defenders' hands, if it is to constitute the nucleus of resistance. Inside this sector, the forces operating outside it are to find support; this is where their supply and command structure is to be located. The conclusion that this central sector can be defended was reached not only on the basis of a large-scale terrain review but more so because this central Alpine area would be of relatively minor importance to the attacker given the above scenario and he would therefore leave this sector untouched. The remaining terrain as well as those sectors which may be of primary in-

terest for the aggressor from the operational point of view were divided up in accordance with their defensibility.

This, in turn, led to the designation of zones which must be held and where the enemy must be defended against by classical means and those in which light units are given the job of operating against the flanks and the rear of the aggressor, thus waging something analogous to partisan warfare against him.

As General Emil Spannocchi for one has said, one of the major differences between the Austrian doctrine and those outlined above is that the Austrian plan rules out armed popular resistance. Guerilla units, too, must be classified as combatants.

The Austrian doctrine also takes its cue from the three-phase concept; but it starts out by pre-empting the first phase, as it were. Wars of liberation of the kind described by us above were invariably set in train when the traditional defense potential—an army operating along conventional lines—had collapsed under the blows of the aggressor; when the state which was attacked had to all intents and purposes become incapable of defending itself and had in many instances actually capitulated. The classic example of this was Yugoslavia. The buildup phase of resistance which commenced at that point—the recruitment of indigenous forces capable of meeting the demands of a defensive struggle—is something the Austrian doctrine proposes to do without. From the very outset, the Austrian armed forces are to be structured in such a way that they can immediately shift into phase two. The organizational structure is twofold. The numerically stronger contingent is responsible for territorial defense. The units of this type are charged with assuming the functions exercised by the locally based partisan units as outlined in the above models. Initially, they are to be locally based and are to do their fighting in previously reconnoitered areas close to their own home. At first, these units fight their engagements according to the no-risk principle. They look for a fight in the sectors assigned to them against enemy forces they can hit and immediately withdraw as soon as the enemy makes an effort to pin them down. Following that, the units are to go underground, let the civilian population take them in under certain conditions and reappear once the danger has passed to take up the fight again. This is a type of warfare which does not allow for lengthy concentration of forces which makes it impossible for the aggressor to commit his technological superiority. These units are referred to as "Landwehr" [territorial forces] or more precisely as "locally based territorial forces."

But there is also another "mobile component" to the Landwehr; a kind of reserve to be used for operational missions. It is used in all those instances where the defense network needs to be strengthened and in those "key zones" to be held by Landwehr units which have received a specific order to defend against or block the enemy advance.

The second component is the concentration of the motorized and armored units which have the job of warding off the aggressor's initial thrust and continuing to fight until the network described above which is to cover the whole of Austria including all the local territorial units has been put in place. Following this, the motorized units are pulled back into the key zones. Later on, they will be the ones which provide the building blocks for the counterattacking forces. Their job is to provide relief and support for the defending forces.

We may say that this particular formation of forces corresponds to the second phase of a defensive war as described above. But initiating the third phase of the operation—which means mounting a counter offensive to liberate occupied territory—is a task which can hardly be carried out given the limited means at a small country's disposal. In this phase, a small country is even more dependent on third-country help. Strictly speaking, in fact, third phase operations are only possible if they are part of a joint effort with the help of that third country.

Broadly speaking, the Austrian plan is to divide the battle up into a series of engagements. An aggressor cannot help being drawn into these engagements because the territorial defending forces are arrayed throughout the depth of the country. As we already said, Austria's entire territory is to be covered by the defensive network of the territorial Landwehr. Since there is no such thing as a frontline, the classic battle array, i.e. the establishment of focal points in specific sectors of the front which are of advantage to offensive operations, will not be possible. In theory, the frontline is everywhere throughout Austria's territory and the aggressor will be subject to attack from all sides.

Given this type of organization and these objectives as well as the avoidance of engagements involving great risk, the physical superiority of the aggressor can be offset. The close linkage between defending and attacking units is also designed to make it hard for the aggressor to commit his nuclear weapons of mass destruction.

Given the decisive time factor, the aggressor—assuming that the above threat analysis is correct—will not be able to achieve his operational objective quickly, which is to carry out a thrust into the flank or rear of the other military bloc. Of course, no one harbors any illusions about the possibility of stopping the armored spearhead of a high-technology force. As we have been able to see, in fact, any such attempt would run counter to the principles of the doctrine. But attacks could very well be mounted against the aggressor's "soft" units, such as those which bring up supplies and fuel, and against his communications network—perhaps even against follow-up weapons systems and rear command units. The non-motorized Landwehr units are quite capable of doing this type of a job. Their infrastructure has already been worked up during peacetime; their phase one is already over. Initially, they do not have to move toward

their objective. Their target, in fact, is moving right past them through a zone they themselves are securing. At this point, the "thousand pin pricks," as Spannocchi has called them, set in and these taken together, he thinks, will be every bit as effective as one grand blow. The primary thing is that they are to deprive the aggressor of the most precious element of all—namely time.

To counter this threat to his operations, the aggressor would have to accept fighting on the defender's terms. But that deflects from his original purpose which was to achieve victory in battle with the opposing military alliance. Above all, this type of warfare confronts him with insurmountable technical problems. In such a situation, the high technology aggressor would have to engage in a more or less primitive type of combat. He would have to fight on the infantry level and would have to put an enormous number of soldiers in the field in order to occupy territory by infantry means. But he does not have this many soldiers. The high-armament, high-tech, motorized armed forces of the military blocs simply do not have enough actual fighting men, since the majority of the personnel is engaged in technical and other tasks which make the actual use of fighting men possible. The higher the level of technology, the greater the disparity among the various components of these armed forces. It may sound paradoxical but the aggressor may be out of his depth when faced by the simple technologies and abovementioned military tactics employed by the defender.

So much for the technological aspects of the doctrine insofar as they concern military resources.

With regard to actual military operations, the Austrian doctrine is carefully patterned after the methods employed in successful wars of liberation. With respect to the purely military aspects, the parallels between the Yugoslav and the Austrian doctrine are quite obvious. But does the military aspect of it truly suffice to wage a successful defensive war? Aside from a handful of commonplace observations, the Austrian defense doctrine does not deal with the issue of the political and social conditions required for such a defensive war. But what are the consequences of disregarding these aspects of resistance which Clausewitz referred to as "absolute war" and by which he meant that no segment of the population of a country under attack could afford to shirk the responsibility of defending that country without jeopardizing overall success. Theodor Koerner, too, spoke of "absolute war" in terms of a people's war, expanding the concept of resistance to include not only the state but society as such or at least those segments of the population which display an interest in resistance. This latter definition is akin to Mao's "New War;" Giap's "People's War" and to Yugoslavia's "popular war of defense." Compared to these definitions, the Austrian concept of "comprehensive national defense" is a good deal more limited. It contains no references to social conditions as they apply to defense. But an even more important consideration left out of the concept is that of political leadership.

This problem is systematically swept aside in the book Gen Emil Spannocchi has written on the subject of the Austrian defense doctrine. The book, which is addressed to a general readership, is our source on this particular issue. The peacetime government is equated with the communist parties which operated the resistance movements from the underground in all wars of liberation. In this case, too, things are reduced to technical details. [The book] posits, for example, that the Austrian federal government might be capable of providing operational leadership to the resistance. Peacetime conditions are simply extrapolated into wartime situations.

We will be dealing with the lack of political and social ideas in our next installment. They will be discussed in terms of their preventing a successful defensive war on the basis of the Austrian doctrine and above all in terms of a conceptual weakness [with respect to the political aspect] which the armed forces reform originally set out to deal with.

[2 Aug 84 p 3]

[Text] Political and Social Parameters

So as to deal with the questions we raised at the conclusion of the preceding installment and to get a better grip on them, we shall turn once more to a theoretician whose writings on the subject of war (as well as civil war) constitute the point of departure for all the ideas concerning wars of liberation which were discussed in the second installment above. We are speaking of Lenin. Now as a rule, Lenin's statements on war are of a general nature; they are statements of principle. In the preceding installment, we described some theories which went into methods of warfare and principles of organization; Lenin's theories do not. Lenin will have nothing to do with method as such. The cardinal principle of his theory of war is flexibility and his basic precept is to draw flexible consequences from existing conditions. For Lenin, this not only applies to the master plan for a military confrontation but to action at any level. In other words, it also applies to tactics and small-scale operations in a war.

The reasoning behind this becomes clearer when one recalls that the war to which Lenin was referring was a civil war. The fighter is to be in a position to analyze changing conditions quickly; to catch the enemy off guard by his subsequent actions and to be able to react at all times because he is familiar both with his physical environment and the society in whose midst he lives.

Lenin and Spannocchi

The Lenin example shows us how the Austrian ideas are based in part on those of others. In the abovementioned book by Spannocchi, there is a sub-chapter devoted to Lenin. Spannocchi first outlines the Lenin position more or less as we have just done. He then goes on to point out objective differences

in physical conditions and in the setting in which theories of war are elaborated. The most obvious difference is one of objective. Lenin is thinking in terms of a civil war whereas Spannocchi's goal is to find ways of defending a small European country. Spannocchi resolves this problem in the simplest way imaginable: he simply takes no notice of it. "Lenin's objective is to organize a revolutionary civil war within the confines of a particular society, arraying 'one segment of the population against the other'," Spannocchi writes. "But this principle can also be applied if one substitutes the word 'aggressor' for the word 'tsar' and the term 'resistance leadership' for the word 'party'." This is one of the instances where the author simply ignores problems which are outside the military realm, strictly speaking.

Let us take the Lenin example to clarify what we mean by our critique. The call for flexibility in civil war situations and the call for civil war as such is addressed to an entirely different group than the defense doctrine proposed for a small country in Central Europe. In the one case, we are dealing with highly qualified cadres and professional revolutionaries who are part of an underground political party and in the other case we are talking about a variety of people who can scarcely be subsumed under any specific heading. In wartime, they would be called soldiers—but what about peacetime? We might refer to them as citizens; members of society. At any rate, it is no easy matter to link them directly to war, much less to "absolute" war which is what "popular wars" or whatever else one calls them really are. Does the social organization and the position of the individual really conform to the requirements of flexibility and creativity? Do they support—or for that matter even call for—decision-making capabilities? Now this may be an—ideological—bias on our part! But we believe that modern societies are made up in an entirely different way. The observations not only apply to the individual but also military units which lean toward schematic solutions whenever their assignments exceed their capabilities and thus run completely counter to the flexibility principle.

What is it then that should enable an individual to display flexibility and to make his own decisions in a wartime situation where he is called upon to defend his country as a resistance fighter? Spannocchi's response is: leadership. Now it is no doubt true that the professional revolutionaries, too, were part of an hierarchical organization. Depending on changing conditions, the basic action and reaction patterns were transmitted to the individual fighter from above—but no more than that. We need not go into a description of "democratic centralism" at this point. At any rate: for it to function properly during the period in question the individual had to be able to debate and to form his own opinions. Even after the reform and after 10 years of reorganization, the Austrian armed forces are organized along the same linear, hierarchical lines as before. Down at the bottom, there are simply those who take orders and when decisions are in fact discussed with the lower ranks, this is done for one of two reasons: either to get those soldiers on one's side or out of weakness.

In 1979, while the SPOe majority government was still in power, DIE ZUKUNFT, the SPOe's theoretical monthly, ran an article dealing with direct democracy as a leadership principle in the armed forces. For the purpose of assuring proper representation, the article argued, a selection should be made among those interested and that these should receive training to qualify them for command positions. To this day, there has been no reaction to this suggestion. The army in particular has evinced no interest in dealing with it.

Structure of Landwehr

There is still another factor which plays an important role in this connection. We have not as yet gone into the ways in which the Landwehr is to be structured. The Landwehr is defined as a militia. Traditionally, the call for a militia-type army goes hand in hand with a call for its democratization. The separateness of the armed forces from society and their intransigence with regard to social change has rightly been viewed as a potential threat to certain social developments. Ever since the 1934 civil war, this view was quite prevalent in the organizations of the labor movement. But the ideas on which the call for the establishment of a militia were based were just about as naive as those held by Engels at the end of last century. The progress of Germany along the road to socialism [he thought] would, among other things, result in the best units of the Prussian army becoming social democratic. Some circles on the left now have similar ideas regarding the militia-like character of the Landwehr. At this stage, for all that, the militia option as conceived in Austria amounts to nothing more than the formation of Landwehr units in wartime, drawing on the ranks of the reservists and including both commissioned and non-commissioned officers.

Now this reduces the militia idea to the type of recruitment pattern which has prevailed ever since mass armies came into existence. It goes back to the idea of conscription which was part of Austria's armed forces legislation even prior to the reform. What is more, Austrian reservists are required to participate in training exercises up to age 35 once they have completed their compulsory military service.

We have come full circle now. We stated at the outset that the doctrine does speak to the military aspects of a resistance war but that it devotes far less attention to other aspects. We now see that the doctrine, by leaving the social conditions of the reform aside, creates major difficulties which might prevent the implementation of the actual military mission itself.

A Problem Swept Aside

If disregarding the social conditions were not bad enough, the doctrine sweeps the issue of the political leadership of a resistance movement totally aside. Let us return to Emil Spannocchi. Questions of political leadership take up precious little space in his book. At one point, he

speaks of the need for "high quality leadership" without making it clear whether this merely applies to the execution of military operations. At another point, he seems to be putting down the political leadership by comparing it to the leadership exercised in successful wars of resistance he has studied. In a war of resistance [he says] successful tactics call for political leadership and successful wars of resistance are characterized by a "predominance of absolutist party dictatorships." This above all seems to be of interest to him. By cutting political leadership down to mere technical procedure and administration, he pushes the problem aside and comes up with a figment of his imagination instead. "In theory, we are familiar with the establishment of coordinating structures which start out at a central point on the federal level and lead down to the individual communities by way of the Laender and in practice, we have already reached the implementation phase. We must build on it in such a way that we will not have the predominance of absolutist party dictatorships in our country but the collaboration of all people to achieve our common objective with the help of the administrative and command hierarchies."

[3 Aug 84 p 3]

[Text] Austrian Model as Bench Mark

If we compare the underground structures—and that is to be taken literally—of the Vietnamese, the Yugoslav or the Chinese resistance with the height of the buildings which house the more and more complex bureaucracies needed to operate the modern state, we can see how much technology is required and how dependent the bureaucracy is on that technology. We cannot imagine how the present bureaucracies and command structures at the federal, the Laender and the community level will be able to do their job in wartime. To be sure, our critique is somewhat vague, since we do not have any different organizational structures to propose and also do not feel it makes sense to copy such structures as exist in liberated areas for obvious reasons. What we are criticizing, however, is that not enough tests have been run and no experiments have been undertaken. To run tests by the simplest means may be one of the virtues of the present Austrian military establishment but without a doubt this is merely a reflection of the lack of funds. Above and beyond this, there has been a lack of experimentation. The odd thing is that the theory of alternative war, based on a militia-type popular army which specializes in guerilla warfare, is by no means a novelty for Austria. As long ago as the period immediately following World War I, Theodor Koerner, a former general in the old imperial army who later became president of the Second Republic, had introduced these very principles into the debate on how to build a social democratic party army.

Koerner's Ideas

Koerner developed some ideas concerning the establishment of a party army and the organization of resistance of the Austrian labor movement against attacks on the democratic way of life and fascist attempts to overthrow

the government of which there had been several after World War I and which put a violent end to the First Republic in 1933 [sic]. His ideas conformed to a large extent to mass trends then prevalent in Austrian political life. Calls for democratizing the state bureaucracy were widespread. Under the circumstances, it is quite apropos to extend these principles for the establishment of a social democratic party army to the defense of the republic.

The basis of Koerner's ideas, which generally correspond to the models described in the second installment of this article, differing in some of the organizational details, was political. Koerner was calling for a political soldier, faithful to the democratic institutions of the republic. Above all, Koerner posited the close connection between the social forms of organization and the army. This was in conformance with classic military thinking. It was taken from Clausewitz's analysis of the French Revolution. Koerner, too, spoke of "absolute war" which he characterized as "the commitment of all social means"—just as Clausewitz had done.

One passage from Clausewitz's "On War", which Koerner cited repeatedly gives an indication of his political view of war. "Among the new developments in the art of war," [Clausewitz wrote] "new inventions and new directions (in the field of strategy) are of the least importance. The greatest importance must be ascribed to new social situations and conditions."

Unpolitical Soldiers

Spannocchi's book does not contain a word regarding Koerner or the entire debate within the "Workers Militia" [Republikanischer Schutzbund] on the organization and the tactics of a struggle to preserve democracy. This makes it appear likely that Koerner's ideas of developing a concept of war, operations and tactics and his approach to strategy—which was an explicitly political approach—stood in the way of the acceptance of his theories within the framework of the new Austrian doctrine. As compared to other theories which were considered, it may be that in the case of Mao, Tito, Giap or Che the strangeness of the conditions of war all but made it appear imperative to reduce matters to technology or technological processes. In the case of Austrian theoretician Koerner, such a situation not only offers itself but because of his outspoken partisanship with regard to the conflicts prevailing in the First Republic, Koerner's theories still have a tendency to polarize the political camps. But above all, Koerner's ideas run counter to the formula which Austrian officers have subscribed to—at least on the surface—since World War II, which is that of the "unpolitical soldier."

It is with this attitude that we wish to deal at the conclusion of this installment. It has become the primary weapon used by the armed forces to justify their conservative approach to the new doctrine.

Up to this point, we have taken the position that the new Austrian defense doctrine calls for a type of defense which does not comply with the social and political conditions in Austria. We argued that the military aspect of the doctrine was the one which had been worked out with the greatest care—but even in this area the goals appear to overtax the organizational structure and above all the individual fighting man. In this connection, we pointed to the social processes which tend to socialize the individual in ways that are incommensurate with the demands placed upon him by the current war scenario. In general terms, we said that the reform lacks a political dimension. The most visible aspect of the armed forces reform, which serves as the basis for the new Austrian doctrine, is the reorganization of the army. This reorganization is in keeping with the most basic principles of rationalization. One might even say that modern management practices have been introduced into the army. Broadly speaking, this is a development which is of advantage to both the armed forces and to military men as such. In addition, the armed forces reform has led to an improvement of the army's position in public life. This becomes apparent when one recalls the fact that prior to the reform an officer's calling was among the least respected in Austria. More recent demoscopic studies have placed the army officer at the very top of the social ladder once again.

All in all, something has been done for the army. But: is it really conceivable that the armed forces would have an interest in seeing the reform implemented in ways which would alter the character of the military? But it is to implement these very aspects of the reform that a political initiative would be required. It is conceivable that a political party—the social democrats perhaps—might have an interest in carrying the reform forward. At the same time, it might not be inconceivable that such an interest might originate in the ranks of the armed forces themselves. The "unpolitical officer" gambit would seem to work against it. The military men are only concerned with military matters; they simply follow orders; they are subordinate to the "state leadership." In case there were a political reform, the unpolitical subaltern (soldier) given no clear-cut political marching orders would tend to block such reform—which would be a political act in and of itself. In his "Clausewitz Studies," Koerner himself traces the career of political theorist Clausewitz from the purely military-technological acceptance of his ideas by the Prussian general staff to the point where he provided aggressive Prussian militarism with both a theory and legitimacy. Koerner points out that the transmogrification of the theory resulted in its being turned upside down and thus becoming unusable. Austria is in no position to pose a threat to any other country. To that extent, it would be wrong to draw a parallel to Prussia. But the way the Austrian defense doctrine is being received is a rather vivid reminder of like developments last century.

The "unpolitical officer" precept is one of those precepts which sounds the death knell for the political reform of the armed forces.

Summary Conclusion

The Austrian model points the way to the future insofar as the basic considerations regarding military operations are concerned.

Austria's attempt to preserve its independence vis-a-vis the military blocs in Europe in particular is translated into a sensible operational doctrine. The new doctrine has departed from the traditional idea of equating defense with the defense of one's frontiers and the idea of fighting for the possession of territory. The plans contained in the doctrine are capable of being implemented militarily and commensurate with the capabilities of a small country. Weizsaecker's call for a discussion of the Austrian model among the NATO membership is a clear reflection of this fact. But too much is asked of the model, if it is simply grafted on some other European country because it is intended for a particular set of social conditions and predicated on the capabilities of political leadership. Conversely, the doctrine may serve to strengthen trends toward authoritarianism and the militarization of a society in countries where the military is not clearly subordinate [to government authority]. In that sense, the Austrian situation of a passive military establishment represents the other side of the coin. In all, we regard the Austrian way as a viable one in the direction of military reform and this in turn raises the need for a political initiative. It is in this area where concepts would need to be worked out which are based on the will to political superiority over the armed forces. Or, to quote Clemenceau: "War is too serious a matter to be left to the soldiers."

9478

CSO: 3620/404

LEADING DEFENSE EXPERT ATTACKS SDP SECURITY, NATO STANDS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 9 Aug 84 p 9

[Op Ed Article by Niels Jorgen Haagerup]

[Text] Directly addressed to several previously mentioned chairman issues within the Liberal [Party] and many members of the Social Democratic parliamentary delegation, former Liberal member of the Europa Parliament Niels Jorgen Haagerup calls for a debate on the parties' basic positions on, in particular, security policy and EC cooperation and requests an explanation of why almost all of the Social Democratic MPs neglected to respond to what he called the Lasse Budtzske flip-flops on foreign policy.

A change of leadership, either one which is pending immediately such as among the Liberals or a later one such as among the Social Democrats, should provide impetus for a more imaginative and basic discussion of the parties' positions. The dissatisfaction which has developed over important aspects of Danish foreign policy, in particular the NATO and Europe policies, is ample justification for a thorough debate of these issues as well as the basic positions of the Liberals and the Social Democrats, respectively.

For the Liberals, I might say, on the basis of several years of personal experience, that the party needs a real Europe debate. This is not just so that it can call itself the People's Movement for the EC, as the party did during the debate preceding the EC vote. I think I know what Henning Christopherson believes and stands for, but I do wish that he had said it on a higher level and more clearly before he himself decided to go to work for the EC at the highest level. I also think that I know what Ivar Hansen stands for, but there are other leading issues, and I have less understanding of what Bertel Haarder and Britta Schall Holberg stand for as regards Europe policy. A battle for the leadership post would thus be a useful opportunity for getting some basic points brought out into the open.

The position of the Liberals as regards security and defense policy is quite clear, but would it be of interest to the members of both parties, the voters and others to learn a bit more about how the party intended to implement its views on security and defense policy? Will we have repeats of the type of compromise which was struck recently? When the conservatives seemingly decided to stop taking the matter of defense to heart, does this mean that the Liberals should do the same thing? Or should the little Center Democratic Party be the

only one to stake out clear positions in both Europe policy and security and defense policy? This vital area should not occupy the same place in the Danish political debate as the Center Democrats' favoring of homeowners and car owners has occupied.

Among the Social Democrats a change of leadership lies further in the future, but everyone knows that the struggle for the succession is on. Several of the candidates for the post who have been proposed or discussed have mentioned the need for a "forceful" policy. Before the party embarks on an orgy of lofty phrases and slogans about peace, detente and the banning of nuclear weapons, when the party convention makes a statement next month, it will be important to see why in particular so many of the parliamentary delegation's well-informed and experienced people maintained such a deafening silence about the shift in the party's security policy.

I know too many of the parliamentary delegation's members to believe that they can be happy with this swing which has taken place and the responsibility which the party and, in particular, the parliamentary delegation have assumed in making Denmark quarrel with its main partners and allies.

While the shift in the party's policy was in its initial phase but shortly after the party joined the opposition, former foreign minister Kjeld Olesen, among others, gave assurances that the Social Democrats did not want to conduct foreign policy jointly with the SF [Socialist People's Party] and the VS [Liberal Party] once it was again at the helm of government.

Why are there no members of the Social Democratic parliamentary delegation, except for one individual (Robert Petersen), who asked clearly and unambiguously why the party thought it entirely acceptable to do that very thing when the party was in opposition?

As a consequence of the powerless parliamentary condition at home (yes, they have no counterparts in any other country), the Social Democrats have the opportunity, as both the governing party and the opposition party, to determine in real terms the content of Danish foreign policy--and this applies to both the Europe policy and security policy. The Social Democrats have not failed to take advantage of this opportunity, as would have been expected. Unfortunately, however, since the fall of 1982 this has been done much more on the terms of the VS and SF than on those of the government parties or, be it noted, on the Social Democrats' own previous terms.

Over the past several years, it has not been uncommon to hear representatives of the SF and VS make pronouncements on behalf of the "parliamentary majority."

In a public debate held several months ago at Christiansborg, the foreign-policy spokesman for the Social Democrats, Lasse Budtz, said, in direct reference to the SF, that "Gert Petersen knows where to find us."

He could not deny this. He found them.

At Christiansborg it is no secret that the decisive resolution, dated 26 May 1983, which really staked out the Social Democrats' security-policy position, was adopted by very few of the parliamentary delegation's members simply because most of the members of the delegation were not present at the group's first debate on it. Later many of the group's more stolid members allowed themselves to be persuaded by the argument that the government parties' representatives had stated that "the government could live with" the proposed text of the resolution.

It was unwise and unfortunate that it was put this way, but it was, and since then there have been almost no limits to what the government has been able to live with in the way of humiliating resolutions. It was not until May of this year when the Parliament was supposed to go on summer recess that the Social Democrats' political spokesman Svend Auken called a halt and, referring to the desirability of a more basic debate with the government parties on security policy, said that it was high time to stop conducting foreign policy on the basis of parliamentary resolutions.

Better late than never. But the damage was done. Kjeld Olesen will remember from his time as minister of defense in particular how difficult it is to get rid of bad reputation--and a bad reputation is what Denmark has gotten in both NATO and the EC, a worse one than we have ever had before. I wonder whether Kjeld Olesen can remember when the British Foreign Secretary (then Sir Alec Douglas) took him aside 12-13 years ago and said that if the proposed plans for Danish defense were put through Denmark could no longer expect support from Great Britain? And has he also forgotten that he was able to make a certain impression by referring to this statement when he was arguing within the parliamentary delegation for a more realistic defense proposal than the one which he himself and others in the party, led by Jens Otto Krag, developed during the opposition years of 1968-1971?

Where was Erling Olsen, who is now at the forefront of the party's internal debate on people and principles? Did he speak out clearly and without equivocation when the party switched directions on security policy? It is not a question of left and right within the party, but rather of knowledge and attitude, and Erling Olsen has always supported a realistic and pragmatic position and presumably continued to do so throughout the discussion on security policy. But when did the public hear from him when it really counted?

Jens Risgaard Knudsen has had his problems in the party, but he is still part of the party's highest inner circle, and he is known both for taking a position and having something to take a position on. While perhaps less well known to the public, he is especially active in Jutland politics and in the Border Association. If he has made statements about the new voices and given Robert Petersen his support, he has up till now escaped public notice.

Former Minister of the Interior and mayor for many years Henning Rasmussen has always been among those who wanted the Social Democrats to take a firm stand on defense policy. If, as some advocated in 1972, he had become Jens Otto Krag's successor, the situation would have been quite different today. But if he was instrumental in the Social Democrats' flip-flop on security policy, and he must have been, this remained hidden from the rest of the world, perhaps even from the party itself.

No one doubts where ex-Minister of Defense Poul Sogaard's heart is in this matter. But if he marked out his views on this matter of the flip-flop, if Anker Jorgensen was zealous in his support and if Lasse Budtz acted as spokesman for the cause, no one knows anyone other than these two, that is if they know anyone at all.

The speaker of the parliament, Svend Jakobsen, must stay somewhat in the background in order to protect his high position when intra-party disputes are involved. However, has he used the authority which both his position and his background in the party give him to oppose the new voices in the party? Or will we perhaps hear from him at the party convention next month?

Deputy speaker Knud Heinesen enjoys a great deal of respect. Security policy is not his specialty, but a career in foreign policy was not unknown to him, and he has too central a position in the party to be able to say, as others in the group have said when they are asked their opinion about Budtz' flip-flop on foreign policy, that "it is not my problem." The reason is that it must be the problem of the entire group, not just Knud Heinesen.

Knud Damgaard has said too many wrong things at the wrong times and too little, or simply said nothing when he should have said something, when a clarification of his views and his position would give meaning [to what he says] even if it has no meaning or he has no position.

Have, however, Erik Holst, J.K. Hansen, Egon Jensen and Erling Jensen made no protest and contented themselves with saying that their party has embarked on a new course which is closer to that of the SF than those of the Liberals and the Conservatives? Have Svend Andersen, Mogens Camre and Henning Nielsen?

It cannot be said yet that the party is standing firmly by NATO, because that is a foregone conclusion. This is no alternative, unless we are to follow the SF line to its logical conclusion and declare Denmark to be neutral and defenseless. Very few Social Democrats want this, however. But sticking by NATO and at the same time renouncing NATO's policy is an open invitation to our partners to give up on Denmark. Has the Social Democratic parliamentary faction fully realized this?

This call and this question put to the group may be viewed by some as "reductio ad absurdum." This is not the case. This is aside from the recognition that in this country it is impossible to conduct foreign policy without the participation of the Social Democrats, much less in the face of their opposition. This is why the upcoming Social Democratic convention is so important, and why we are waiting so impatiently for the resistance to the party's new course (or should we call it the wavering course?) to be clearly stated by those who, I know, have more realistic views on, on the one hand, Danish foreign policy and, on the other, the role which the Social Democratic Party can and should play regardless of the party's position as an opposition or a government party.

There should be no need to say this: but the Social Democrats' influence will not be any the less, even if the party conducts a more responsible and more realistic security policy than has been the case over the last 18 months. And the reward for doing this will be, among other things, that Denmark will then be able to regain some of the influence over its closest partners and allies which we have lost to an extent which few people can imagine. The party and especially the leadership will appreciate this one day when the party regains power within the government.

Because it plans to do so some day, doesn't it?

CSO: 3613/213

GOVERNMENT DECISION ON AIRCRAFT PURCHASE ANNOUNCED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 1 Aug 84 pp 1,3

[Excerpt] The final phase of negotiations for the "deal of the century" is being entrusted to Minister of National Economy Ger. Arsenis, by decision of KYSYM-KYSEA [Government Council-Government Council for Foreign Affairs and Defense] which met yesterday in a joint session. The final negotiations, which must end by 1 October, will concern 80 to 100 F-16, F-18A and Mirage 2000 airplanes, while the Tornado has been excluded since it serves only offensive purposes, as Prime Minister Papandreou stated after the three-hour KYSYM-KYSEA session. Political circles believe the meeting which the prime minister will have at noon today in the Maximos Building with U.S. Ambassador Stearns is related to the purchase of the airplanes. The same circles interpret as a diversion yesterday's government announcement that Papandreou will visit the Soviet Union in the first two months of 1985, with no specific date set, in response to the invitation conveyed by President of the Chamber of Deputies I. Alevras. The purpose of this announcement is to mollify the reactions from the Left, particularly KKE, which will be caused by the purchase of the airplanes.

The prime minister briefed the Council of Ministers, which met last night, about relations with the EEC and announced the decision for purchase of the airplanes, which was approved. No other minister made a speech because, after his own speech, Papandreou adjourned the meeting.

Mr. Papandreou

The KYSYM-KYSEA decisions, as announced by the prime minister, are the following:

"First: It was entrusted to the minister of national economy and finance, Ger. Arsenis, to conduct the final phase of negotiations which will end before 1 October 1984.

"Second: The total number of aircraft Greece will purchase will be 80 to 100, according to the type.

"Third: The Panavia Tornado aircraft was excluded because it is limited to an offensive role only (air to surface).

"Fourth: In order to safeguard our country's independence, two types will be chosen finally, from among the Mirage, F-16 and F-18.

"Fifth: The balanced modernization and arming of the two other forces, the army and navy, was also decided.

"In the KYSYM, which met before the joint KYSYM-KYSEA session, the strategy which our country will follow, in EEC frameworks, following the decisions at the Fontainebleu summit meeting in connection with promoting the Greek memorandum, was discussed and developed."

Balance in the Air

As concerns yesterday's government decision, our military editor notes the following:

At this moment, our country is qualitatively superior to Turkey in the air force sector.

The Turks have F-84 aircraft from the 50's, as well as F-5's and F-104's from the 60's. There are, of course, in the Turkish Armed Forces many transport aircraft and helicopters which, in combination with the landing-crafts, offer the possibility of a direct amphibious operation.

The Greek Air Force has a total of 335 fighter aircraft of various types, versus Turkey's 350. Most of our own aircraft are modern. This, in combination with the great skill of our aircraft operators, creates the unquestionable superiority which Greece has secured in the air. However, a change in the balance of forces in the area in favor of Turkey would be possible if the Turks begin to receive the 160 F-16's which they have already ordered and we continue to talk about whether we should procure aircraft, and how many. The opinion of a party (KKE) that purchasing the fighter airplanes does not serve the cause of national defense has been expressed, and, in fact, officially....

9247

CSO: 3521/322

POLL RESULTS MAY SPUR DRIVE TO CHARGE U.S. RENT FOR BASE

Reykjavik NEWS FROM ICELAND in English Aug 84 p 3

[Commentary by Einar Sigurdsson]

[Text]

The two main planks of Iceland's postwar foreign policy have been membership of NATO and the presence of American naval forces at the Keflavik base on the southwestern peninsula. Both issues have been subjects of constant, and at times heated, debate.

Three parties — coalition partners the conservative Independence Party and centrist Progressive Party, as well as the opposition Social Democratic Party — have lent almost unqualified support to traditional foreign policy, and according to Iceland's first-ever scientific election survey, carried out last year, a majority of the electorate appears to concur. Of the four main parties in Icelandic politics, only the socialist People's Alliance has consistently opposed both NATO membership and American forces at Keflavik.

People's Alliance leaders must have been struck dumb by these survey results, published in early July, since it turns out that almost one-quarter of PA voters who expressed an opinion support Iceland's continued membership of NATO. On foreign policy the PA has clearly separated itself from the other parties by opposing NATO membership, making the amount of support for NATO within its ranks seem all the more significant. PA leaders can take some comfort from the overwhelming support among its

voters for the removal of American troops. More than 9 out of 10 PA voters supported the suggestion, according to the survey.

The leadership, however, must feel uncomfortable about the large number of PA voters (almost half) who support levying a charge on the U.S. government for Keflavik facilities, since it seems logical to assume that if one is campaigning for removal of the base, such a move would prove more difficult once a levy had been integrated into the Icelandic economy. A lot of PA voters remain to be convinced on this point — but they are not the only ones supporting the idea of charging for the Keflavik facilities.

Voters of other parties are overwhelmingly in favour of the idea. It has always been clear that a strong current of opinion favoured such a levy. What remains to be seen is whether the results of this survey, which has been called the first scientific poll of its kind in Iceland, can drive a wedge into the all-party consensus against the idea. Leaders of all the main parties have repeatedly — and for a variety of reasons — fought the idea of levying a charge on the Americans.

One thing is clear, however. Iceland reaps some financial benefits from the American presence. Prime Minister Steingrímur Hermannsson, in an apparent softening of views, conceded that he might consider

asking the U.S. government to lend financial support to projects that could be seen as part of the country's defence structure, i.e. roadbuilding and airport construction. It could be argued that a step in this direction has already been taken with the American financial support for a new civil air terminal at Keflavik airport. Nevertheless, this remains a sensitive issue with firm supporters of NATO, and charging Americans for the Keflavik base would, it seems to them, amount to a levy for the privilege of defending Iceland.

Of those who expressed their view on Iceland's continued membership of NATO, 8 out of 10 were in favour. It is interesting to note, however, that one-third questioned had not formed an opinion. This must worry adherents of the pro-NATO lobby. No more than 53% actively support NATO membership (offering a positive opinion when invited to do so) — the hearts and minds of a great many people have yet to be won either way. The chairman of *Samtök Herstöðvaandstaedinga*, the movement opposing the U.S. military presence, claims that this organi-

zation is ready for a national referendum on the matter, as the anti-NATO lobby would inevitably benefit from attendant, intense discussion.

Clearly a great number of voters in Iceland distinguish between NATO membership and the presence of American troops on Icelandic soil. Although the survey revealed a majority in support of both issues, opposition to the U.S. naval base was considerably stronger than to NATO — both in a general consensus and on an individual party basis. For example, 41% of Progressive Party voters (now in government with the Independence Party which strongly favours the base) were opposed to continued American presence. Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrímsson of the IP said in a newspaper interview that a distinction between the NATO and naval base issues was natural. "We want to keep open the possibility of not having foreign military forces when the international situation is more peaceful, even if a defensive alliance such as NATO continued to exist," stated Geir Hallgrímsson.

CSO: 3600/48

POLL FINDS MAJORITY SUPPORTS NATO MEMBERSHIP

Reykjavik NEWS FROM ICELAND in English Aug 84 p 2

[Text]

The majority of Icelanders support the country's continued membership of NATO and U.S. military presence at the Keflavik naval base, while also agreeing with peace movements and a Nordic nuclear-free zone. These are some of the conclusions reached in a survey on "Attitudes of Icelanders to Security and Foreign Policy" by Olafur Th. Hardarson, the first academic research ever carried out on the subject.

The national survey, carried out after last year's general election, asked 1003 voters (chosen by random sampling) their views on three questions of defence policy, while a more detailed survey asked 329 voters in the Reykjavik area their opinions on various other foreign policy matters. Participants were classified by age, sex, education and party affiliation (i.e. which party they voted for in 1983). There were six main political categories: Independence Party (IP) on the right, People's Alliance (PA) on the left, Social Democratic Party (SDP), Social Democratic Alliance (SDA), Progressive Party (PP) and Women's Platform (WP).

NATO membership

Asked whether Iceland should remain in NATO, 53% said "yes," 13% "no" and 34% expressed no opinion. Voters in most parties were in favour; 70% of IP, and a smaller majority of other parties. A surprising 17% of PA voters were in favour, and 56% against. Women were less likely than men

to express an opinion, and although the majority was in favour in all educational groups, the less educated were less likely to give a view either way. The majority was in favour in all age groups except the under-30s.

The participants were asked secondly whether they approved of the U.S. military presence and the Keflavik naval base. Giving approval (strong or with some reservation) were 54%, while 30% were opposed in some degree, and 15% felt it did not matter. The overwhelming majority of IP voters supported the base, and the overwhelming majority of PA voters were opposed, while WP voters showed a small majority

Should Iceland remain in NATO?	
Yes	53%
No	13%
No opinion	34%

Should there be a U.S. military presence at Keflavik?	
Strongly in favour	23%
In favour	31%
Does not matter	15%
Opposed	15%
Strongly opposed	15%

Should the U.S. pay for the use of military sites in Iceland?	
Agree completely	49%
Agree	14%
Ambivalent	9%
Disagree	7%
Totally disagree	22%

against, and all the other parties had a majority in favour (around 50%). Of those who supported NATO membership, 14% opposed the base. The majority was in favour in all age groups and educational groups, but the smallest margins were in the 20-23 age group and among the most educated.

Should the U.S. pay?

The third question on the survey concerned the possible levying of charges by the Icelandic government on the U.S. government for the location of military forces in Iceland. In agreement (generally or strongly) were 63%, while 29% were more or less opposed, and 9% were undecided. Among those who supported NATO membership, 65% were in favour and 26% against, while opponents of NATO were 34% in favour and 61% against. Groups who came out clearly in favour were those who did not support any party strongly, those who expressed no opinion on NATO membership, and those who had received little education. The university-educated, on the other hand, were 58% against. There were no clear party divisions: a small majority of PA and WP voters were against, while all the other parties were around 60-70% in favour, 25% against.

In the second part of the survey, 329 voters in the Reykjavik area were asked more questions on foreign policy. The small sample is not as representative as the larger national survey, and only indicates opinions in the metropolitan area. Party-classifications were not used in this part of the survey, because of small numbers, but participants were asked to place themselves on a left-to-right scale.

Closest to the Nordic countries

Asked to compare the importance of the Keflavik naval base issue with other vital matters, the voters showed that although they felt the Keflavik question was important, inflation and labour relations tended to be uppermost in their minds. The next question asked them to say with which countries Iceland had the most common interest. The clear answer was the Nordic countries, put in first place by 90%. In second place was Western Europe, and third the U.S.A.

On the subject of world peace, 37% felt the risk of war had increased, while 57% thought there had been little change. Women were more likely to think the risk had increased than men. Most people on the Right thought there had been no change, and a small majority on the Left thought the risk had increased.

Nordic nuclear-free zone

A nuclear-free zone in the Nordic countries was supported by 86%, while 6% were ambivalent and 8% opposed. Women were even more strongly in favour than men. Among supporters of NATO membership, 79% supported the nuclear-free zone, and on the Right 79% agreed while the Left was 97% agreed.

Asked whether they felt the European and U.S. peace movements were going in the right direction, 66% agreed, 16% disagreed and 18% were ambivalent. Women were more likely to agree than men. Among those who supported NATO membership, 56% were in favour of the peace movements, 25% against: on the Right, there was 50% support.

Arms race

Asked to comment on the statement "NATO must not be allowed to fall behind the Warsaw Pact in military terms if peace is to be ensured," 71% agreed, 17% were opposed, and 12% were ambivalent. Among supporters of NATO membership, 87% agreed, while 30% of opponents of NATO agreed. In the under-40s age group the majority disagreed. On the Right there was 89% agreement, while the Left was divided, 35% in favour, 41% against, 24% undecided.

On the question of whether Iceland needs military defences within the country, 45% agreed, 43% were opposed and 12% ambivalent. Among opponents of NATO membership, 93% disagreed, while NATO supporters were 67% agreed, 24% opposed. The majority of the under-40s were opposed. On the Left, 10% agreed, and on the Right 17% disagreed.

The new light thrown by this wide-ranging survey on the political views of the man and woman in the street will certainly give the policy-makers food for thought.

NEW SOVIET 'EKRANOPLAN' THREATENS COUNTRY'S SECURITY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 7 Aug 84 p 8

[Article by Olav Trygge Storvik]

[Text] Reports that the Soviet Navy is testing the prototype of an entirely new airplane, the so-called WIG [wing in ground effect] plane, should give rise to further concern in political circles throughout the Nordic region--but especially in Norway. Along with development trends in the Nordic area in general, the new Soviet airplane is a sign that weapons development is about to undermine the "Nordic balance" as we know it.

The WIG plane, or the "Ekranoplan," as the Soviets call it, is a plane that resembles a regular airplane but it is propelled by double propellers in the tail section and gas turbines in the front part of the plane. The principle is that the plane flies at great speed on a cushion of air formed beneath the wings when it moves along the surface. The principle gives the plane enormous lift properties. It is most effective over water but it can also be operated over land like an ordinary plane although this increases fuel consumption and reduces the flying range. It has been disclosed that the prototype now being tested has a top speed of well over 500 km an hour and can easily transport several armored vehicles, or around 400 soldiers with their equipment--in other words a group almost the size of a battalion. Full production of this airplane will begin in around 3 years, it was revealed.

According to Soviet military commentators the advantage of the Ekranoplan is that it can transport very large forces to selected landing sites without paying much attention to conditions at sea, tide flow, mine fields, submerged rocks or other barriers in approach channels. A version of the Ekranoplan has now been made that will serve as a launching platform for the Soviet SS-N-22 cruise missile, a missile that is guided toward its target at around wave height from distances as far away as 200 km.

This weapons system must be viewed as a sign that the Soviet Union is now placing even more emphasis on solving the "strait problem" of its naval forces. And it cannot be regarded as anything but a direct and unmistakable threat to countries like Japan, Turkey, Denmark and especially to Norwegian territory. The Soviet North Fleet could hardly gain control over the

Norwegian Sea and be able to move out into the Atlantic in a major conflict without first seizing Norwegian air bases for air support use or at the very least putting them out of action.

The Ekranoplan is a new example of the fact that Soviet naval leaders are placing increased emphasis on amphibious operations in the immediate vicinity for the purpose of securing naval forces. In this development maximum weight seems to be given to utilizing such factors as surprise and mobility in operations. Earlier this year it was discovered that a squadron of hovercraft planes of the "Lebed" type was stationed with the North Fleet. According to JANES DEFENCE WEEKLY marine forces carried out almost continuous exercises at one point in landing small sabotage groups and support operations for flank operations. One of the main goals of the exercises was probably to test new techniques for greater mobility. Hovercraft of the Lebed type can be carried on the decks of regular transport ships for use in landing troops and equipment in shuttle traffic from amphibious ships of the "Ivan Rogov" type. It is all done very quickly. Lebed has a speed of around 100 km an hour and can carry a cargo weighing 35 tons.

The technique of using hovercraft for landing and providing increased mobility for marine forces has not yet been used in the West. An experiment the British Army conducted with a smaller hovercraft in North Norway a few years ago produced very positive results. The British found that divisions could be put ashore very quickly and under weather conditions that would otherwise block such operations.

This new Soviet development in the North resurrects the question of the position of North Norway and whether warning and deployment times for reinforcing that part of the country on Norway's part are adequate. The Soviet development should also be seen in conjunction with what is happening in Sweden. In the past Norway could count on Sweden providing good backup protection against an attack from the East due to the strong Swedish air defense system. Now this is increasingly questionable since the number of fighter planes in Sweden have been cut in half over the last decade. This development must be regarded with uneasiness in all Nordic countries. The question is: what effect will this have on the "Nordic balance"?

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COUNTRY'S ARMED FORCES WELL PREPARED FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 7 Aug 84 p 5

[Article by Liv Hegna]

[Text] Norway is close to being at the top of NATO when it comes to equipment for protection against chemical warfare. But now more money will be spent on this. AFTENPOSTEN learned from the Army Supply Command that the graduated supplement to next year's budget bill will contain sizable sums for new acquisitions of this kind of equipment. In the near future a stand must also be taken on purchasing new modern protective masks for soldiers. These would make it possible not only to survive but also to go on fighting.

The last of the Swedish protective masks will be delivered to the Norwegian defense system in 1984. After that the Supply Command must have clear alternatives to present. A Norwegian product is unlikely in view of the enormous costs involved in development and production on a small scale. However the British have come a long way with protective masks that make it possible to eat while wearing them, use glasses and talk clearly. Standardized requirements in NATO call for being able to use masks continuously, not just as an initial tool during a direct attack.

When it comes to the production of civilian protective masks Helly-Hansen Factories is the main supplier in Norway. But sales have been low in this area. However the firm still has its production materiel. But these "civilian gas masks" do not meet the specifications set by the Army Supply Command for use by Norwegian military forces, including standards for resistance to extremely cold temperatures.

When it comes to personal equipment for the individual soldier, his most important first aid tool is still a water bottle, AFTENPOSTEN learned. An effort will now be made to supply all soldiers with a block of litmus paper, a special kind of paper that changes color if troops are exposed to an attack with chemical weapons. This paper is produced in Canada. It is patented and a production license for Norway is difficult to get despite the fact that there is plenty of pulp here for producing paper. Just a few years ago a package containing twelve sheets cost around 7 kroner. Today the price is more than 20 kroner.

Sometime in 1987 it is planned to equip soldiers with light "pullover," plastic sheets that are simply drawn over one's head in the event of an attack. Countries like Yugoslavia already have this kind of equipment for their military forces, AFTENPOSTEN was told.

The "biggest clothing order in Norwegian history," namely the defense order for protective suits costing 100 million kroner from Stormark Clothing Factory in Dokka, to be delivered over a 5-year period, just covers the suits. The actual material comes from Germany. The same is true of the rubber boots that will be used, while the gloves come from the United States.

The Army Supply Command is also working on a proposal for an automatic electronic warning system. Warning of an attack with this kind of weapons is the major problem. And there are relatively good chances of surviving such an attack unharmed if the chemical weapons are detected in time.

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STATE MINISTER OZDAGLAR ON CONTRACTOR DILEMMAS IN LIBYA

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 13 Aug 84 pp 1,7

[Interview with Minister of State Ismail Ozdaglar by Aytul Gurtas]

[Text] Ankara--Senior-level efforts are under way to resolve the problems of Turkish contractors working in Libya. Libyan Secretary of Agrarian Reform and Land Reclamation Abu Zayd 'Umar Durdah, who previously conducted talks in connection with the condition of Turkish contractors in Libya and their payments, is expected to come to Turkey around the end of August. Responding to questions about Turkish contractors in Libya, Minister of State Ismail Ozdaglar asked banks which have given letters of guarantee to contractors to be more understanding toward their clients. Noting that banks in Turkey are encountering serious resource shortages, Ozdaglar said: "This situation is a natural outcome of the policies being pursued."

Responding to DUNYA's questions about debts owed to Turkish contractors and the issue of their repayment with oil, Ozdaglar insisted that Libya is working very hard to resolve the problem. Stating that the issue of debts will be settled after talks with the Libyan Secretary of Agrarian Reform, who is expected to come to Turkey at the end of this month, Ozdaglar gave the following answers to our questions:

DUNYA: What are the latest developments regarding debts owed to Turkish contractors to Libya?

Ozdaglar: The problem does not stem solely from delays in payments. When payments are delayed, job completion times get longer, and conflicts may arise. This is not a problem that only contractors in Libya are encountering. Are contractors in Turkey being paid on time? In general, payment difficulties affect all segments of a country's economy. Your concerns about payments would be justified if Libya had taken a negative stance, had refused to grant extensions for job completion and had insisted on levying penalties. But Libya says: "My oil revenues have declined, but by agreeing to extensions and by exploring various possibilities we will resolve the problems in a manner befitting two brotherly countries." In fact, that is what it is doing. Otherwise, the completion deadline for some of the still uncompleted projects run by Turkish contractors has expired.

DUNYA: There are rumors that Libya has threatened to cancel the contracts of contractors who have not met their job completion deadlines.

Ozdaglar: That is not true. We are determined to develop relations between the governments of the two countries. This must be understood. The oil issue has been virtually resolved. Libyan Secretary of Agrarian Reform Abu Zayd 'Umar Durdah will come to Turkey at the end of this month. Furthermore, to help overcome this temporary problem, we are working with banks which have given letters of guarantee to Turkish contractors in Libya and which have committed themselves to their projects.

DUNYA: How?

Ozdaglar: For example, a bank gives a contractor a letter of guarantee, and the contractor goes overseas and starts work. The contractor encounters problems because Libya delays its payments. So, what happens is that a 6-month or 3-month extension is given. But the gravity of the problem arises from the fact that the banks are facing serious resource shortages. Otherwise, the problem is not one that should have grown so big. Because Libya is genuinely well-intentioned. It has no intention of pushing Turkey, the contractors and itself or the work into a deadlock situation. Its only goal is to make the Turkish contractors complete the projects they have started. Both sides are working sincerely to resolve the problem in an official framework. I believe that this approach will solve all the problems. The Turkish government thanks the Libyan government for its understanding.

DUNYA: You said that the banks are facing serious resource shortages.

Ozdaglar: The banks are not the only ones who are encountering serious resource problems. Today, the man in the street and everyone who reads papers knows that the banks are suffering from resource shortages. The banks are not alone. Everyone knows that there is a general credit and financing shortage in Turkey's exports, investments and domestic market. This is normal; this situation is part of the battle against inflation. In other words, it is the result of tough actions that were necessary to take. But the problem cannot be depicted by terms such as "serious." It cannot be called a "serious crisis" or a "serious problem." It can be referred to as simply a problem. Because it is not a malady to be called "serious"; it is only a temporary problem.

DUNYA: At last week's meeting of the Private Sector Overseas Contractors Consulting Committee, headed by Undersecretary of the Treasury and Foreign Trade Ekrem Pakdemirli, it was agreed to set up a \$300-million fund until the issue of Libyan payments is settled. Will this fund be set up?

Ozdaglar: No, that is not possible for the moment. But solutions are being sought which will compensate for the functions of the fund. The Turkish and Libyan governments will resolve the issue of who will pay how much to whom through technical measures that will emerge from negotiations. The fund would partly perform this function. When the oil issue was settled, the fund became unnecessary. Libya says: "I will give you oil in exchange for what I owe you." There were technical problems in settling this issue. The establishment of the fund was thought of in order to solve this issue. But when the issue was resolved the fund became unnecessary. The issue of Libyan debts can be resolved in two ways. One way is through resolving the oil problem, that is by making oil imports functional. We thank the Libyan government for the understanding it has

shown on the oil issue. If, in addition, Turkish banks which have undertaken risks in Libya show more understanding during this transition period, the issue of Turkish contractors in Libya will cease to exist. In other words, I believe that we have reached a very favorable point on the oil issue and that Libya has acted with much understanding. The agreement will soon become functional.

DUNYA: How much progress has been made on this issue? There are reports that Shell has stepped in.

Ozdoglar: Those are oil companies.

DUNYA: Do you mean that Shell will buy the oil from Libya? What will Shell's role be on this issue?

Ozdoglar: Nothing has been finalized so far; everything will depend on a final agreement between myself and Mr Durdah.

DUNYA: At what solution stage are you right now?

Ozdoglar: We are at the stage of talking with Durdah. The issue will be resolved the moment Durdah agrees to this matter.

DUNYA: What matter?

Ozdoglar: I cannot say anything right now, but the issue is about to be resolved. It is wished that the contractors be paid their money. This money will be paid. The whole problem hinges on the issue of oil. Libya is telling the contractors: "Come and take your oil." But the contractors cannot take delivery of the oil. Four or five of them cannot get together to ship the oil. So they ask for government assistance, which we will provide.

DUNYA: Will TUPRAS [expansion unknown] become operational?

Ozdoglar: No, TUPRAS will not become operational. As an institution with expertise in the petroleum field, TUPRAS is advising me. That is the whole story.

DUNYA: It was reported that TUPRAS will buy more petroleum and sell it overseas.

Ozdoglar: No sir. TUPRAS will not buy the oil for itself and pay cash in return. TUPRAS is only acting as a consulting body. What does the contractor know about oil? Does he know anything about oil? No, he does not. He does not know anything about the subject. I am proposing that TUPRAS help these contractors. It can tell them where the oil can be bought and where it can be sold. It can show them how to ship the oil and how they can procure loans. In other words, it can show them the ropes. This is all the function of TUPRAS.

DUNYA: Will the issue of debts finally be settled at your meeting with Mr Durdah?

Ozdoglar: It will be settled one way or the other. Let me put it this way: The oil issue will definitely be put in order. This issue has remained in limbo for

months. We bought the oil, we are asking the large contractor to take it, and it cannot take it. The contractor is timid. The oil is standing right there; four or five contractors will have to come together and send over a tanker to take delivery of the oil.

DUNYA: What is the second way?

Ozdaglar: The second way may be the expediting of the payments. Payment by oil is an interim solution. Payments for a work volume of 3.5 billion Turkish liras in Libya are not linked solely to petroleum. Direct payments are also continuing. We will discuss all these issues with Durdah.

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CSO: 3554/301

SURVEY OF SECTORAL CONCERNS FACING OZAL SUMMIT

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 13 Aug 84 pp 1,8

[Text] Ankara--This week, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal will listen to the woes of employers, small businessmen and farmers. The summit talks will last 2 days.

The meeting with the Turkish Union of Chamber [TUC], previously scheduled for today, was postponed to Tuesday upon Ozal's request. Mehmet Yazar, who will head the TUC delegation, asked TUSIAD [Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association] President Ali Kocman and TISK [Turkish Confederation of Employer Unions] President Halit Narin to attend the meeting in order to resolve employer problems in unity and harmony.

At the summit meeting the Prime Minister will hold with the TUC, the employers will express their concerns on the following issues:

--Concerns over exports: The government will be asked to postpone cuts in export tax returns--scheduled to begin in September--until the end of the year. Attention will be drawn to growing export inventories.

--Concerns over investments: It will be stated that higher interests rates on bank deposits will also affect credit interest rates and that, as a result, investment plans will have to be put off even further.

--Concerns over inflation: It will be stated that the payment of government debts to the farmers in the fall and record money supply levels in the market may boost the inflation rate after September.

--Government competition for credit: It will be stated that the offering of government bonds with attractive interest rates will divert funds that would otherwise go to the private sector and that such a move must not be made.

--Early implementation of reforms related to the State Economic Enterprises will be demanded.

--The formation of consulting committees by the Undersecretariat of the Treasury and Foreign Trade will be criticized.

Kasim Onadim, President of the Central Union of Tradesmen's and Artisans' Security Cooperatives, said that he will have a meeting with Prime Minister Ozal at his office at 10:00 am on Wednesday and that, at the meeting, he will ask for

the collection of unpaid Bag-Kur [Social Security Association for Tradesmen, Artisans and Independent Workers] premiums without penalties and interest on a one-time basis only. In a statement to the Ankara News Agency, Onadim disclosed that his organization has nearly 6 billion Turkish liras in blocked funds at Halk Bankasi and added: "At this meeting we will ask the government to sell more than half of the bank's stock to the security cooperatives." Stating that he will also propose changes in Law No. 1163 on Cooperatives, Onadim said that he will ask for the raising of the cooperative partnership share ceiling stated in Article 19 from 30,000 Turkish liras to 300,000 Turkish liras.

Tradesmen and artisans summarize their problems as "high rents, lump-sum taxes and price schedules which do not reflect current conditions." Responding to the questions of the Anatolia Agency before the summit, Mehmet Gurkan, President of Ankara Shoemakers Association, said that if shoemakers are spared the burden of high rent, average shoe prices may drop by as much as 2,000 Turkish liras. He said: "Manufacturers must be spared the burden of high rents so that prices will come down." Mesut Can, President of Turkish Taxi Drivers and Owners Federation, complained about gasoline price hikes and said: "Gasoline prices are hiked too often. We apply to the municipalities to adjust our fare schedules. By the time the new fare schedules are approved, gasoline prices are raised again." Turkish Tailors Federation President Baki Topcu declared that 20 percent of the tailors are unemployed and said that half of his colleagues in Ankara have closed down their shops and that they are working for wages in military garment houses. Avni Kilickaya, Secretary General of Grocers and Dealers Federation, charged that working with invoices has put them in a difficult position. He said:

"Since most of our members are subject to lump-sum taxation, the invoices they issue are considered invalid. Thus those who want to take advantage of tax deductions by obtaining invoices for their purchases prefer the supermarkets."

Ali Pasa Aksu, President of the Coffee Shop and Coffee House Operators Federation, said that their primary problem is the license requirement for beer sales.

At 3:00 pm on Wednesday, Prime Minister Ozal will receive representatives of the Turkish Union of Agricultural Chambers and will listen to their problems. The president of the union, Osman Ozbek, said that they will ask for measures to prevent producers from going into the new farming season without pesticides, seeds and fertilizers.

Some of the proposals the producer sector will submit to the government are as follows:

--Firms in which the government does not have any stake should not be taken away from agricultural sale cooperatives.

--The cotton floor price should not go below 200 Turkish liras.

--Credits should be deregulated.

--Premiums should be paid to olive oil and sunflower oil producers.

ULAGAY ON OZAL COMPROMISE OF WORKER DEMANDS TO IMF

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 13 Aug 84 p 9

["Economic Notes" column by Osman Ulagay: "IMF, the Government and Business Circles"]

[Text] In statements to the domestic and foreign press, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal frequently plays the same theme and insists that it is "certain business circles" who are displeased with government policies and not the workers, the public servants, the retirees and the peasants, who are all included in the definition of the "mainmast." In saying this, Ozal gives the impression that he is disturbed by and unhappy with primarily these "certain business circles."

Business circles, on the other hand, generally appear to be in a state of uneasy awaital. Everyone is curious about what direction the economic indicators and the markets will take, how faithful the government will remain to the IMF prescription and what political climate will take hold in Turkey after August. Everyone is awaiting to see which promises the Ozal government--for which there appears to be no alternatives today--will keep and how far it will fulfill them. Everyone you talk to gives the same answer: "Let us just wait for the fall. Then we will decide our position."

In view of this general climate in business circles, the timing of the government-private sector talks to be held in Ankara tomorrow is significant. At a time when everything is arranged on the basis of "wait and see until September", what is the purpose of convening the business spokesmen in Ankara in the heat of August? Was this meeting requested by business circles at this time or did the government organize it? Was the meeting designed to catch the business circles unprepared and thus take the wind out of their complaints in order to forestall a September storm?

We do not have definite answers to these questions, but we get the impression that, as in the case of Pakdemirli's advisers, the government is attempting a maneuver to detect internal conflicts within business circles and to preempt a united reaction front against the government.

As for the question why the need was felt for such a question, the answer is clear when the concerns and the demands of business circles are juxtaposed against the concerns and the demands of the IMF.

Business circles oppose the shifting of Central Bank resources from the private sector to the Treasury and are unhappy about the fact that the money-credit policy being pursued is not as liberal as they would like it to be. The IMF, on the other hand, proposes--even insists as a precondition--that a much tighter money-credit policy be implemented.

While business circles demand that all efforts be made to reduce credit interest rates as soon as possible, the IMF wants deposit interest rates to be increased further and thus puts upward pressure on credit interest rates by raising the costs of the banks.

While business circles appear to be favoring large wage increases on the assumption that generous increases in the income of workers particularly employed in the domestic sector will have a spurring effect on domestic demand, the IMF says: "Watch wage increases."

While business circles watch with anxiety the dollar inching up to 400 Turkish liras and wonder when it will reach 500 Turkish liras, the IMF is not inclined to consider the slightest relaxation in currency exchange policies.

The only issue over which business circles and the IMF appear to have similar views is that of the State Economic Enterprises for which there are not prospects of short-term solutions.

When the government says "yes" to all IMF demands in order to insure "full congruence" with the IMF, it is not much likely that it can say "yes" to most of the demands of the business community. Consequently, it appears reasonable to assume that a government which is determined to implement the IMF recipe more faithfully will seek measures to "tackle" the business circles in advance. The response of the business circles--which, in addition to the issues we have enumerated above, are also upset with the Ozal government for its unpredictable decisions and the climate of uncertainty it has created--to this "tackle" is awaited with interest.

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CSO: 3554/300

TUSIAD REPORT OFFERS SELECTIVE CRITICISM OF OZAL POLICY

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 25 Jul 84 pp 1, 7

[Text] NEWS CENTER - The TUSIAD [Turkish Association of Industrialists and Businessmen] report, issued on the Ozal government's general economic policy, criticizes certain practices in this area, contending that the struggle with inflation will be won, not by means of money policy alone, but through the development of uncomplicated incentive systems to stabilize financial institutions and to increase productivity, investments and exports.

The TUSIAD report, entitled "Turkish Economy 84," assesses the Ozal government and past practices and stresses that Turkey is entering a critical period as to foreign debt payments in the second half of this year.

The report points out that while efforts for the transition to a parliamentary regime were in progress in 1983, the stabilization policy was relaxed and says, "The impetus to adjust to the new system was slowed as a result." In assessing 1983, the report criticizes the way in which public funds were utilized and maintains that "public funds were used to shore up a few companies, brokerages and troubled banks. Investments demonstrated no significant development."

Emphasizing that inflation soared during the period in question, it contends that "the current deficit in the balance of payments rose by \$1 billion to 2.1 billion liras and the increase in the money supply put into circulation caused the inflationary pressures appearing in the first half of 1984."

Tax Reduction, Private Investment Plunge

Noting that a real decline occurred in 1983 in fixed capital investments, the TUSIAD report states that the negative development rate in agriculture brought GNP growth down to 3.2 percent. While unemployment remained an important problem, the private-sector share in fixed-capital investments, which had been around 50 percent, dropped to 40 percent in 1983, according to the TUSIAD report.

The report indicates that the new interest policies had been inadequate and had failed to bring funds into the banks in 1983, stressing that the tax burden had dropped from 17.9 percent last year to 16.8 percent.

Financing Problem Unsolved

Noting that financing for both the private and public sectors is still a very important problem, the view expressed in the TUSIAD report is that the problem, whose importance it contends is overlooked, "is to find a remedy for the inadequate formation of funds rather than new legislation. The private sector must take advantage of opportunities to borrow on the international market." The report claims that public authorities are not sufficiently convinced as regards finding new fund resources and development of the capital market and, indicating that banks' unit costs are still too high, sending credit interest up, stresses that "the private sector, as a result, is faced with raising its bond interest rates as well."

The major factor stimulating domestic inflation is public-sector deficits, according to the report, which notes that the result is steadily rising prices on SEE [State Economic Enterprises] products and that SEE price hikes have a direct effect on inflation at the source and an indirect effect in the carry-over to the many products in which they are an input.

Remarking that "it cannot be said that the new plan goals are unrealistic," the report suggests that "to accomplish these goals, it is necessary that the government not rely on money policy alone in the struggle with inflation, that other steps to stabilize financial institutions be taken, that productivity be raised, that a more effective but less complex system of incentives for investors and exporters be devised, and that a more dynamic approach be adopted to increasing foreign capital investments."

Scoring the repeated slowdown in April and May in the export growth rate, the report notes that imaginary exportation may have been a factor in this and that the decline in worker remittances may have been the result of closing this route also. The report contends that the foreign value of the Turkish lira is more realistic in 1984 than it was in 1983. "The difference between official and market rates of exchange is smaller. It is highly likely that high tax rebates encouraged imaginary exports. For the government to approach a foreign exchange rate balance will require reducing the tax rebates and ultimately a return to international norms," it reads.

The report criticizes the designation of export firms as "large" and "other" and opposes the privileges granted to the "foremost" exporters. In assessing as wrong the decision to leave trade with COMECON countries under the supervision of these firms, the following view is expressed:

"The most important lesson to be learned from all these developments is that it is extremely harmful and risky to create so overly complex a system of export incentives. Encouraging exports under equal conditions and following a realistic foreign exchange rate would doubtless be more [word illegible: appropriate?] and would require at a later state the provision of simple, realistic opportunities and incentives for the exporting sectors which find it impossible to compete equally under the fierce conditions of competition on the international market."

The report also criticizes the high customs duties and other taxation on imports and, suggesting that this amounts to protectionism, calls for forcing domestic producers to abide by the same competitive conditions as foreign producers. While noting that import taxation is an understandable feature of state policy to obtain ready income, it is pointed out that this is a negative factor obstructing efforts of the Turkish economy to become a free economy.

Observing that 1984 is a critical year as regards foreign loan repayments, the report reads: "Foreign loans must be given the necessary importance and it must not be overlooked that the large percentage of current loans are medium-term credits."

Noting that one must expect certain negative developments in this regard in the second half of 1984, the report contends that stability cannot be come by unless new approaches are found to the current account balance of payments problem in the long run.

8349

CSO: 3554/284

MIXED RESPONSE TO EASTERN REGION DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 25 Jul 84 p 10

[Article by Nursun Erel: "Trillions Needed for Development of 27 Provinces"]

[Text] Ankara (TERCUMAN) - An investment of trillions of liras is needed to solve the problems of the 27 provinces designated priority development areas [PDA]. In these provinces, where the literacy rate is 50 percent, an average of 1 in every 10 children born dies before reaching 1 year of age and the doctor-population ratio is 1 to 10,000, there are 1,460 village schools, 3,195 village roads and 10,863 villages waiting for electricity.

According to these figures, compiled by the State Institute of Statistics and the State Planning Organization [SPO], the best opportunities for employment in these provinces, where unemployment is high, are in "agriculture" and "state" jobs. Irrigible farm land in the priority provinces comprises at most 20 percent of all farm land, while per-hectare use of credit does not exceed 2,000 liras.

The SPO report, "Public Investments in Priority Development Areas," states that these areas take only a 10.69 billion-lira share of the total investment of 31.117 billion liras. "These regions, which comprise 41.8 percent of the population, manage to receive only a 32.4-percent share of total investments. The per-capita investment figure is 899 liras in other regions, but 599 liras in these regions," it reads.

A 1982 report by the SPO notes that Southeastern Anatolia, where the priority development provinces are concentrated, is the region worst affected by drought and states that the region and Turkey would gain a great driving force agriculturally if the surface and subterranean water resources of this region were utilized to advantage.

Businessmen Comment

Meanwhile, businessmen are assessing the government's edicts on the PDA's and its studies related to these regions. Businessman Sakip Sabanci said, "They tell us, 'Oh, please do invest here.' This is not something accomplished by talking about pipe dreams of fatherland and nation."

Sabancı said, "Everybody wants a prosperous Turkey, but it will not happen by talking about it. There is not yet a climate of investment in the country. Incentives are courageous, but first the winds of investment have to blow in the country." Sabancı said:

"We think these recent measures will be effective in bringing services to the East. But a driving force is needed.

"The government is now addressing these problems in a courageous manner. We think these measures are positive in principle. But something else besides all this is needed. A climate of investment is necessary, the winds of investment have to blow in Turkey, but this has not yet happened in Turkey."

Existing Business in Trouble

Sakip Sabancı blamed the lack of a climate of investment in Turkey on "the inconsistency of government policies." First the philosophy of "Get loans, do business on credit" was touted to the firms, then the exchange-rate guarantee was discontinued and interest policy was changed, remarked Sabancı, adding, "Now business is suffering for this. There is contraction on the world market also and business is in a very difficult position because of it. Can one say there is a climate of investment in Turkey while these are the facts, when certain private-sector establishments cannot keep their existing factories operating and the state has even taken over some of them? When the state cannot look after the children it has, should it go about having more?" He added that he approved the government's policies in general and that these measures would produce results after the climate of investment was formed and the winds of investment began to blow in Turkey.

We Are Doing It

Nurettin Kocak, owner of Kutlutas Holding, said they would be working in the area with the "AGVA [expansion unknown] Poultry Industry" starting next year on large and small livestock projects. Explaining that they were working on the production of quality breeding stock in Southeast Anatolia, Kocak noted that they would institute a "contract farmer" system. Under this system, he said, young livestock would be given to the farmer, then bought back when they matured.

In connection with the edicts on investment in the PDA's, Nurettin Kocak had this to say:

"The edicts for activating the latent work force in the east are a good opportunity. They are the best decision ever made in Turkey, and very appropriate, not just for profit-making, but from the social standpoint also. Villagers are not happy when they come to the big cities. The decisions will bring development to them instead, and development in these areas will be more balanced."

We Have Projects

BORUSAN [Pipe Industry Corporation] owner Asim Kocabiyik, meanwhile, remarked that they had investment projects in the east before. Kocabiyik announced that they were starting machinery and spare parts projects for export next year. He continued:

"A social atmosphere in which experts, engineers and master craftsmen can work in these areas is needed, but does not yet exist. The problem of schools for the children of the personnel who work is another obstacle. It would be better if firms went out in groups, not individually."

A Must

Osman Boyner, owner of Altinyildiz [Textile and Garment Factories, Inc], stated that they were trying to up their present factory capacity by 50 percent and said:

"We will not launch any new investments until this is completed. But we want to utilize this opportunity in the future. Investments in the east have been made pretty attractive. It is a must, in my opinion, to go outside the developed areas vis-a-vis this attractiveness. Labor-intensive investments can be put in place rather easily in these areas."

Sarik Tara said he welcomed the decisions, adding, "We at ENKA [Construction Corporation] are not considering investments at this juncture. We therefore have no investment planned or under consideration in the incentive provinces right now."

Prime Minister: Public Sector First

Prime Minister Turgut Ozal said in a statement to ANKARA AGENCY that the state would be going into the area first, that it would be impossible for the private sector to make investments unless the public sector established the infrastructure in the region. The prime minister said, "We will make 10 percent of the public partnership fund available. Credit interest will be low. This area will be developed through the cooperation of the state, private enterprise and foreign capital."

Development Allowance for Educators

Following the encouragement of investments in the priority development areas, a "development allowance" will be given to educators at the universities and faculties located in these regions which cannot get a sufficient number of teachers.

According to a Council of Ministers' decision published in yesterday's RESMI GAZETE, the development allowance will be over and above salaries, including supplemental indicators.

According to charts accompanying the decision, a development allowance of up to 50 percent of their salaries, including supplemental indicators, will be given to teachers at the Century University in Van, Kahramanmaraş Vocational College,

Surmene School of Maritime Science, Gumushane Vocational College, Malatya Inonu University, Elazig Firat University, Diyarbakir Dicle University, Erzurum Ataturk University, Sivas Cumhuriyet University and the Cankiri, Kastamonu and Yozgat Vocational Colleges.

The development allowance rate for instructors at other universities and colleges varies between 15 percent and 25 percent depending on the degree of development in the province.

8349

CSO: 3554/284

OPPOSITION RAPS GOVERNMENT FOR HIGH INFLATION

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 13 Aug 84 p 9

[Text] Ankara--The opposition has reacted sharply to the government decision to raise interest rates. Populist Party [PP] deputy leader Engin Aydin said that the Ozal government does not have the wisdom to free itself of IMF yoke. Expressing the views of the Social Democracy Party [SODEP], Central Decision and Administrative Council member Birgen Keles interpreted the raising of the interest rates as a sign of inflationary expectations. Correct Way Party [CWP] press spokesman Mehmet Muhsinoglu charged that the Ozal crew has failed to bring the inflation rate down. Nationalist Democracy Party [NDP] leader Turgut Sunalp said that this decision is an indication of the government's failure in combatting inflation.

PP deputy leader Engin Aydin responded to the CUMHURİYET's questions as follows:

"The increase in interest rates by the government is the latest evidence that this government is incapable of developing, by its own will, an economic model that is compatible with the structure of Turkish society. They are completely under the yoke and control of the IMF. They do not have the wisdom to free themselves of this yoke and control. Rising interest rates fuel cost inflation; this is followed by higher living costs and price hikes, and the people grow poorer. Rising interest rates also discourage investments. This, in turn, gives rise to more unemployment. This issue also has a political aspect. The PP wants this government to stop turning a deaf ear to every well-meaning proposal by saying 'the people elected us; we can do whatever we like' and to try to rid itself of this narrow-minded and sterile approach as soon as possible. We want this so that at least democracy will develop in a healthy manner."

NDP leader Turgut Sunalp said in a speech at the Central Decision and Administrative Council of his party that the government decision to raise interest rates is an indication of the government's failure in combatting inflation.

Charging that higher interest rates will aggravate the imbalance in monetary policy, Sunalp said that the said decision cannot produce growth in savings deposits and that investments will come to a halt as a result of higher interest rates.

Birgen Keles, member of the SODEP Central Decision and Administrative Council, explained his party's assessment as follows:

"When setting interest rates at the beginning of 1984, the government stated that the highest interest rates were set for 3-month deposits because interest rates would fall as the inflation rate declined. During the time that has passed since then, interest rates have been raised and not reduced. This situation shows that the government's expectations of inflation have also increased. In fact, rising expectations of inflation is a natural outcome of the policy being implemented. This is what is contradictory."

CWP press spokesman Mehmet Muhsinoglu stated that answers for the questions raised by the problems stemming from the economic program "will begin to be sought in the fall." Muhsinoglu said in brief: "Our party's views on this issue were stated when interest rates were raised the previous time. By raising interest rates once again, the government has clearly admitted that the Ozal crew has failed in its bid to reduce the inflation rate and that, on the contrary, inflation is rising with full force."

9588

CSO: 3554/299

INTEREST RATES, CURRENCY LEVELS SEEN FUELING INFLATION

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 13 Aug 84 p 9

[Text] Concerns about inflation remain unabated despite promising signs in the price indexes for July. Rising rather than declining interest rates, record money supply growth rates and the prospect of payments to producers in the fall make it hard to be optimistic about inflation.

Price index figures for July appeared to confirm previous statements by government spokesmen to the effect that "prices will fall beginning in the second half of the year."

Except the cost of living index compiled by the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce [ICC], all indexes maintained by the Undersecretariat of the Treasury and Foreign Trade [UTFT] and the State Statistics Institute [SSI] agree that the pace of inflation slowed down significantly in July. The slowdown was particularly visible in wholesale prices. According to the UTFT, wholesale prices rose by only 0.5 percent in July. The SSI index, on the other hand, showed a 0.7 percent decline in wholesale prices. Thus, the two indexes which had a tenfold difference between them in June indicated similar conclusions in July.

The observed "July slowdown" in prices was expected to be crowned with government statements such as: "Did we not say so? Price hikes will slow down even further in the future." But, significantly, the government did not claim credit for the slowdown. The unexpectedly high increase in interest rates that followed this disclamation refueled concerns about inflation in the future. Since interest rates are set in accordance with current inflation rates and future expectations, the fact that they were raised by a recent decree shows that the government is also concerned that the inflation rate will not drop in the near future. Otherwise, interest rates would have been lowered.

In addition to these concerns, there are several indications that price hikes may gain momentum in the coming months. The most important of these indications is that the money emission rate has passed the 900-billion-lira mark. Despite the determination of the Ozal government to cut back the money supply, the money emission rate has been leaping by 100 billion Turkish liras each month, and it is widely believed that this will have an adverse effect on prices.

In addition to the emission rate, payments to be made to agricultural producers are also clouding the future of the prices. It is now seen as certain that the

floor price payments to be made to farmers beginning in September will push the general price level upward. Moreover, the government has on its agenda the issue of unpaid debts to contractors.

Despite the existence of these factors which may boost the inflation rate, there is considerable interest about the package of measures the government will introduce. As the money supply grows and as the promise made to the IMF to the effect that "we will not issue high-interest bonds" stands on the sidelines, it is not yet clear how the emission rate will be reduced. Meanwhile, it appears unlikely that a government which has promised the producers to pay them in full will issue "a decision to make the payments in installments."

Latest Inflation Figures

	<u>1983</u>	July <u>1984</u>	January-July <u>1984</u>
Wholesale Goods, Turkey (UTFT)	1.7	0.5	28.8
Istanbul Cost of Living Index (UTFT)	1.3	2.7	28.8
Ankara Cost of Living Index (UTFT)	1.6	1.0	29.1
Wholesale Goods, Turkey (SSI)	1.2	-0.7	33.0
Consumer Price Index, Turkey (SSI)	1.1	0.9	29.6
Istanbul Wage-Earners Cost of Living Index (ICC)	0.6	2.7	32.5

9588

CSO: 3554/299

NORTH SEA FIELDS TO PROVIDE COUNTRY 60 PERCENT MORE OIL BY 1987

Third of Country's Consumption

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Aug 84 p 1

[Article by Peter Kjelstrup]

[Text] The gas project will lead to greater oil production while at the same time 4 billion kroner will be pumped into the old Dan field and an entirely new small oil field will go into production.

Within a few years Danish oil production could meet a third of Danish oil consumption needs.

This appears from the oil production projections made by the A. P. Moller shipping firm after there has been a major expansion of the old Dan field and production is started at the new Rolf field.

This means that in 1987 Danish oil production will rise by almost 60 percent compared to current production.

Thus A. P. Moller predicts an increase of 1.2 billion tons in oil production in 1987 after 4.55 billion kroner is invested over the next few years.

At the same time oil production will rise sharply when gas production for the natural gas project really gets under way.

According to the Energy Board the Gorm, Skjold and Dan oil fields produced around 2.2 billion tons of oil last year.

The Energy Board expects this production to increase by 300,000 tons next year, mainly because of higher production at Skjold and Dan and oil coming from the Tyra gas field.

Oil from Gas Field

The gas project is of great importance for oil production.

For one thing Tyra produces a small quantity of oil along with the gas (in 1980 this amounted to 300,000 tons of oil for the year) and for another thing the Dan field could produce oil from all of its 15 wells, since there is no longer any restriction on production as a result of the ban on burning off the gas that is brought up with the oil.

The large amount of gas that came up along with the Dan oil has meant that half the Dan field's oil wells could not produce.

Now the Danish Underground Consortium has published plans to expand the Dan field with an entirely new platform city that will provide an extra 1 million tons in 1987 along with plans to build an unmanned production platform at a smaller field, Rolf, that could provide around 250,000 tons more oil a year in the first few years.

But at the same time oil production at the big Gorm oil field will decline somewhat as the field loses pressure. But all in all, if the plans work out oil production in 1987 will be close to 3.7 million tons a year.

This will give a total oil production of over 3.5 million tons starting in 1987, or over a third of the amount consumed in Denmark.

Uncertainty Regarding Natural Gas

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Aug 84 Sec III p 5

[Article by Peter Kjelstrup]

[Text] More than four times as much gas as the amount specified in the Danish natural gas project has now been found. But it is still uncertain whether it will be economically and technically possible to extract all of it.

At the moment Denmark is known to have enough oil underground to cover Danish consumption for almost 10 years. And at the same time four times as much gas has been found as DUC [Danish Underground Consortium] needs to meet its commitments to DONG [Danish Oil and Natural Gas] and the natural gas project.

This appears from a new assessment from the Energy Board which also shows that the new drilling performed in 1983 led to our now having more than twice the amount of gas reserves reported the year before.


The enormous Danish natural gas project begins officially on 1 October and involves the delivery of a total of 55 billion cubic meters of natural gas over the next 20 years from the Tyra and Roar gas fields as well as the gas that is present in the oil fields that are already in production. In these

fields a total of 69 billion cubic meters of gas that could be produced has been found. But according to the Energy Board, finds have now been made that bring the total natural gas finds in the North Sea up to 238 billion cubic meters. One cubic meter of gas is roughly the equivalent of 1 liter of oil.

Uncertainty

But it is not yet certain whether it will be economically and technically possible to produce all this gas since a final demarcation of the finds has not been made in all cases. But it is certain that there is almost twice as much gas as the amount needed by the gas project, namely 99.4 billion cubic meters.

While the amount of natural gas in the finds where a decision on production has not yet been made increased by 131 percent last year, the yields from oil drilling were considerably smaller.



Danish Oil and Gas Production in 1984

The graph shows current gas and oil production. Gas production will rise substantially when production really gets under way at the big Tyra field on 1 November. In 2 years, production from this field will have risen to 2.5 billion cubic meters a year.

Key:

1. Oil production

2. Gas production

In all the potential oil finds amounted to 122 million cubic meters or around 100 million tons. That is ten times the amount of total Danish annual consumption, 10 million tons. But over half this oil is in small fields and no decision has yet been made as to whether to develop them. However results from the development of the small Skjold oil field with an unmanned platform controlled remotely from the Gorm field have been so successful that one more oil field is slated for similar development.

This is the Midt-Rosa field where DUC has applied for permission to set up a small remote-controlled platform.

While the oil reserves could theoretically meet consumption needs for 10 years production currently lies around a quarter of annual Danish consumption. In all the Dan, Gorm and Skjold fields produced 2.52 million cubic meters of oil last year. Within the next few years this figure will rise to between 2.7 and 2.8 million cubic meters. There will also be an extra million tons of oil expected from the Dan field starting in 1987 and at least 200,000 tons from Midt-Rosa starting in 1986 as a result of new expansion plans.

The very latest finds, such as Elly and Gert, are not included in the assessment of oil and gas reserves.

Production in Dan Field Doubles

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Aug 84 Sec III p 14


[Article by Peter Kjelstrup]

[Text] Denmark's oldest and most difficult oil field will get new platforms costing 4 billion kroner with the aim of substantially increasing oil production. At the same time the gas can now be sent to the Gorm field, which alone will lead to a doubling of production at the field, which has produced oil since 1972.


The Danish Underground Consortium will now invest another 4 billion kroner in the Danish oil field that in the past has produced the most disappointments, namely the Dan field. The plan is to spend the 4 billion on 20 new production wells and three new platforms, one of them a so-called processing platform containing all that is needed in the way of electric power plant, water plant, purification equipment, residential modules and so forth. In other words there will be a whole new platform complex at the oldest Danish field, which has now produced oil for 12 years.

The massive investments that will rejuvenate the oldest Danish oil field are planned so that production can get going by the end of 1986. That is quick

work in the offshore business and will also produce welcome orders for the sector of Danish industry which otherwise would have faced the prospect that the construction of the Tyra gas field with its total of nine platforms was the culmination of activities in the Danish part of the North Sea until new finds by the new consortiums that are searching for oil in the North Sea begin to produce results, leading to the development of new fields.



The Dan field as it looks today. A separate platform is located a little to the northwest of the platform complex which has now produced oil since 1972. In a short time it will be assisted by an entirely new platform complex.



This is how the brave new world in the North Sea looks. The insert at the bottom shows the new plans for an expansion at the Dan field, which will be ready in 2 years.

Key:

- | | |
|-------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Tyra field | 7. Gorm field |
| 2. West Tyra | 8. Oil/gas |
| 3. East Tyra | 9. Skjold field |
| 4. Condensate | 10. Oil |
| 5. Denmark | 11. New Dan field project |
| 6. Oil/condensate | 12. Dan field |

An Extra 6 Million Tons

According to calculations based on extensive technical reservoir and geological studies of the structure and chalk in the field, the investments in the Dan field should provide an extra production of 6 million tons of oil in all over the next 10 years. A production that will reach its peak in the first year, which means there will be an extra million tons of oil produced in 1987.

But oil production will rise sharply at the Dan field as early as this month. A project to transport both the oil and the gas from the present wells to the Gorm field via the oil pipeline that has already been laid will mean that production can be increased from the modest 200,000 tons now being produced annually to roughly twice that amount. The problem today is that only part of the large quantities of gas that come up along with the oil can be burned off. After remodeling, some of the gas will be handled at the Gorm field from which it can be sent on to the Tyra field and be included in the Danish natural gas project or where it can be used to stimulate oil production at the Gorm field by being pumped into the ground under high pressure, thus helping to maintain the pressure and keep production up at the biggest of the oil fields.

Dan a Disappointment from the Start

The Dan field, which was discovered and developed even before the first oil crisis, was a big disappointment from the start. The potentially enormous oil field actually contains around 200 million tons of oil. Enough to cover total oil consumption in Denmark for 20 years if it could be brought to the surface. But it is estimated that only between 11 and 13 million tons can be extracted over the lifetime of the field.

A production of a half million tons of oil annually was anticipated in spite of the fact that the oil is situated in a very dense chalk layer that slows production and means that only a small part of the oil found in the field can come up.

But the chalk was even worse than they thought. It washed out continuously. And a lot of work has been done just to keep the field going. But even so, production in 1973 was all the way down to 134,000 tons a year. New platforms were built and new wells were drilled in 1976 and 1977 with the result that production again rose to half a million tons, to be precise, 509 million tons in 1977. That is the record so far.

Restrictions on burning off the gas that comes up with the oil have limited production substantially in recent years, so that last year production was only around 241,000 tons.

This production will almost double this year while the additional platforms will increase production to around 1.5 million tons annually. That is about 15 percent of the oil consumed in Denmark.

Large-Scale Test Drilling

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Aug 84 Sec III p 8

[Article by Peter Kjelstrup]

[Text] The Tyra field extracts gas from a depth of 2 kilometers from 36 holes and a total of four platforms. Two big processing plants and a railway station for the gas insure that the gas is usable and that it is sent to and from the various platform complexes and finally the 300 kilometers to shore.

Four small platforms, two located at each of the two gas cities, East Tyra and West Tyra. Those are the four platforms where the gas that will provide heat and energy for a third of Danish homes and a good part of Danish industry is brought up from where it has lain for thousands of years beneath the North Sea.

There have been 36 holes drilled from these four platforms, nine from each platform that go under the ocean floor. The holes not only go 2 km down into the earth in order to trap the 35-meter thick chalk layer that forms the Tyra field but spread out 1 1/2 km into a fan so that a circle with a total diameter of 3 km is covered by the suction pipe. Three kilometers away stand the two sister platforms with their additional nine holes each, also covering an area of 3 square kilometers. In all they cover almost the entire 35-meter deep and 3 by 6 kilometers wide surface of the field named for a Danish queen.

Two Platforms Enough

"Maersk Endeavour" and "Dan Earl" have each drilled a set of holes. Two of the Danish drilling platforms with their characteristic long legs that they can pull up under them when they move from one drilling job to another finished the complicated drilling job in which the big contract machines loomed over the smaller production platforms and practically drilled right through them 2 weeks ago. Each of them has room for 12 holes in all. Thus with the nine production wells in each platform, there is room for another three if this should prove necessary. Often this need arises because water begins running into one of the wells which thus becomes unusable and must be replaced.

Each of these 24 wells can produce 400,000 cubic meters of natural gas a day when they are in full production. This corresponds in thermal value to roughly the same number of liters of oil. Thus with the deliveries currently agreed to by DUC and DONG the 24 wells can take care of the average deliveries needed to supply the total of 2.5 million cubic meters of gas annually called for by the agreement.

Thus two of the four production platforms could be shut down altogether and the commitments made could still be met. Or one of the two "gas cities" that make up the Tyra field.

Processing

For each two production platforms there is one of the enormous processing platforms, although East Tyra is by far the larger one. This is the central gas city in the DUC empire. Gas is sent to shore from it as well as the gas-oil mixture that goes to Gorm further to the south. The central oil complex in the DUC empire which was built to handle the more fluid part of the mixtures that come up from below the ground.

For the line between what is oil and what is gas is not a sharp one. The distinction does not become firm before the various processing plants on the platforms separate and "stabilize" the various elements. This occurs in a complex system of pipes and containers and with the help of different pressures and temperatures. The processing plant is about the size of an entire refinery but also provides its own electricity and water, for example.

Both gas cities also have a platform that consists simply of a tower where all the gas can be burned off in an emergency. If something happens in the process the wells can be shut immediately. But all the gas in the system must also be taken care of. And if necessary that would be done by the incinerator towers which also have other safety functions.

Pipelines

East Tyra has one more platform than its sister 3 kilometers to the west.

This is the riser pipe platform, which could be called the railroad station of the gas complex. At the moment five pipeline connections lead from the platform down to the ocean floor. One sends the deliverable natural gas the 300 kilometers to shore where the gas processing plant in Nybro takes care of the final minor refining. Gas and the more fluid condensate from West Tyra come in in separate pipelines. Condensate from both platform complexes is sent on to the Gorm field, 16 kilometers to the south. In return, gas from the Gorm field is sent by pipeline to Tyra.

Later there will be three more pipelines. When the Dan field is expanded with another platform center a few years from now, the gas from Dan will also be connected with the main center of the gas field. And when even later the small but apparently efficient Roar gas field is developed according to plan, there will also be two pipeline connections with it.

At least that is what has been planned so far. There are many indications at the moment that even more small fields will have a direct connection to the natural gas railroad terminal when they are developed.

6578

CSO: 3613/208

MORE INVESTMENTS KEY TO ENERGY SELF-SUFFICIENCY

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French No 430, 30 Jul 84 p 37

[Statement by Michel Rolant, AFME president]

[Text] Don't play with the price of gas: public opinion, it seems is resigned to many things, but balks at the idea of having to pay a little more--20 francs, on the average, per driver per month--for automobile fuel. It does not matter, it seems, that a liter of super today costs 5.34 francs, in constant 1984 francs, which is cheaper than it was in 1960 (5.74 francs) or in 1957 (6.87 francs), in spite of two oil crises and the rise in the dollar.

Well, let us carry this sacrilege to the limit: I would go so far as to say that energy is not expensive enough in France. The majority of producers--EDF [French Electric Company], GDF [French Gas Company], coal mine operators, refiners--are losing money. The taxpayer makes up the difference. And, by selling energy below its real price, we encourage questionable uses and we discourage useful public investment.

Reducing our consumption of energy without depriving ourselves is possible. For example, between 1973 and 1983, we doubled the number of housing units equipped with central heating, but thanks to the efforts to reduce consumption--more efficient heating systems, insulation, regulation--the quantity of energy consumed barely increased. Yet, in order to obtain those results, it was necessary to encourage users to invest in order to use energy more efficiently. The rise in prices should have that effect: first, because it makes investments in energy efficiency more attractive and, second, because the additional money can be placed in a public fund, which will help finance investment. Such was the case of the special fund for major projects (second stage): as of today AFME [French Energy Control Agency] has allocated 1 billion francs to encourage investment. And this billion has led to an investment of 5.2 billion, which will allow us to save the equivalent of 370,000 tons of oil and to substitute domestic energy products for imported ones at the rate of the equivalent of 500,000 tons of oil on an annual average. The future of energy efficiency lies in investment. Investment by business--particularly those businesses engaged in transportation, which increase their competitiveness by reducing their energy costs--and where the average time for a return on energy efficiency

investment is only 2 years. Investment by individuals, by landlords and by real estate managers, which will lower their energy costs and improve the comfort of buildings. Energy efficiency does not mean constraint, it is not the economics of poverty or the management of penury, it is on the contrary a challenge to all consumers and in particular to industry.

Using less energy means loosening external constraints. In order to achieve this, we must have new and efficient equipment, reflecting a progressive industrial plant and a progressive society. The market for energy efficient equipment, equipment which is used in all sectors of the economy, is very large: markets for renewing old equipment as well as for new equipment will amount to 20 to 30 billion annually by the end of the decade. That means potentially a very profitable field of activity.

This market is far from being limited to France itself; all countries are subject to energy constraints. The products, know-how and engineering which are geared to energy efficiency are those which will be exported; that is a "vein" which our domestic industry should exploit. In order to do that, there are two indispensable assets, which up to now are still present: innovation and the will to develop energy efficient products.

Not to pursue this path and to believe once again in the myth of abundant energy at bargain prices would be a serious error for the industrial and economic future of our country.

8956

CSO: 3519/467

DEI LOSSES FROM SHORTFALL IN PRODUCTION

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 29-30 Jul 84 pp 1,4

[Article by K. Tsopolidis]

[Excerpt] The maintenance and increase of our energy dependence, and huge losses for DEI [Public Power Corporation] and our national economy, are resulting from great and inexcusable delays in five of DEI's hydroelectric works under construction.

These unacceptable delays, to which is now added the additional holdup in the Sfikia hydroelectric work which was destroyed recently by fire, are creating, beyond the immediate losses, future problems in the country's energy balance. They indicate DEI's general productive and operational shortfall, which, instead of being gradually reduced, is increasing, particularly in the sector of hydroelectric works.

In five large DEI hydroelectric works under construction--Sfikia, Asomata (on the Aliakmon River), Stratos (on the Akheloos River), Thisavros (on the Nestos River) and Piges (on the Aoos River)--with a total power of 1,000 megawatts and a total yearly production of 1,500 million kilowatt-hours (equal to the consumption of 375,000 tons of mazut a year, at a cost of 65 million dollars), the following delays are being verified: Asomata, 10 months; Sfikia (before the fire), 9 months; Stratos, 27 months; Piges, 7 months; Thisavros, 27 months.

These delays, which may become even greater, will result in DEI losing hydroelectric energy, which for the coming years will be: 1984, 280 million kilowatt-hours; 1985, 470 million kwh; 1986, 420 million kwh; 1987, 210 million kwh; 1988, 440 million kwh and 1989, 440 million kwh.

According to the most moderate estimates, DEI will have total energy losses of 2,260 million kilowatt-hours, which, to be produced, requires 565,000 tons of mazut, at a cost of 93 million dollars in exchange.

Beyond these delays, however, the additional holdup, due to fire, in the operation of the Sfikia work by one and one-half to two years--despite the energy minister's statements that the delay will be limited to six months--will result in a further loss in DEI's yearly production, on the order of 660 gwh (gigawatt-hours) of energy a year, at a cost of approximately three billion drachmas. According to the energy minister, the six-month delay in the Sfikia work will cause a loss in gigowatt-hours costing 600 million drachmas.

These losses from delays in the hydroelectric works, which will put DEI's energy balance in the red, are not the only ones. It is expected they will be increased by at least 145 kilowatt-hours of electricity a month (at a cost of 2.5 billion a year) by the year's delay in placing within the national network the Agios Dimitrios steam-electric work in Kozani, which is composed of four 300-megawatt units.

DEI is obligated to cover these large losses in its planned electricity production with additional imports of electricity; these will be particularly burdensome in terms of exchange for the national economy because of the continually increasing cost of imported energy.

9247

CSO: 3521/320

BRIEFS

GEOTHERMAL CONTRACT WITH JAPAN--A contract for installation of the first geothermal energy-producing unit, with a power of two megawatts, in our country--on the island of Milos--was signed yesterday by DEI [Public Power Corporation] and the Japanese "Mitsubishi" company, which was the lowest bidder in an international competition in which Greek companies also participated. The cost of the work will be 263 million drachmas, of which 159 million are to be converted to exchange at the time of payment. The remaining 104 million drachmas are the Greek share in constructing the unit. The unit will operate on a trial basis at the beginning and by the end of 1985 it will be put into commercial operation. Installation of the first two-megawatt geothermal electric unit on Milos will provide the necessary experience for further productive exploitation of geothermal energy in our country, and for development of the related technology so that geothermal works can be constructed in the future with greater Greek participation. DEI has plans for another geothermal-electric unit (three megawatts) to be installed on Nisyros by 1988; it will supply electricity to the greatest part of the islands of Kos, Kalymnos and Leros. Also, by 1990, installation of other geothermal-electric units (60 megawatts) on Milos is planned; at the same time, Milos will be connected with other islands in the Cyclades and, finally, with the national network, so surplus energy can be transported and oil units on these islands abolished. [Text] [Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 31 Jul 84 p 7] 9247

DETAILS ON DRAMA LIGNITE--The new lignite-bearing deposit which has been located by the Institute for Geological and Mineral Research (IGME) in the "Drama basin" amounts to 400,000 tons of inferior lignite reserves. The quantity of the reserves, which, according to IGME, may in the course of the continuing explorations in palisading the deposit prove to be greater, was confirmed yesterday by the Institute's general director, Papavasileiou. The IGME director reported that by the end of 1985 there will be a full recording of the deposit which extends to an area of 30 kilometers and is a surface deposit. This fact, it was mentioned, makes it immediately exploitable. Papavasileiou added that the lignite in the new deposit has a heating capability equal to that of Ptolemais--1,050 to 1,100 kilowatt-hours per kilo. As Papavasileiou reported, the new, important lignite-bearing deposit had been located several years ago, but now IGME's exploratory efforts have precisely pinpointed its size. The new lignite deposit's 400,000 million tons are equivalent to 42 million tons of oil. Exploitation of only 300,000 million tons of the deposit's lignite could ensure the production of 600 megawatts of electricity for 30 years. As sources from the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources reported, it is hoped that, based

on the deposit's possibilities, and as long as its exploitation is done correctly, by 1990 our energy needs can be satisfied by local sources. It is noted that our country's total lignite reserves have been estimated at about four billion tons at present. [Text] [Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 1 Aug 84 p 7] 9247

NO FUEL PRICE RISE--According to information, during yesterday's session of the "Economic Circle" under Minister of National Economy Ger. Arsenis, it was decided that the deficits in the petroleum-products account, which amounts to approximately 10 billion drachmas, will be covered by the Bank of Greece's liquid reserves. As a result, it was decided that liquid fuel prices will not be increased this year. At yesterday's meeting, a decision was also made--according to the same information--to ask the European Economic Community to extend the release--that is, forming prices freely--of the petroleum products market; this release was going to be effected--as the agreement for our country's association with the EEC provides--beginning on 1 January 1985. There was also discussion in the Economic Circle of the housing loans program which is not squaring accounts "for lack--as was discovered--of the money which loans had taken." The whole matter is being examined so some solution can be found. [Text] [Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 31 Jul 84 p 1] 9247

CSO: 3521/320

ENERGY

ICELAND

BRIEFS

POWER NEEDS MET DOMESTICALLY--Domestic energy sources provide almost three-quarters of Iceland's total national energy requirements, according to an article in the annual report of Landsvirkjun, the National Power Company. Total energy consumption in Iceland last year ran at the equivalent of 1,800,000 tons of oil, of which 44.7% was generated hydro-electrically and 27.6% by geothermal means. Imports of coal met 2.4% of the nation's energy needs, and oil 25.3%. The 475,000 tons of oil imported last year, however, provided the sole fuel source for a number of vital industries--including the operations of fishing boats and trawlers--and the article levelled a firm criticism at the authorities, who were accused of failing to formulate a clear policy on emergency oil reserves in the event of an unexpected crisis. [Text] [Reykjavik NEWS FROM ICELAND in English Aug 84 p 5]

CSO: 3600/48

ICELANDERS PRESSURE ON NORWAY CANCELS JAN MAYEN QUOTA FOR DANES

Reykjavik NEWS FROM ICELAND in English Aug 84 p 7

[Text]

Protests by the Icelandic government have led Norway, co-signatory to the 1980 accord sharing out fishing rights off Jan Mayen between the two countries, to back down completely from granting Denmark an unofficial 20,000-ton capelin concession off the Arctic island.

Iceland's protest, delivered through diplomatic channels, centred not only on the fact that negotiations were taking place with a third party without the other signatory to the Jan Mayen agreement being consulted, but also that Norway did not intend to subtract its concession to Denmark from its own quota.

Talk of a Danish quota off Jan Mayen first emerged when negotiations failed to settle the delineation of economic zones in the region. Greenland claims a 200-mile fishing zone, extending east of the median line with Jan Mayen which both Iceland and Norway have agreed upon.

It appears that Norway had decided to turn a blind eye to a Danish capelin catch of up to 20,000 tons, by not enforcing routine sea

patrolling of the waters off Jan Mayen in order to avoid incidents in the disputed area.

During the talks with Norway, Denmark's status as a negotiating party was complicated by its membership of the Common Market, which precludes the signing of agreements on fishing rights by individual nations within the E.E.C. Moreover, any case which Denmark or the Common Market countries can make out for a share in the capelin stock, which is primarily found in the Iceland zone but migrates to the Jan Mayen and Greenland areas, rests with Greenland. The country enjoys partial autonomy under the Danish crown but will be withdrawing from the Common Market at the end of this year, when it will assume responsibility for all fishing in its own waters.

Norway's formal reply to the Icelandic protests announced that no quota would be granted to a third party. In addition, Norway promised that routine patrolling would be maintained, and reiterated its desire to consult with Iceland over future developments.

CSO: 3600/48

IMPROVED COORDINATION, INCREASED ACTIVITY IN POLAR RESEARCH

Decided at Polar Conference

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 10 Aug 84 p 5

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen]

[Text] Ny Alesund, 9 August--An important Nordic scientific conference on polar research was recently concluded in Ny Alesund: a strategy for improved Nordic cooperation in polar research is taking shape. The final plan will be presented to the Nordic Council of Ministers later this year, probably during the fall. In addition, several good Nordic research programs will be organized. AFTENPOSTEN learned that Svalbard will play an important role in this activity.

At the conference in Ny Alesund, Prof Olaf I. Ronning of Trondheim University was recognized as a leader in this field. Ronning is considered responsible for initiating these conferences, which bring together experts in many fields, in 1977. The wide range of professionals represented at the conference is considered an extremely positive achievement.

This broad range of professionals was discussed by the director of the Fridtjof Nansen Institute of Polhogda, Willy Ostreng. He stated the following in a candid interview with AFTENPOSTEN: "Norway is falling behind Sweden and Denmark in arctic research! This is deplorable. Norway is a polar superpower. We are the only country with claims of sovereignty in both the north and the south.

Ostreng pointed out that this research included more than botany and biology. "The political aspects of this research must not be overlooked. What political questions must be dealt with? What points of international law are raised by polar research? These questions must be integrated into the overall scientific research in the polar regions. In a word, the problems of polar research must be faced with a comprehensive approach."

According to Willy Ostreng, these questions must be dealt with immediately. "We have now reached a point at which the social-science aspects of this research must be considered. Sweden has established an Office of Polar Research,

which will certainly include the social aspects of this research in its work. The Danes are opening an institute whose scope will go beyond Greenland. At the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, we have only two people involved in the social aspects of arctic research. We need three new positions in this area," said Willy Ostreng. "Norway is in a unique position in the field of polar research. This gives us certain obligations," he said.

Government Approves Antarctic Expedition

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Aug 84 p 3

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen]

[Text] Ny Alesund, 7 August--"It is highly gratifying," Odd Rogne, director of the Norwegian Polar Institute, told AFTENPOSTEN. This was his comment on the upcoming Norwegian expedition to the Antarctic. The government has given the green light to this expedition, which will cost 14.5 million kroner. The expedition will use one of our coast guard ships. There have been only two Norwegian expeditions to the Antarctic since 1960.

"Norway has some extremely important polar research to conduct. If we intend to assert our interests in this region, we must maintain our presence," Rogne explained.

AFTENPOSTEN spoke with director Rogne in Ny Alesund on Svalbard, where he is participating in a Nordic scientific conference on antarctic research. "The Antarctic is the least studied region in the world," said Odd Rogne, who said that the ship would leave Norway this December. The trip to the southern polar region will take about 1 month.

The research team will include two main groups--a marine section and a land-based section. Much scientific research will be conducted in areas such as marine geology, biology on land, iceberg research, geology, and topographic charting.

The expedition will probably return in early March next year after a trip to Bouvetoya, where there is a weather station that must be inspected.

The director of the Norwegian Polar Institute makes no secret of his interest in maintaining a Norwegian presence in the Antarctic. "We have not had regular expeditions to this region since 1960. Since that time, there have been only two expeditions," Odd Rogne said.

There is reason to believe, however, that the government now wants some measure of continuity in these expeditions.

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CSO: 3639/149

COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF GROUND WATER POLLUTION BEGINS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Aug 84 Sec III p 3

[Text] Several hundred experts will discuss how the disturbing pollution of streams and ground water by industry, agriculture and urban communities can be brought under control.

More than 200 experts on water quality will examine the increasing nitrogen pollution of streams and ground water by industry and agriculture.

This will be done at a big conference in Nyborg Strand from 6 to 8 August, the eighth conference on hydrology. About 50 speeches are scheduled for presentation at the conference.

Danish water quality in the 1980's is the topic of a speech by the chairman of the Nordic Hydrological Society, Erling Rordam, who is head of water resources for the Environmental Agency.

Other speeches will deal with international water supply problems. This problem will be discussed by the director of the Meteorological Institute, A. Wiin-Nielsen, former secretary general of WMO, the World Meteorology Organization under the United Nations.

Pollution of the ground water has increased alarmingly in the postwar years. While in the first years after the war only 4 mg of nitrates were found per liter of ground water the pollution level is now three times as high and still rising.

It is not primarily industry that causes pollution, although dump pollution exists in many places and has led to a number of problems in Denmark alone in the last few years.

The Cheminova chemical plant has provided numerous examples of this. But the real problem stems from the use of artificial fertilizer by farmers. Thus many experts favor regulation of farmers' fertilization of their fields based on the conviction that too much fertilizer is being used.

The acidification of our natural environment will also be discussed at the conference. Thus a number of speeches from Sweden and Finland will deal with precipitation and evaporation and discuss models and methods for measuring these factors.

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CSO: 3613/209

FIRE DESTROYS LARGE WOODED AREA RESOURCES

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 28 Jul 84 p5

[Excerpts] The destruction of Greek flora is continuing. Whatever had remained of our country's forest wealth is being burned in great pieces. In the month of July alone, 95,000 stremmas of forests and other vegetation were burned, while the total area incinerated since the beginning of the year amounts to approximately 106,000 stremmas. This area is to be added to the 203,000 stremmas of forests and other vegetation burned last year and the 248,000 stremmas incinerated in 1982, and these are to be added to the more than two million stremmas of flora destroyed by fire in 1970 to 1981 (to go back only this far).

Most of the fires destroying our flora were caused by either arson or serious carelessness, which is tantamount to duplicity.

Nevertheless, no case of arson, from duplicity or carelessness, has reached the courts. No service could ever discover and turn over to the law the perpetrators or organizers of even a few of the many arsons.

But also on a practical level, none of the sensible anti-fire measures which have been recommended--"by reason of knowledge"--for two years now by the Foresters' Association have been implemented.

The destruction of Greek flora, a priceless and indispensable factor in the whole ecological balance, has progressed to the point that dangers of serious ill-natured alterations in the natural environment and in our country's whole biosphere are being created. Nevertheless, it seems we all--government and private citizens, those governing and those governed--are remaining inactive and weak facing a phenomenon of such vital importance.

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CSO: 3521/321

END